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silvia cavasola
coNTemPoRaRy miGRaTioNs, a veRy PluRal PheNomeNoN
It is profoundly wrong to talk about contemporary migration – as in singular form
– as the phenomenon is inherently complex, heterogeneous and plural. Notwith-
standing a general oversimplifying tendency after political and mediatic convenience,
contemporary migrations represent an authentic puzzle of experiences that is as dis-
parate as humanity itself. 
There are many migrations: some of them feared and obstructed, while others
cheered and even encouraged by individuals and institutions of different political
colours. Whereas on the one side stands the group of the so called “mass” migrants,
on the other one can find the relatively small but dynamic group of the “exception-
ally mobile” (Favell, 2008, 35), that is, young and well-educated individuals who move
across borders carrying along a high social capital and a strong determination to prop-
erly invest it. Exceptionally mobile is the group of individuals whose stories are of-
ten told and admired in the newspaper pages of Southern European countries, where
the number of “highly skilled” feeing to countries that have better resources to ab-
sorb their talents has been on the rise for over a decade. It is the individuals who the
European Union is counting on to create an ever more unite, integrated and com-
petitive Europe in the current context of the global competition for talent (OECD, 2008;
Cavasola and Vitiello, 2014).
It is interesting that the two groups, that of the “mass” migrants and of the ex-
ceptionally mobile, often happen to be attracted by and intersect in the very same cities.
European capitals such as London, Bruxelles, Paris and Amsterdam have in the past
years attracted rising numbers of both categories, as each of the two plays an equal-
ly important role in the modern mobility panorama. On the one hand, exceptional-
ly mobile parents, whose life in the City allows a better job and career perspectives,
create a high demand for the mass migrant nannies taking care of their kids while
they are out properly investing their talents. The services offered by mass migrant
nannies (or cleaners, or waiters), on the other hand, become an indispensable com-
modity which valued and prized much higher in cities that attract exceptionally mo-
bile individuals than in cities that do not.
The substantial differences between the migratory trajectories of exceptional-
ly mobile individuals and the other migrants is mirrored in the language that is com-
monly used to refer to these two categories of transnational individuals – both in aca-
demic and popular discourse. High skilled migration is most often referred to as “mo-
bility”, whereas only mass migration is conceived as migration tout court. Similar-
ly, qualitative literature on the topic shows that it is very uncommon for highly skilled
movers to be conceived as migrants: they most often tend to be described by them-
selves and others as “expats”. 
Still, the sometimes-sharp differences between the two groups should not lead
to believe that these are internally homogeneous. The group of mass (low-skilled)
migrants, for example, tends to be characterized by heavy internal stratification de-
pending on as language, ethnicity, gender, religious beliefs etc., each of which might
make some migrants more unwanted than others. Similarly, reasons for migration also
represent a powerful factor impacting the individual migratory experiences and
chances for integration. For example, whether migration is a forced or a free choice
of the individual tends to have a huge impact on individual migratory trajectories,
as people fleeing wars, life threats, persecutions or severe political, social and eco-
nomic instability normally face different challenges and opportunities in host coun-
tries than those having moved with the intention of ameliorating their socio-economic
position. 
Also highly skilled movers might differ substantially depending on the reasons
and circumstances of their migration. One just needs to think for example about the
difference between “first-movers” and “followers”, that is, typically, the ones that move
after a study or career opportunity on the one hand, and those who follow their part-
ner or family member in their enterprise. The difference that characterizes not only
the migratory life experiences of these two, but also the respective formal status, rights
and legal treatments they have access to, is in some cases very sharp. Furthermore,
also among highly skilled movers, some are more wanted than others, and variations
in the job offer in the destination country according to the specific economic, social
and political instances determines which profiles are most welcome.
If on the one hand it appears that migration is as old as humanity (Massey et al.
2005), one the other hand it is also a fact that modernity and technology have pro-
foundly changed the way migration happens. Global communications and modern
markets transactions have caused twenty-first century migrations to lose their tra-
ditional “one way” character – with migrants being either pushed out and pulled in
of countries – and to become much more “multi-directional”. Indeed, with the en-
largement of the horizons for participation, identification and care beyond, below
and across the national level (Isin, 2002; Sassen, 2008), contemporary migrations
have come to be characterised by a large extent of transnationalism. 
To be sure, many of the seasonal workers of post-WW2 experienced some “mul-
ti-directionality” in their going back and forth between home and host countries. How-
ever, those kinds of “circular” migratory trajectories were generally linked to spe-
cific work arrangements and limited to a specific group of people. What is new to
contemporary migrations, is indeed the extent of the transnational component which,
featuring large number of migrants maintaining frequent and intense exchanges with
both home and host countries, has turned these mobile individuals into new key ac-
tors onto the global arena. 
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The transnational component of contemporary migrations is so important that it
has transformed not only the way people migrate, but also the relationship between
the individual and the State. While in the past national citizenship used to be the prin-
cipal form of membership to a polity – with individuals being either “members” or “aliens”
– contemporary migrations have complicated the membership panorama by opening
up possibilities for schemes of differential inclusion (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2012). 
At the EU level, the long-term residence status (LTRs) represents an emblematic
example of such differential membership, since it gives non-citizens “rights (…) as near
as possible to those enjoyed by citizens” (EC, 2003, n.109), while keeping them from
exercising key citizenship rights (ex. vote). Created to ensure that immigrants’ access
to the right of family life and other fundamental rights, the LTRs (also known as res-
ident-alien status – for paradoxical that it may sound), has de facto contributed to the
setting up of a new membership system that is parallel to that of national citizenship.
The emergence of differential membership statuses within national borders has
been taken by some as the sign of the emergence of a post-national kind of membership
(Sosyal, 1994). In a world in which States have ceased to be the only sources for the
protection of individual rights, and new and multiple sites of claim-making have
emerged above and beyond national boundaries (Sassen, 2008), some indeed argue
that for immigrants nowadays “the real prize is residency, not citizenship” (Spiro,
2008). According to these authors, the new avenues for membership that have opened
up for migrants have opened the way for a serious devaluation of the institution of
national citizenship, turning it into an anachronistic legal status with no real prac-
tical utility.
Still, other authors argue that the rights that the new systems of “differential in-
clusion” provides to immigrant look more like generous concessions than actual rights
(Joppke, 2010; Morris, 2002). In this view, the status of contemporary immigrants
resembles that of some sort of privileged non-citizens (Hammar, 1989) who, while
being welcomed as contributors to the productive system, are kept away from all rel-
evant decision-making activities. What these authors seems to suggest, overall, is that
being born on the lucky side of the “birthright lottery” (Shachar, 2009), and there-
fore holding the “right” citizenship status, still retains its traditional power to determine
individual life chances. 
Whether the the emergence of new, non-national forms of membership have
strengthened immigrants position in host societies, or rather accrued their precar-
iousness, is beyond the scope of this short introduction. However, it is important to
underline, as some do (Mezzadra and Ricciardi, 2013), that membership is not just
about a formal “status”, with its included package of rights, but also and very im-
portantly about acts, practices and – why not – individual feelings. The idea is that
the weight of national citizenship cannot be measured exclusively in terms of the pack-
age of rights that it gives access to, as that represents only part of an institution which
also carried deep implications at the social and cultural level. This is indeed a key
point, as contemporary migrations are characterized not only by the struggle for rights,
but also by the social and cultural challenges related to immigrant integration in host
countries.
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How does the current puzzle of memberships impact contemporary societies’ abil-
ity to integrate newcomers? Are we all becoming “universal persons” (Hansen, 2009,
as cited in Joppke, 2010, 84), whose lives and solidarities are no longer shaped by
the boarders we happen to live in? Are twenty-first century migrants pioneers of this
change? While not hoping to provide answers to all these questions, this volume of-
fers some insights on the complexity that characterises the contemporary migrato-
ry panorama. At a time at which migration hits the very top of international politi-
cal agendas, and has converted into a central concern not only of States, but also of
families, enterprises and overall public opinion, this work collects contributions of
a number of scholars observing various aspects of the phenomenon under the mag-
nifying lens of political science and sociology. 
Rome (LUISS)/Madrid, 20 December 2016.
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a Few quesTioNs To FRame The issue
1. How was multiculturalism born? At the beginning it was a “melting pot”. It was
deemed the historical foundation of American integration and it represented the so-
ciety as a big mortar where all the cultural differences and origins were "crushed"
and assimilated, just like in the famous “pesto” condiment. Many believed it repre-
sented a model for all multi-ethnic societies. But, over time, the “pesto” went bad.
And so multiculturalism imposed itself as the new recipe to feed Western societies
searching for effective and painless solutions to exit the cultural impasse of their iso-
lated identity. Not a “pesto” sauce anymore, but a mixed and colored salad, where
different ingredients coexist in the same bowl while still maintaining their individ-
ual taste (Joppke, 2004).
2. How can it be defined? Multiculturalism is a type of political management strat-
egy for inter-ethnic relations that focuses in giving value and respecting every dif-
ference in customs, culture, religion or ethnicity. Born in the mid-eighties, multi-
culturalism progressively affirmed itself in the United States and then Europe, but
its origins date back to at least twenty years earlier, when in the western society the
matter of “difference” started to make its way into society in the context of the tra-
ditional culture advocated in the '68 and with the ethnic and nationalistic claims of
the Decolonization. The intensifying of the migratory phenomena and of the glob-
alization led to the definitive passage between a culture of uniqueness to the cult of
difference (Kymlicka, 2010).
3. What are the main aspects of the concept of multiculturalism? The historian Fran-
cis Fukuyama proposed a version of “good multiculturalism”: a corporate multicul-
turalism or “globalization multiculturalism” of sorts that by applying the economic
approach used by multinational corporation focuses on the spreading of the same con-
sumptions between the various life-styles of different social, ethnic and cultural groups
(Fukuyama, 2007). Of the opposite opinion is the Italian political expert Mr. Giovanni
Sartori, who believes that multiculturalism is “bad” by definition because it consid-
ers society as built on separate and segregated identities. Sartori counters the Amer-
ican “recipe” proposed by Fukuyama by proposing the “European model of pluralism
and tolerance” understood as the “correct management of diversities” (Sartori, 2000).
immiGRaTioN aNd mulTiculTuRalism
RaFFaele de mucci
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4. What does the European Union do to improve the integration of immigrants? In-
tegration of third country nationals is a European Union financing program for the
promotion of integration of non-EU citizens in the European Union member states.
Its goal is to promote the dialog in civil society, develop integration models, and spread
and give value to best practices in the field of integration. The contribution made
available to the 25 member states in the year 2005 was 5 million Euros. In parallel,
the EU has finalized an “Handbook on integration” to spread the best practices fine-
tuned in Europe to governments and public authorities dealing with integration: train-
ing, political participation and inter-religious dialog. The manual was presented at
the end of 2004 and it highlights the need to involve unions, foreigners' associations
and employers.
5. Which are the integration models in Europe? Europe oscillates between two types
of integration models: the French “assimilation” one and the English “multicultur-
al” one. Both are struggling. The first focused on integration founded on an exchange:
granting of “republican citizenship” in exchange for a privatization of the religious
creed (for example, the prohibition to wear a veil in French schools). The British mul-
ticultural policy allowed public spaces to ethnic or religious minorities under the form
of “collective rights” to support the harmonious coexistence between different groups
within a liberal and tolerant society. How did they fail? In France, many French cit-
izens of second and third generation (children and grand-children of those North-
African immigrants that a few decades ago chose to become French citizens) refused
the old style “assimilation” under the republican concept, and the riots in the sub-
urbs in November 2003 or the protests against the 2004 that forbid the use of the
Islamic veil in schools were clear examples of this. In Great Britain, vast sectors of
the Islamic world refused to recognize themselves in the laws of the country, form-
ing a hostile and isolated minority. The British public opinion could be summarized
in a sentence of the African-Arabic Labor Party’s member Trevor Phillips, Chairman
of the Committee for the equality of the races published in an article of the Times
magazine: «Multiculturalism does not mean that everyone can do whatever he wants
in the name of his own culture» (Vertovec, Wessendorf, 2010).
whaT kiNd aNd how much mulTiculTuRalism
Let’s look at the following figure to understand the effective size of the problem through
comparisons. 
The countries were evaluated based on an official affirmation of multiculturalism:
multiculturalism in school curriculum; inclusion of representation/ethnic sensitiv-
ity in public and media licenses; exemptions from dress codes in public law; accep-
tance of double citizenship; financing of ethnic organizations to support cultural ac-
tivities; funding for bilingual and mother tongue education; and affirmative action
for immigrant groups. 
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Figure 1. Multiculturalism Policy Index Scores for Selected Countries, 1980-2010.
Notes: The absence of a bar for a particular year indicates a score of zero on the multiculturalism
policy index for the country that year. Source: Multiculturalism Policy Index. Accessed September
2011 (Available Online).
This type is similar to those of researchers using alternative measures, such as the
one created by Ruud Koopmans and colleagues in 2005 or built by the Migrant In-
tegration Policy index (MIPEX). The evaluations drawn indicate that, despite Chan-
cellor Merkel’s promotion of the principles of multiculturalism, Germany is not a coun-
try that practices strong multicultural policies. Indeed, Denmark, France, Germany,
Norway and Switzerland are among the least multicultural among all the countries
among those assessed, although Germany over time has adopted a greater number
of policies inspired by multiculturalism. Belgium, New Zealand, United Kingdom,
and the United States rank as moderate multicultural countries, while Canada and
Australia sit at the top rank, having adopted the widest array of multicultural poli-
cies. In many of the analyzed countries, we find an increase in the number of mul-
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ticultural policies over time. Sweden’s multicultural policies in 1980 and 2000 can
be classified as modest, for example, but by 2010 they were more widespread and
significant (Koopmans, 2010). Spain and Portugal, countries with international mi-
gration flows of very little relevance in 1980 and correspondingly very weak in mul-
ticultural policies, have moved to a moderate level of multicultural policy in the de-
velopments of the migration dynamics starting from 2010. This suggests that the real
policy in many countries has been affected by moving towards greater respect for the
values of pluralism, despite widespread political rhetoric around the perception of
diversity issues. Naturally, political developments are a moving target. While the gen-
eral trend is towards a greater range of multicultural policies in most Western coun-
tries, some nations, like the United States, have not experienced any considerable
change in national multiculturalism. Holland and Italy both had the lowest scores
on the MCP index in 2010 and in 2000. It is unclear at this time, however, if this is
the beginning of a downward trend for multicultural policies, or whether it is to be
considered an abnormal datum (Bloemraad, 2006).
mulTiculTuRalism, PluRalism, aNd immiGRaTioN
How much do multiculturalism, social cohesion and the integration of immigrants
have to do with the policies on multiculturalism? The promotion of pluralism and
respect towards diversity stand in conflict with social cohesion and with the integration
of immigrants, or is multiculturalism a path towards incorporation? The topics brought
forth by the theorists of multiculturalism suggest that, recognizing and respecting
the culture of minorities, the members of these communities will feel closer and more
involved in the political system that hosts them. The critics say instead that an ex-
cessive emphasis on diversity exacerbates the differences, undermines a collective
identity and hinders shared political projects – from supporting the armed forces,
social benefits, and redistribution policies. They also fear that by promoting multi-
culturalism, the minorities are left to segregate in communities where they conduct
“parallel lives”, delaying the learning of the language of the country’s official lan-
guage, hindering the economy and weakening social ties and, therefore, the social
capital with individuals belonging to different ethnic enclaves. 
The empirical research on these issues was limited, and the conclusions on the
socio-economic consequences of multiculturalism are rather varied. Certain stud-
ies state that facilitating ethnic closure – an assumed consequence of multicultural
policies – prevents or discourages immigrants from competing in the broader labor
market, which leads to a higher rate of unemployment and social assistance (Bar-
ry, 2002). Others state that it is precisely the maintenance of social capital, ethnic
and cultural, which facilitates educational attainment by the second-generation im-
migrants’ children and the second-generation natives (Koopmans et al., 2005). The
truth could be somewhere in the middle of these two positions, as it is not clear what
mechanisms link multiculturalism to outcomes such as employment or education.
The policies of the job market, educational institutions, and economic integration
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in the social state structures likely have a higher influence in respect to the multi-
culturalism policies. 
As for the civic and political integration of immigrants, the consequences of mul-
ticulturalism are more pronounced. Immigrants who live in countries that adopt mul-
ticultural policies are more likely to engage in non-violent political activities toward
their country of residence rather than their homeland, making more likely a rela-
tionship of trust with the government. Ultimately, the less widespread are the chances
of discrimination based on their belonging of a “different” group, the higher the like-
lihood of becoming citizens of the host country. According to the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 89% of immigrants of working
age (15-64-year-old), that lived in multicultural Canada at least ten years, had adopt-
ed the Canadian citizenship in 2007 – a high amount in respect to the acquisition
of citizenship of the same population of immigrants in countries with few multicultural
policies. From 2007, only 57% of immigrants in Denmark obtained Danish citizen-
ship, 47% in France became French citizens, and 37% in Germany obtained German
citizenship. To the extent that we consider citizenship an indicator of civic “incor-
poration” and an additional factor facilitating integration, political or economic ac-
cess to the job market, we find greater integration in countries with more developed
multicultural policies. 
However, although multiculturalism reinforces civic ties and the immigrants’ sense
of inclusion, the negative perception of multiculturalism by some politicians and right-
wing parties in various European countries is based on the fact that some people are
very alarmed on the issues regarding diversity. Seven out of nine studies carried out
on the anti-immigrant behaviors monitored in the course of time, the researchers
found stable or increasingly negative attitudes towards immigrants, especially in West-
ern Europe, while only two studies document more positive trends. The distinction
between the various meanings of multiculturalism becomes important in order to
understand the potentially different answers that the social majority of a country pro-
vides to ethnic minorities in that society and how the government deals with this di-
versity. However, much of this opposition reflects concerns about “demographic mul-
ticulturalism”, namely the growing pluralism in Western societies caused by immi-
gration. Thus, even the politicians in multicultural countries manifest some ideas con-
trary to the idea of multiculturalism (Parekh, 2006).
coNclusioNs
Can multicultural policies improve the potential negative reactions from members
of the majority group to demographic multiculturalism, or could such policies ex-
acerbate them? Very few research studies examine this issue with concrete data. A
study on 19 western nations found that, in societies are grappling with the problems
arising from migration, multicultural policies seem to mitigate or reverse the ero-
sion of confidence or political participation that may occur in relation to situations
of demographic change (Kesler, Bloemraad, 2010). In contrast, another study found
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that residents of countries with the most multicultural policies might move towards
more exclusionary schemes of national identity in the past decade (Bloemraad, 2011).
These findings raise difficult questions for academics and policymakers on how to
evaluate the preferences of the majority against the interests of minorities. The ma-
jority of the population could express limited support for policies for the recognition
of political minorities – an attitude that some politicians support and encourage. Ev-
idence shows that multiculturalism probably facilitates the socio-political integra-
tion of immigrants and contributes to their sense of civic inclusion. It is possible that,
in the medium and long term, the effects of multicultural policies could also bene-
fit the majority of residents. If the integration of minorities is facilitated, greater civic
and political cohesion could follow and prevent the negative consequences that can
result from feelings of exclusion and marginalization among minority residents. Giv-
en the tone of the current debates and the political climate in some countries, how-
ever, the maintenance and expansion of multicultural policies could be in danger. 
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sTRaNGeRs aRe NoT uNwelcome iN aTheNs 
«Western Europe’s current demographic decline is likely to reiterate [...] the prob-
lem of workforce shortage. In the first quarter of the next century those who were
born in 1945-1965 will be in age of retirement. By then, both the old-young ra-
tio and the level of dependency of the European over-65 will reach their peak.
The huge number of over-65 will still act on the market as buyers, thanks to the
means provided by the social security, whether public or private. The problem
will not lie in the demand, but in the supply of productive workforce. That be-
ing the case, immigration will act as a balancing force, a sort of “natural graft”
encouraged by productive enterprises and families. As immigrants will inevitably
come from civilizations different from ours, the problem of the preservation of
our system of values will be more pressing and will increasingly draw the pub-
lic attention [...]» (Baffi, 2013, pp. 90-91).
These undoubtedly forward-looking words were written on La Stampa by Paolo Baf-
fi – economist, banker, and former Governor of Banca d’Italia – on 3 June 1989. Baf-
fi was denouncing the mistakes made in the South-East of the World, both in foreign
policy and economy, and was warning the highest representatives of Western econ-
omy, finance, and politics of «their duty to encourage the virtuous potentialities of
the East, the South, and the West, in order to level global inequalities» (ibid.). As an
advocate of liberalism – formerly he had been pupil of Lionel Robbins at the London
School of Economics, and collaborator of Luigi Einaudi at Banca d’Italia1 – he believed
that, in attempting to preserve of our system of values, the problem did not reside
in the open society itself but rather in the illiberal policies promoted by its enemies,
convinced that those thorny issues could be solved by restricting individual liberties.
According to Karl Popper, the Open Society is «not really a sort of State nor a form
of government, but rather a way in which the coexistence between human beings
is built on individual liberty, non-violence, protection of minorities, and defence of
the weak» (Antiseri, 2002, p. 139). The most eﬀective instance of such conception
The oPeN socieTy aNd The sTRaNGeR
simoNa Fallocco
1. Cf. Infantino (2013, pp. 39 & ff.).
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of human society is Fifth-century-BC Athens: here, no individual was bearer of the
whole truth, since all held diﬀerent worldviews and cooperate with each other2.
In Pericles’ funeral speech, as reported in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian
War, we read:
«Our constitution is called a democracy because power is in the hands not of a
minority but of the whole people. [...] And, just as our political life is free and
open, so is our day-to-day life in our relations with each other. We do not get into
a state with our next-door neighbor if he enjoys himself in his own way, nor do
we give him the kind of black looks which, though they do no real harm, still do
hurt people’s feelings. We are free and tolerant in our private lives; but in pub-
lic affairs we keep to the law. It is because it commands our deep respect. We give
our obedience to those whom we put in positions of authority, and we obey the
laws themselves, especially those which are for the protection of the oppressed,
and those unwritten laws which it is an acknowledged shame to break» (Thucy-
dides, II, 37-40).
In Athens, economic liberty, political development, and the growth of knowledge are
tightly bound between each other: economic liberty, especially carried out through
trade, requires a relationship with the Other (and the Different), the exploration of
new ideas and beliefs, openness to commerce, and critical discussion, while it can only
take place within a pluralistic, democratic society; and for a society to be open, there
cannot be a single philosophical or religious creed imposed upon others as a legitimising
source of political power. In Athens the free circulations of goods went along with the
free circulation of individuals. Strangers permanently residing in the polis (called met-
ics) constituted a fundamental part of society, regardless of their wealth: they par-
ticipated in commercial activities and could be admitted to phratries, while they were
granted the rights – which required a special public decree – to own estates, attend
the agora, stand judgment, observe the cult of their native gods, serve in the army,
etc. By granting these liberties to all strangers, Athenian society was acknowledging
their contribution to the development of the polis, whereas an exclusivist or autarchic
policy would have slowed down, if not impeded, Athens’ expansive growth3.
Clearly enough, what made possible such peaceful coexistence of diﬀerent philo-
sophical worldviews and religious creeds within the same community was the rule
of law – establishing as it did the legitimate boundaries of individual action – and
particularly the principle of equality before the law, which facilitated the circulation
of knowledge, and granted all citizens the full liberty to pursue their own ends4.
Ever since Solon’s reform, which took place in the Sixth century b C., Athenian
2. Another example of the sort is given by Middle-Age Toledo, where christians, jews, and mus-
lims could leave in peace without having to renounce to their traditions. Cf. Menocal (2009).
3. Cf. in this regard Thompson (1949), where it is observed that the Solonian constitution was
meant to encourage immigration as a solution to Athenian insufficient workforce.
4. Cf. Infantino (1999, pp. 28-51).
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institutional history consisted in the constant growth of a normative environment
favourable to social cooperation. We may thus agree with Benjamin Constant, who
claimed that among all ancient states the Athenian polis is the closest to modern state,
whose liberty «must consist of peaceful enjoyment and private independence» (Con-
stant, 1819).
Conversely, Sparta is the clearest example of the “liberty of ancients”, epitomized
by the collective and direct exercise of an illimited and all-embracing sovereignty,
to which all is subject and individual independence is sacriﬁced. There could be no
liberty outside the political community. Accordingly, Sparta must be considered a
“closed” society: «All private actions were submitted to a severe surveillance. No im-
portance was given to individual independence, neither in relation to opinions, nor
to labor, nor, above all, to religion. The right to choose one’s own religious aﬃlia-
tion [...] would have seemed to the ancients a crime and a sacrilege» (ivi). Tribal-
istic in character and ruled by a rigidly disciplined military caste (i.e. the Spartiates),
Sparta refused to trade with foreign countries, fearing that imported goods could
introduce new requests and new ideas; and, for the very same reason, Spartiates care-
fully watched over foreign visitors and frequently banished undesirable strangers5.
In the long run, such inclination toward isolation and autarchy prevented, despite
Sparta’s military success, any economic, political or cultural growth, which could
only have been granted by freeing individual energies.
Any closure to the Other and the Diﬀerent is a missed opportunity which acts like
a boomerang, impoverishing society under all respects. In the next paragraphs we
will see what follows from the above considerations, with regard to the social ﬁg-
ure of the “stranger” and especially to the problem of mass migrations.
socioloGical RePReseNTaTioNs oF The sTRaNGeR
The etymology of the word “stranger” is quite straightforward: it probably comes from
the ancient French word “estrangier”, derived in turn from Latin “extraneous”, i.e.
“coming from outside”, “foreigner”. Moreover, Latin preposition “extra” corresponds
to Greek preposition εξ, which we find in the word ξένος, with which ancient re-
ferred to “those who do not belong in a community”.
Since the beginnings of sociological thought, and especially in the ﬁrst half of
the Twentieth century, the stranger has been described as a marginal, borderline ﬁg-
ure6. According to Georg Simmel, who conceived it as the “form” of the sociology
of groups, the stranger is part of the group (ingroup) without having a real mem-
bership (outgroup); the stranger is the very embodiment of ambivalence, of the bound-
ary, of the frontier. The stranger is the emblem of a new “constellation” of human
beings, simultaneously including the dimension of nearness and that of distance: «The
stranger is thus being discussed here, not in the sense often touched upon in the past,
5. Cf. Rostovcev (1926).
6. Cf. Tabboni (1990, 2006) and Pollini-Scidà (2002).
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as the wanderer who comes today and goes tomorrow, but rather as the person who
comes today and stays tomorrow. He is, so to speak, the potential wanderer: although
he has not moved on, he has not quite overcome the freedom of coming and going.
He is ﬁxed within a particular spatial group [...]. But his position in this group is de-
termined, essentially, by the fact that he has not belonged to it from the beginning,
that he imports qualities into it, which do not and cannot stem from the group itself»
(Simmel, 1950, p. 402). More speciﬁcally, the stranger is not seen as an essential-
ly positive element: coming from a distant place, in fact, the stranger forces us to con-
front with the new and the diﬀerent, and to redeﬁne the limits both physical and sym-
bolic of the group and the individual who belongs in the group, thus eliciting anx-
iety, fear, and a sense of uncertainty.
Obviously enough, as this ﬁgure establishes some relationship with the members
of an integrated group, there can be no “stranger” without a group that considers
itself as such while perceiving the newcome as extraneous: «The stranger is close to
us, insofar as we feel between him and ourselves common features of a national, so-
cial, occupational, or generally human, nature. He is far from us, insofar as these com-
mon features extend beyond him or us, and connect us only because they connect
a great many people» (ivi, p. 406). The social and relational condition of being a
stranger is thus connected to the very concept of extraneity: from this point of view
the relationship is asymmetrical, taking place on the territory where the group re-
sides. And it can turn into a source of conﬂict in «all cases in which it is precisely gen-
eral attributes, felt to be speciﬁcally and purely human, that are disallowed to the
other. But “stranger”, here, has no positive meaning; the relation to the stranger is
a non-relation; the stranger is not considered a member of the group itself. Thus he
is close and distant at the same time, as is characteristic of relations founded only
on generally human commonness. But between nearness and distance, there aris-
es a speciﬁc tension when the consciousness that only the quite general is common,
stresses that which is not common» (ivi, p. 407).
Inﬂuenced by Simmel’s reﬂections, the so-called “sociology of the stranger” would
later focus on the role of the stranger as expression of traits which are diﬀerent from
those of the established group. The ﬁgure of the stranger is thus outlined as follows:
an immigrant endlessly divided between two cultures, suspended between two worlds
and belonging to both identities at the same time.
Later on, the school of Chicago would develop an analysis of the stranger as a
social phenomenon emerging from modern migrations toward metropolitan areas.
In particular, William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, in their early twentieth-cen-
tury work on Polish farmers in Europe and America, explored the condition of in-
certitude and social disorientation of immigrants moving to a new environment, char-
acterized by behavioural models and values diﬀerent from theirs and to which they
ﬁnd it hard to adapt7. Robert E. Park stressed even more the condition of marginal-
7. Znaniecki will return on the subject in a 1931 essay dedicated to the concept of “extraneity”,
in so far as it is connected to the figure of the stranger and source of conflict between the in-
tegrated group and the stranger. Cf. Cipollini (2002, pp. 19 & ff.).
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ity experienced by migrants as soon as they came in contact with the new society8.
Thus he described the “marginal man” as an individual permanently in crisis, hang-
ing in the balance between two cultures none of which he seems able to choose. But
he is also a symbol of emancipation – as he severs his bonds with old norms and tra-
ditions – of secularisation, and individualism; he is reﬂective and self-aware, cos-
mopolitan, freer and thus potentially an actor of change9. If, however, he does not
succeed in driving change, he can then provoke conﬂicts. The risk he is constantly
running is that of ending up being even more marginalized, or eliciting aggressive
and racist reactions against those features that apparently cannot be assimilated –
e.g. somatic traits, language, religion. It thus emerges that predisposition toward iden-
tity crises which is frequent among members of highly diﬀerentiated societies.
The ﬁgure of the stranger as migrant has also been analyzed by Austrian soci-
ologist Alfred Schütz. It was Schütz who explored the typical situations in which a
stranger need interpret the cultural models (the “thinking as usual”) of the social
group he is joining. To the stranger, «the cultural pattern of the approached group
does not have the authority of a tested system of recipes [...]. To the stranger the cul-
tural pattern of his home group continues to be the outcome of an unbroken historical
development and an element of his personal biography, which for this very reason
has been and still is the unquestioned scheme of reference for his “relatively natu-
ral conception of the world”» (Schütz, 1944, p. 502). Yet, in approaching a group,
the stranger «has to “translate” its terms into terms of the cultural pattern of his home,
provided that, within the latter, interpretive equivalents exist at all. If they exist, the
translated terms may be understood and remembered; they can be recognized by
occurrence; they are at hand but not in hand. Yet, even then, it is obvious that the
stranger cannot assume that his interpretation of the new cultural pattern coincides
with that current with the members of the in-group. On the contrary, he has to reck-
on with fundamental discrepancies in seeing things and handling situations. [...] In
other words, the cultural pattern of the approached group is to the stranger not a
shelter but a ﬁeld of adventure, not a matter of course but a questionable topic, not
an instrument for disentangling problematic situations but a problematic situation
itself and one hard to master» (ivi, pp. 504, 506). A problematic situation that could
trigger a hard and lengthy process of rebuilding of one’s identity, of assimilation, but
also of strenuous defence of that very identity, of distinction potentially leading to
discrimination.
8. Cf. Thomas and Znaniecki (1968) and Park (1928). It may be also added that some years be-
fore the “marginal” stranger had been one of the typical figures described (in his Materialien
zu einer Soziologie des Fremden, 1925) by Roberto Michels, starting from the conditions of
psychological membership and extraneity that connect the stranger, respectively, to the coun-
try of origin and that of destination. Beside the “marginal” stranger, Michels also focused on
the “integrated” stranger, the “divided” stranger, and the “excluded” stranger. Cf. Cipollini
(2002: 10 & ff.).
9. On the stranger as propeller of change, although with special focus on capitalistic en-
trepreneurship, see the fundamental early-twentieth-century contribution of Werner Som-
bart (1967).
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It was precisely in these terms that the relationship between the the “au-
tochthonous” and the “outsiders” was explored by Norbert Elias, who stressed how
the main problem with linguistic, cultural, and racial diﬀerences is their evident asym-
metry in favour of the autochthonous: on the one hand, in fact, the social and hu-
man capital of the strangers is always at risk of not being fully integrated; on the oth-
er, the autochthonous may perceive the immigrants as a threat, and react by erect-
ing emotional barriers (e.g. they are dirty, contagious, dangerous, etc.) which fur-
ther stigmatize and isolate the immigrants10. Group stygma is thus much more eﬀective
than any overtly discriminatory or racist policy, since «the objects of the attack are
unable to hit back because, though personally innocent of the accusations or re-
proaches, they cannot discard, not even in their own mind, the identiﬁcation with
the stigmatised group» (Elias-Scotson, 1994, p. 102). There follows a sort of descent
into the netherworld, as «this internalisation by the socially inferior group of the dis-
paraging belief of the superior group as part of their own conscience and self-image
powerfully reinforces the superiority and the rule of the established group» (ivi, p.
159); and this makes it even more diﬃcult to achieve a balanced and peaceful co-
existence between the two groups.
The growth of migratory movements which occurred in the late decades, and the
consequent escalating perception of the cultural diﬀerences between the West and
the so-called “south of the world”, led sociologists to pay even more attention to the
social ﬁgure of the stranger. According to Zygmunt Bauman, we live in an age of glob-
al (and globalized) uncertainty, characterized by such tremendous economic, social,
and cultural transformations that have destabilized the framework which in the past
help build the essential perspectives of one’s own existence. Here, postmodern
strangers should be seen as «indispensable signposts on the itinerary with no plan
or direction – they must be as many and as protean as the successive and parallel in-
carnations of identity in the never ending search for itself» (Bauman, 1997, p. 30).
In other words, they give us the chance to experiment new ways of living together,
to enrich our social existence by confronting diversity. And yet, as the dominant trait
of postmodern society is uncertainty, the diversity of which the postmodern
stranger is bearer can be perceived, more than in the past, as a threat to one’s own
beliefs and convictions. These risks can be met in two ways: the ﬁrst consists in dras-
tically reducing or eliminating altogether the “unexpected” and unpredictable ele-
ment of the stranger’s behaviour; the other consists in putting at some distance that
condition of contingency and unpredictability, in the attempt to make it irrelevant11.
In brief, either the established group create the conditions for integration and/or as-
similation of diversity within their own standards, or they implement forms of ex-
10. On the prejudice accompanying the encounter with the “outsider”, cf. Wood (1934), which
focuses on the “abyss of solitude” characterizing the condition of the stranger, judged as he
is not by his unique individuality, but by his extraneity to a predefined group which perceives
itself in an ephemeral and undifferentiated way, and where disapproving (if not overtly hos-
tile) attitudes, opinions, and feelings prevail.
11. Cf. Bauman (1995).
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clusion – sometimes entirely unprecedented (from neglect to indiﬀerence, under the
delusion of removing a threat by simpling ignoring it) – aimed no longer at preserving
the identity and the integrity of the group, but that of the individual. 
In modern society, focused as it is on individual needs, systemic contradictions
– despite being social products – are often perceived on a personal level, as private
experiences which individuals, isolated in their “home-sanctuaries”, have to face alone.
As if the uncertainties regarding one’s own safety, the diﬃdence about the future,
and the lack of trust toward people and institutions, make each individual respon-
sible for the future. In this sense the problem of personal safety becomes crucial, as
the stranger (i.e. the immigrant) stands by deﬁnition for what is diﬀerent, uncertain,
and unpredictable, acting as a visible and tangible mirror of the precariousness of
the well-being of citizens.
Safety is one of the fundamental necessities of citizens, encompassing that set
of material conditions, perceptions and representations – both individual and col-
lective – which protect the individual from all that can jeopardize his physical integrity
and that of his beloved ones, his property, and his way of living. In contemporary so-
ciety, however, safety is not a condition to protect, but to realize altogether, which
can only happen by acting on the way citizens build their sense of safety within their
social networks, and by actively providing protection and shelter to those in need.
What is still unclear, and represents one the most salient issue in current debates
on immigration, is whether these solutions must be provided by respecting or by sac-
riﬁcing the liberty of individuals (on both sides) and of the whole community.
immiGRaTioN as a “NaTuRal GRaFT”
To those who think that the problem of safety is to be met politically, by limiting per-
sonal liberties, it should be reminded that liberty is not simply a political issue. Hu-
man beings “have to” be free because of their ignorance and fallibility.
The condition of “anthropological ignorance” – i.e. «the necessary and irreme-
diable ignorance on everyone’s part of most the particular facts which determine the
actions of all the several members of human society» (Hayek, 1973, vol. I, p. 19) –
and the “postulate of scarcity”, according to which «our physical existence and the
satisfaction of our most ideal needs are everywhere confronted with the quantita-
tive limits and the qualitative inadequacy of the necessary external means» (Weber,
2011, p. 64), are the fundamental premises (epistemological and economic, re-
spectively) of social cooperation. If human beings were infallible and omniscient, and
if they could rely on unlimited resources, they would always realise their projects
successfully and in full autonomy. Conversely, their limited knowledge and the scarci-
ty of the available resources force them to seek for other people’s cooperation. Re-
lying on free social cooperation means to employ our knowledge in an endless pro-
cess of discovery and exploration of the unknown, correcting possible mistakes, putting
under constant scrutiny our ideas, projects, and solutions to problems. There can be
no cooperation without critical discussion. By acknowledging our ignorance and fal-
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libility we are “forced” to live with tolerance, to accept confrontation, to facilitate
the coexistence between diﬀerent cultures and social statuses. More to the point, to
rely on social cooperation means believing in free market and democracy. The mar-
ket is in fact nothing else than a system of independent, decentralized decisions com-
peting between each other, within an economy based on the division of labour, ex-
changing goods to meet their reciprocal demand12. This system, by protecting and
allocating private property, and propelling free venture and the spontaneous
mechanism of supply and demand, set the conditions for a pluralistic and democratic
society. And yet, the soul of democracy is not only pluralistic but also competitive:
conﬂicts between the parts may occur, but they are always between rivals, not en-
emies. In other words, democracy postulates a pluralistic arrangement of the com-
munity where private interests are not subversive but constitutive of the general in-
terest. Democratic society is thus “polytheistic” as it welcomes a plurality of values,
worldviews, and political ideas, and the conﬂict that may originate from such plu-
ralism always occurs under general and abstract “rules of just conduct” (Hayek, 1973).
The improvement of our standard of living is thus critically dependent on the exis-
tence of a normative and institutional framework which protects individual liberty
by means of rules that deﬁne the boundaries of liberty itself.
Our very safety, too, depends on the rule of law. As Adam Ferguson wrote in 1792:
«It is under just restraint only that every person is safe, and cannot be invaded, ei-
ther in the freedom of his person, his property, or innocent action. If any one were
unrestrained, and might do what he pleased, to the same extent also every one else
must be exposed to suﬀer whatever the free man of this description were inclined
to inﬂict; and the very usurpation of the most outrageous» (Ferguson, 1792, pp .458-
459). Thus, the problem of peaceful coexistence with the Other is to be solved by
emphasising not the right “actions” – often judged emotionally following the daily
newscast – but the right “rules”13. Not traditions, race, skin colour, but only rules bind
together society, ensuring peaceful coexistence between individuals. Only under the
rule of law there can be protection of one’s own identity and values.
Immigration, correlated as it is with man’s endless desire for a better future, has
always existed in the history of mankind. Historically, migratory ﬂows have been more
frequently directed toward countries where capitalism and democracy are more de-
veloped. This is not surprising: property rights and the market lead to economic de-
velopment, democracy leads to political development, and critical discussion allows
us to expand our knowledge and ability to solve problems. These institutions are ben-
eﬁcial to all mankind14.
12. For a more extensive analysis of the issue cf. Fallocco (2014).
13. On the importance of rules over actions, David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40)
is still unsurpassed. Cf. Hume (2000).
14. Against the anti-capitalistic prejudice of those who claim that the market can solely gener-
ate exploitation and inequality, cf. Hayek (1954). Here, with the support of data, it is shown
how industrial revolution and capitalism did in fact improve the standard of living of the work-
ing class. Cf. also Hayek (1993).
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Conversely, be denying rights, closing borders, and erecting barriers, we would
condemn the poorer regions of the world to an ever worse future, and the richer part
to an impoverishment which is not only economical but also cultural and moral. Putting
safety issues aside, in the attempt to keep an high standard of living for their citizens,
western countries have been recently dealing with an increasing ﬂow of immigrants,
often seen as competing with the autochthonous for jobs and welfare. Nor does the
politicization of the issue help ﬁnd a solution, making even more diﬃcult to imple-
ment forward-looking policies and of wider scope. 
Clearly enough, an intelligent migratory policy would beneﬁt enormously the
economy of western societies, which are witnessing a constant increase of the av-
erage age of the population. For instance, it would help restore full workforce in de-
clining sectors, and it would sustain public social security.
As rightly put by Baﬃ in the opening quote of this paper, immigration could rep-
resent “a balancing force, a sort of natural graft”, while being also a valuable op-
portunity for our cultural growth. Unfortunately, the policies that are currently be-
ing implemented are conceived to meet only short-period needs.
In conclusion, until we get rid of prejudices and stereotypes, the topical element
of ambivalence, identiﬁed by sociology in the strangers’ attitude towards society (their
being at the same time close and distant, outside and inside the social system) will
continue to belong to our society, which will be condemned to this “suspension”, against
its own interest, between an instinctive suspicion and timid openings.
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iNTRoducTioN
The definition and management of European frontiers has historically been a com-
plex exercise in geopolitical terms. Certainly, the main scenario over the last
decade has been one in which the Euro-Mediterranean frontier has been subjected
to pressure from repeated so-called “migration emergencies”. This cross-border geopo-
litical situation hinges in particular on the role of those countries situated in loca-
tions that are geographically most favourable for crossing borders. It is difficult to
assess the extent to which the recurrent migration crises may be attributed to ex-
ogenous factors such as failed states, military and civil conflicts, economic collapse
or environmental disasters, or endogenous ones such as border control, management
of migration flows, integration policies or stagnant economies in the host countries.
The increase in migration flows over recent years is certainly quite exceptional when
compared to the average rate of arrivals during the previous decade, but one can-
not help but question whether it is so exceptional as to justify the sequence of uni-
lateral actions to reinforce national border controls carried out by several European
countries in recent months. In other words, the question is whether the present geopo-
litical impasse on the Mediterranean borders of Europe is simply a migration crisis
in the narrowest sense or whether it is a result of a “crisis of policy”.
The principal objective pursued by European politics over the last decade has ba-
sically been to conﬁne undesired migration movements to the fringes of Europe as
far as possible, directly in countries outside Europe, or else in the Member States sit-
uated along what has now become a common border. This has been carried out both
by the stipulation of a dense network of cooperation agreements with countries out-
side Europe and by the reinforcement of the rules of the so-called “Dublin System”,
in place since 1997, which places the burden of providing shelter to asylum seekers
on the country of ﬁrst arrival. This type of model was unsustainable from both the
judicial and the geopolitical points of view, and signs of the crisis it has caused have
been obvious for several years now. The dramatic humanitarian situation that has
been created as much on the borders with countries outside the Schengen Agree-
ment as on the internal borders between EU states, as well as in the many migrant
centres of various diﬀerent kinds, clearly expresses the sense of the inadequacy of
the European political response to the present crisis. 
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The BuildiNG oF euRoPe BeTweeN New GeoPoliTical aReas 
aNd GRaduaTed FReedom oF movemeNT
The arduous evolution of the European Union as a key transnational geopolitical fig-
ure is taking place in parallel with a complex redefinition of the policies of Member
States with regard to their frontiers, along their new and shared external borders.
Many commentators believe that this development is exemplified above all by their
policies on the control of external borders; others see the creation of the Schengen
area, with the establishment of shared external borders, as the foundation of a dif-
ferent type of European citizenship, constructed on a new definition of belonging
and of difference. At any rate, the creation of Schengen as an area of freedom, se-
curity and justice would appear to replicate at a continental level the same geopo-
litical dynamics produced by the creation and transformation of national spaces: a
new transnational political and socio-economic unit is being created, which is at the
same time marking out a boundary line that defines the rights of belonging. 
In modern geopolitical theory, borders are habitually described as lines of sep-
aration between diﬀerent sovereign political entities. They are seen as force ﬁelds
where contrasting geopolitical factors interact with each other in search of a ﬁnal
equilibrium constructed around a territorial demarcation of diﬀerent spheres of in-
ﬂuence (Agnew, 1999). In this context, the new geopolitical unit that is the Nation
State, being an expression of a particularistic perspective, has attributed a special
and exclusive signiﬁcance to the “territorialisation of identity and the conferring of
identity on territories” (Encel, Thual, 2004), and has contributed to the reshaping
of countries’ concepts of frontiers and borders from a modern perspective. In the mod-
ern geopolitical imagination, the border appears as a line or barrier that identiﬁes
and protects national sovereignty from the outside, functioning as an institutional
system attributed with prevalently politico-military functions.
On the basis of this model, the business of controlling borders is managed ex-
clusively by national authorities and is generally the responsibility of the security forces.
It is no coincidence that the areas in the immediate vicinity of the borders, more tech-
nically deﬁned as frontiers15, have often taken shape as places with strong military
defences, fully equipped with strategic infrastructure aimed at protecting the integrity
and independence of the national territory (Kolossov, 2005). Alongside this strict-
ly military function, a further dimension in border control has been developing since
15. For many experts in the field of Political Geography, the concepts of “boundary”, as a line of
separation, and “frontier”, as a space for politico-spatial encounter and the superimposition
of political powers, have well-established different meanings. However, in this article the two
terms will be treated as synonymous, as tends to be the case in most present-day debate. Along-
side the concepts of boundary and frontier as a means for the spatialisation of political pow-
er, the idea of “border” has also emerged as a tool for the social segmentation and stratifi-
cation that has led to the practice of bordering. That is, a process of production and repro-
duction of borders regardless of their geographical situation, for the spatial creation of seg-
regation, exclusion and restriction of mobility.
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the end of the 19th Century, linked to the need to keep movements that are perceived
as undesirable, in that they threaten public order or the national economy, at a dis-
tance from national territory. 
Schengen has certainly been a very signiﬁcant development in the recent history
of the re-allocation of European borders, a stage that could be seen as having a cer-
tain continuity in the line of events that have been crucial in the territorial stabilization
of Europe16. However, as has been opportunely pointed out (Walters, 2002), the im-
plicit geopolitics of Schengen do not correlate with wars and conﬂicts between the
great powers, ﬁghting to ensure their own hegemony in Europe. Behind the creation
of this European space as an area of liberty, security and justice, there is a process
moving towards rendering internal borders increasingly less signiﬁcant and conse-
quently towards regional integration. At the same time, however, the de-securitization
of political and socio-economic borders within Europe has in some ways created a
parallel reinforcement of the border police (Campesi, 2015), who are called upon
to control the movement of the so-called “irregular” transnational players. 
In other words, the liberalization of borders does not automatically produce a
spatiality that is free from hegemonies, powers and controls. On the contrary, Schen-
gen is the embodiment of a complex hierarchical politico-economic spatiality con-
structed around a network of communications and circulation, that develops
diﬀerent rights to movement and graduated degrees of possibility for crossing bor-
ders through the European region. So this tension between the impetus towards the
liberalization of borders, deriving from the geo-economic imperatives of global cap-
italism, and the apparent counterthrust towards the closing and protection of bor-
ders, deriving from the geopolitics of global insecurity, is producing a new regime
for management of mobility in which freedom and security, rather than opposing
each other, actually support each other (Chalﬁn, 2012). 
Recent international events however, above all in terms of migration, have bad-
ly shaken the vision of a uniﬁed European area and the protection of its borders, bring-
ing the European Union to an impasse, stuck half way between the responsibilities
of its respective Member States and those of the European institutions themselves.
A complex tangle has ensued that has produced serious consequences for national
and pan-European security concerning two fundamental aspects: the management
of Europe’s external borders – illegal traﬃcking, irregular migration ﬂows and ter-
rorism – and reception procedures for those seeking international protection. 
Two contrasting and opposing visions and needs have thus arisen: the safeguard
of the European area and the protection of national interests. On the one hand, Eu-
ropean integration has led to the elimination of internal barriers within the Euro-
pean Union, transcending political, social and economic borders. Freedom of
movement is fundamental to the vision of a Europe without barriers and the con-
struction of a European community and identity. On the other hand, from an in-
tergovernmental perspective, territorial security necessarily prevails on the freedom
16. Westphalia 1648, Vienna 1815, Berlin 1878, Versailles 1918, Potsdam 1945, Berlin 1989.
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of movement; States have the right and the duty to exercise their territorial
sovereignty though control of their borders and management of migration ﬂows and
it is this control that has recently led to the creation of both tangible and intangible
barriers. 
So what should have been guaranteed through the Schengen-Frontex combination,
that is, the joint arrangement consisting of freedom of movement within a territo-
ry and control of its external borders, has not functioned as in the case of the clas-
sic Nation-States. More speciﬁcally, the Schengen Agreement focuses particularly on
a pact of mutual trust and solidarity between Member States that has led to the abo-
lition of barriers and controls along its internal borders; for all intents and purpos-
es external borders have been “moved” to coincide almost entirely with those of the
whole Schengen area. This implies that every single country, particularly those sit-
uated along the area’s external frontier, assumes responsibility for the control of the
Schengen borders in the interests of the other Member States to ensure the highest
levels of internal security. This fundamental commitment implies the ability – and
the trust of the other countries – to control borders (airport borders, land borders
and maritime borders) and to cooperate with all relative State and supranational ac-
tors.
The explicit and implicit implications of the Schengen Agreement comprise a va-
riety of positive elements, but also and above all many weaknesses. By allowing the
free movement of people within its Member States, Schengen has radically changed
the political geography of mobility and individual State migration policies have ac-
quired a previously unheard of supranational dimension (Giordano, 2015). The se-
curity and management of Schengen borders in airports is relatively straightforward,
as for example in Austria; land and maritime borders under signiﬁcant migratory
pressure are, however, much harder to control, as is the case with Poland and Italy
respectively (Giordano 2016b). At the same time, checks at internal national bor-
ders have gradually been abolished, providing foreign immigrants with the same ad-
vantages as EU citizens, whether they be regular or illegal (Morehouse, Blomﬁeld,
2011).
Essentially, the Schengen Agreement has given rise to a contradiction in terms
that lies at the heart of Europe: on the one hand the Agreement claimed to estab-
lish a supranational border for the ﬁrst time in the history of Europe; on the other,
it handed the onus of managing that border to a limited number of States, those bor-
dering with extra-EU countries who also had to assume responsibility for the iden-
tiﬁcation and repatriation of irregular migrants from Third Countries.
What is more, the setting up of Frontex, a European agency that was to be in-
creasingly endowed with supranational functions, led to the emergence of what is
to all intents and purposes an explicit challenge to one of the cornerstones of national
sovereignty: control of the external borders, traditionally the domain of the Nation
State, which would now be managed in partnership with agents from other nations.
This dovetailing of political functions in a way that is not yet suﬃciently consistent
- in the absence of a genuine European policy on immigration and in the presence
of other causes of geopolitical, environmental and ﬁnancial origins (Giordano, 2014),
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not forgetting the heavy inﬂuence of national egoisms - has contributed to the fail-
ure of the European Union Asylum policy and the creation of genuine personal and
social exclusion zones.
walls, BaRRieRs aNd exclusioN zoNes
Truth be told, EU States have always considered immigration an exclusively national
responsibility and have therefore failed to put the provisions of the Schengen Agree-
ment into practice in the application of the Convention. This same legislation did not
stop at the straightforward abolition of borders, instead it stipulated a set of com-
pensatory measures to stop the freedom of movement from transforming itself into
an open invitation for illegal trafficking of goods or people. In fact, in this case ar-
ticle 17 of the Schengen Agreement speaks clearly: “with regard to the movement
of persons, the Parties shall endeavour to abolish checks at common borders and trans-
fer them to their external borders. To that end they shall endeavour first to harmonise,
where necessary, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions concerning the
prohibitions and restrictions on which the checks are based and to take complementary
measures to safeguard internal security and prevent illegal immigration by nation-
als of States that are not members of the European Communities”. Although some
level of uniformity exists today in certain areas of the Schengen acquis, there is still
a lack of consistency in the protection of external borders that represents a weak-
ness in the system, as well as threatening the security of its internal borders. This
has produced an increase in mistrust between Member States and therefore the re-
instatement of controls within the area. 
Even more worrying than the escalation of border controls within the Schengen
area is the construction of walls, barriers and fences along borders between EU coun-
tries, an authentic step back in time that was not thought possible after the decades
of free movement that have brought so many beneﬁts to European States. The Eight-
ies ended with a Europe proud to have dismantled the Berlin Wall, yet this barrier was
an exit border designed to stop Eastern Germans from emigrating to the West; the
government of East Germany forced citizens to remain within its own territory, re-
stricting their freedom of movement. Today’s walls are entry borders, that is, they are
intended to stop unwanted people from entering the country, such as those born in
unfortunately poor countries or persecuted in various ways by their governments. 
This is particularly true in Eastern Europe where more and more anti-immigration
barriers are being erected. For the ﬁrst time since before the Second World War, an
area once known as “the time bomb of Europe” is again marked by militarised bor-
ders. Hungary has recently ﬁnished building a wall along the border with Serbia, while
both Bulgaria and Greece have erected analogous barriers along their respective bor-
ders with Turkey and Macedonia has done the same along the border with Greece.
The one objective that all these States share is to stop illegal immigrants from en-
tering their own national territories. In reality, it also involves decisions made in or-
der to combat the growing electoral success of anti-immigration parties such as Gold-
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en Dawn in Greece and, on the other side of the Channel, Nigel Farage’s Ukip, whose
main platform in support of Brexit was, in fact, the aversion to immigrants, although
this time from the European Union. 
Macedonia, one of the ﬁrst stages on the so-called “Balkan route”, has also be-
gun to erect a barrier along its border with Greece to block entry to all migrants ex-
cept those from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, three war-torn countries whose citizens
have a better chance of being oﬀered refugee status once they have entered Europe.
At the moment, the barrier consists of a metal fence topped with barbed wire. This
situation has ended up causing a humanitarian crisis in Greece, especially in the small
village of Idomeni in the municipality of Paionia in Greek Macedonia, which un-
willingly found itself to be another key geographic location for migrations, like Lampe-
dusa. Idomeni is a border village just a few metres from the barrier, with a long his-
tory of migration and a population of about one hundred and ﬁfty inhabitants - most
of whom are elderly since the young people have emigrated. It became a focus for
world news partly because its inhabitants responded to the crisis by oﬀering help and
support, even though the population had shot up from one hundred and ﬁfty to over
ten thousand. This small village was, in eﬀect, transformed into a large refugee camp,
oﬀering shelter to more and more people every day as they sought to cross the bor-
der to the north. By March 2016, however, the situation had become unsustainable,
with the refugee camp housing ten times more migrants than its actual capacity al-
lowed. In May 2016, the Greek police began dismantling the Idomeni refugee camp.
The refugees, who were living in the camp in very precarious conditions according
to humanitarian organisations, were moved to reception camps in the north of the
country.
At this point, we need to ask ourselves what motivates States to build barriers,
returning to times of closure and opposition that have historically led to tragedy. As
transit countries that do not represent the ﬁnal destination of those migrating, gov-
ernments often claim they are not able to sustain the cost of reception procedures.
In each of these countries however, it is evident that the pressure exercised by anti-
immigration movements represented in parliaments have become the thorn in the
side of governments who are thus forced to respond. Clearly, statistics tell us that walls
help prevent migrants trying to cross borders at speciﬁc points, sometimes reduc-
ing their number drastically. However, rather than stopping migration waves, they
simply deviate them towards other less controlled or harder to control borders. Re-
cent research shows that the construction or strengthening of walls will not change
or interrupt the ﬂows. What counts are the reasons that lie behind the decision to
depart: new wars, revolts, famine and the worsening of unfavourable climactic con-
ditions determine the scale of migration (Giordano, 2013). 
What emerges from most studies and research and that weighs more heavily than
any other consideration, is the European Union’s basic evasion of the issue. Let it be
clear: this is due to the existence of many diﬀerent and in some cases contrasting na-
tional policies, as well as the national resistance of European States guided by gov-
ernments afraid of antagonising their electorates. It is also clear that no single Eu-
ropean electorate sharing the same objectives exists and that Nation States respond
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to the requests of their own populations, thus creating walls, trenches and barriers
between their territories.
But the issue of areas of personal and social exclusion within European territo-
ry is no less complicated. These refer to the various forms of containment and con-
trol of asylum seekers and migrants in general: reception centres, centres for asylum
seekers, centres for identiﬁcation and deportation, “hotspot” centres etc. In reality
these are by and large case studies of administrative detention. The history of the ad-
ministrative detention of foreigners diﬀers widely from country to country and this
has had a profound eﬀect on how the judicial and social sciences have regarded the
institution. In the United States and Britain, its roots extend far back in time and this
has clearly fostered a tendency to consider administrative detention as an instrument
of ordinary administration that does not need to be hedged around with speciﬁc guar-
antees (Wilsher, 2012). In these countries, the term “detention” is used in the oﬃ-
cial lexicon without any qualms, while the management of the migrant centres has
been largely inspired by the model of common law prisons. It is only recently that ad-
ministrative detention of foreigners has begun to attract the attention of human rights
activists and social scientists, who see in them a further sign of the expansion of pow-
ers of penal control in the era of mass incarceration (Bosworth, Turnbull, 2014). 
In continental Europe, the history of the administrative detention of immigrants
is much more recent, however. Right from the start, the judicial and social sciences
have denounced the legal scandal that this represents, forcing governments to em-
phasize the humanitarian nature of the migrant centres that were being opened (Fish-
er, Clémence, 2010). It is not by chance that the oﬃcial lexis in countries such as
France, Italy and Spain avoids the mention of the word “detention”, preferring eu-
phemisms such as “retention”, “reception” and “internment”. In response, the political
and academic debate often refers to the creation of new “immigration lagers”, to em-
phasize the contrast between the principles of the rule of law and the administra-
tive detention of foreigners. This interpretation has also been legitimized at a the-
oretical level, where people have not been slow to compare the migrant centres with
concentration camps. Many consider the “camps” of our own times to be places in
which the principles of the rule of law have been suspended and where the excep-
tion becomes the rule. 
All this ﬁts in another criticality: the Common Asylum Policy in the EU. Facts
demonstrate that over the last decade the rules set by the Dublin Regulation for a
Common Asylum Policy in the EU exist on a purely formal level as the basis for an
informal and tacit compromise between Mediterranean and Northern European States.
Despite restrictions established by Dublin, the Mediterranean European States are
substantially alone in having taken on the costly onus of receiving and guarantee-
ing initial assistance to asylum seekers, while maintaining a lax approach to those
who refuse to register themselves because they wish to formally apply for asylum in
Northern Europe. 
This game of do ut des holds few advantages for either side and only persists be-
cause it is unanimously considered the lesser evil in comparison to the only possi-
ble alternative: a real common asylum policy. In brief, the EU states have preferred
40 miGRaTioN movemeNTs, TeRRiToRial BoRdeRs aNd Places oF exclusioN
to adopt an ineﬃcient, badly performing system, rather than concede their respec-
tive national competences in this ﬁeld. This evidently defective system puts the ex-
istence of a common good such as the freedom of movement at serious risk. Guar-
anteed by the Schengen Agreement, this system was feasible as long as the number
of new arrivals to Europe remained at least manageable if not low. It began to show
dangerous shortcomings after 2011, under the gusts of the perfect storm sparked by
the Arab Spring (Giordano, 2011) and the break out of war in Syria that has upset
the entire geopolitical equilibrium of the Southern shores of the Mediterranean, un-
leashing the most serious refugee crisis in Europe since the post war period of the
Second World War (Tsourdi, De Bruycker, 2015).
The geopolitical situation has however considerably worsened over recent
years. The south-eastern shore of the Mediterranean leaves us few reasons to be cheer-
ful. While Tunisia guides its own democratic experiment among fears and shocks,
Libya is in a state of total disintegration. Egypt is resigned to the repressions of Al
Sisi, while Syria has sunk into another year of civil war. Post-coup Turkey seems to
be in decisive disagreement with the United States and the EU, while Lebanon ﬂoun-
ders under the weight of all its refugees. The Mediterranean is burning and there is
no partner on the horizon to bring down the temperature. 
This has also led to diﬃculties in setting up cooperation frameworks with neigh-
bouring countries outside the EU, who should become increasingly involved in what
has been deﬁned the external dimension of migration policies or the “extra-terri-
torialisation of control”, from the Agreement with Turkey to the more recent Italian
proposal known as the Migration Compact. 
coNclusioN
A phenomenon such as migration - a structural problem rather than an emergency,
which we will be dealing with for many years to come - which has assumed global
proportions, clearly requires a multi-disciplinary approach. Of all the different pos-
sible disciplines, the geographical-political, and in particular geopolitical approach
- considering the migration issue within the context of a specific geographical area
- opens up new perspectives for dealing with this worrying phenomenon in a rational
way. The Mediterranean, with its forty-six thousand kilometres of coast and 450 mil-
lion people living on its shores, may – in fact, should – be considered a very impor-
tant area in geopolitical terms for the whole of Europe, and one in which the migration
phenomenon of our times needs to be reconsidered, so that a suitable arrangement
may be found. 
Those making political decisions should have at heart the shared geopolitical in-
terests of the countries that they govern, which, whether they like it or not, consti-
tute a shared space rather than particularistic spaces. The various bilateral agree-
ments aimed at containing the migration problem are not succeeding in their in-
tentions, despite the goodwill that inspires them, because they express a basic am-
biguity; an ambiguity that consists in the fact that the European drafters of agree-
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ments do not have a clear European geopolitical awareness. The creation of this new
European borderscape called upon to govern diﬀerent mobility regimes is a perfect
case study for investigating frontiers beyond the classic perspective of modern po-
litical and legal theory. 
Instead, the border barriers that have been announced or constructed symbol-
ize the political decisions of the EU Member States, willing to multiply and distribute
borders throughout European territory in their attempt to limit or block the move-
ments by means of frontiers, rather than considering opening up humanitarian cor-
ridors. Such decisions may be criticized not only from the humanitarian point of view,
but also as being myopic and short-term from a geopolitical perspective. A more for-
ward-looking vision might contemplate the comprehensive rethinking of the Dublin
system, for example, and above all a diﬀerent approach to the functioning and pur-
pose of the migrant centres, which in one aspect represent places of exclusion for
the person and places of humanitarian tragedy, and in another simply repeat the same
old story to European citizens through the media, that the migration phenomenon
is solely responsible for the socio-economic crisis in Europe.
People certainly have the right not only to refuge but also to mobility, and pos-
sibly also to the pursuit of their own hopes and expectations. And similarly, coun-
tries have a duty to control their own territory and to safeguard the well-being of their
societies. In a world that is demographically shifting its centres and peripheries (Gior-
dano, 2016a), and in a Europe that is surrounded by areas that are in crisis geopo-
litically, and where the European countries are largely languishing in economic stag-
nation and demographic slumps (Dumont, 2009), the challenge posed by these mi-
grations presents both risks and opportunities at the same time. Only if the Euro-
pean countries face up to reality with a more united and continental vision on pop-
ulation issues, and one that is not limited to the short-term, will they be able to adopt
the right measures to contain the ﬂows within acceptable limits, to regulate them
with humanity, to manage them without too much confusion, to make them more
proﬁtable for the host countries and the countries of origin, and ﬁnally, to protect
their own territorial and social boundaries.
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The decision to leave your home country and establish your life somewhere else is
a complex one, in which personal and psychological reasons, economic and politi-
cal factors, information and preferences as well and sheer luck all play a comple-
mentary role. For this very reason the study of migratory processes tends to be a mul-
tidisciplinary enterprise, in which economists, sociologists, antropologists have a say
(Jansen 1969). It is also a historically and geographically changing phenomenon,
from the fordist-immigrations of the last centuries to the high-skilled mobility of con-
temporary knowledge workers. 
In literature, there are three main models of assessing drivers for immigration:
(1) network-driven models, in which cultural similarities, historical aﬃnities and the
existence of a large group of migrants attract new ﬂows of migration; (2) econom-
ic-driven migration, in which is the diﬀerence in expected salary or other econom-
ic variables, such as GDP, median income and employment opportunities attract mi-
grants to their new country of residence (Sjaastad 1962); (3) and welfare-driven mod-
els, according to which more generous welfare state tend to attract more immigrants
(Borjas 1999). While all these hypotheses are well established in literature, it is most-
ly the latter that gains prominence in public debates, often overemphasizing its rel-
evance. 
In this work we want to analyze the question of what drives immigration in the
framework of neo-institutionalism, namely the theory that focuses on the way insti-
tutions, meant as “humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic, and
social interaction” (North 1990), interact with and aﬀect society. The whole eﬀort of
social sciences through centuries, from Plato’s Republic and Adam Smith’s Inquiry on
the causes of social welfare to contemporary economics, sociology and political sci-
ence can be summarized as a collective – and often uncoordinated – enterprise to dis-
cover what institutions can foster prosperity. Therefore, references to literature can
only be partial and useful to insert this research in a general framework. Acemoglu
& Robinson (2012) explains how economic growth is caused by inclusive institutions,
which “require secure property rights and economic opportunities not just for the elite
but for a broad cross-section of society”, and nations fail to accomplish growth and
prosperity “when extractive economic institutions do not create the incentives need-
ed for people to save, invest, and innovate. Extractive political institutions support these
economic institutions by cementing the power of those who beneﬁt from the extraction”.
Similarly, North et al. (2009) explains how open access orders, institutional ar-
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rangements in which citizens have untampered access to economic resources, are char-
acterized by increased growth and development. In order to operationalize the qual-
ity of institutions, we will use Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall’s (2012) Economic Free-
dom of the World Annual Report (EFW). The EFW index measures the consistency of
a nation’s policies and institutions with economic freedom on a broad range of indi-
cators, covering ﬁve areas: 1) size of government: expenditures, taxes, and enterprises;
2) legal structure and security of property rights; 3) access to sound money; 4) free-
dom to trade internationally; and 5) regulation of credit, labor, and business. 
EFW index is widely used in literature: Hall and Lawson (2014) survey 402 ar-
ticles on journals listed in the Social Science Citation Index since 1996, ﬁnding out
that 198 empirical papers use EFW index as an explanatory variable and that few-
er than 4% of the articles surveyed found economic freedom to be associated with
a normatively negative outcome such as income inequality or obesity. EFW is also
consistently correlated with the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom.
In this framework, we are going to assess whether intra-EU28 migration is re-
sponsive to better institutions, as previously deﬁned in terms of economic freedom.
Analyzing intra-EU migration allows also to be aware of an important distinction in
migration literature, i.e. that among voluntary and non-voluntary migration (Segal
et al. 1993): European countries are quite homogeneous in terms of political stability,
personal safety and economic development, so we can reasonably assume that EU
citizens migrate in order to satisfy largely non-critical life-choice ambitions, such as
better working prospects or improved quality of life.
Migrations inside EU are an interesting case-study for the Tiebout (1956) mod-
el of geographical competition: according to this model, citizens leave their home
jurisdiction for a jurisdiction that has a set of institutions and policies closer to their
set of preferences. This “exit” decision is aﬀected by the expected improvement in
the correspondence to one’s set of preferences, and the cost of leaving. 
European countries are more diﬀerentiated, in terms of language, culture and
socio-economic indicators than other federal orders, e.g. US, on which most of the
literature on internal migration is based. But the principle of free-movement of work-
ers lays at the core of the European project since its foundation, therefore the EU is
committed to remove legislative barriers to internal migration, so that “regulatory”
cost of exit is lowered. 
To sum up, intra-EU28 migration provides us with an interesting case study of
voluntary migration, with medium-high cultural barriers and low regulatory bar-
riers, and a limited variance in terms of political stability and accountability. 
visualiziNG iNTRa-euRoPeaN miGRaTioN
Immigration is a complex bidirectional phenomenon, and in order to better under-
stand the complexity of flows to and from a given country it is important to watch
it in a compelling format. Bidirectionality, intensity and complexity are missed in tra-
ditionally used migration maps, which show flows as stroked lines among the in-
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terested geographic areas. “Effective visualisations of migration flows can substantially
enhance our understanding of underlying patterns and trends. However, common-
ly used migration maps that show place-to-place flows as stroked lines drawn atop
a geographic map fall short of conveying the complexities of human movement in
a clear and compelling manner” (Sander et al, 2014:1). 
Following Abel & Sander (2014) demographic visualization technique, we map
the ﬂows of immigration to/from 28 European Member state on a circular bidirec-
tional chord chart. (Graph X.1) 
Graph 1. Bidirectional ﬂows of intra-EU immigration. Data sources: OECD International Migra-
tion Database and the United Nation International Migration Flows to and from Selected Coun-
tries (2015 revision). Our elaboration.
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This visualization helps us realize how the migratory phenomenon has multiple di-
rections but it is clearly differentiated, so as to make possible to assess for meaningful
trends. 
As a further assessment of the migratory phenomenon inside the European Union,
we built a fractionalization index (Alesina et al. 2003) which accounts for the diversity
of local populations in European countries by using the 2012 stock of Eu28 (except
reporting country) and non-Eu28 migrants over the total population aged 15-64 (Eu-
rostat). Based on this fractionalization, we built two Lorenz curves showing the pro-
portion of the overall population represented by European and non-European mi-
grants that are distributed in the EU territories. In fact, the closer the curve is to the
bisector, the less concentration you can observe in the population. But our curves
are quite far from having a 45° angle. That means that immigrants are distributed
across the European territory in a very heterogeneous manner.
Graph 2. Lorenz curves for EU28 and non-EU28 migrant population. Data source: Eurostat.
clusTeR aNalysis oF immiGRaTioN
In order to assess whether interesting trends need to be further explored, we con-
duct a preliminary data analysis. We firstly compare flows of European migrants in
2013 and corresponding differentials between the EFW rank of the destination coun-
try and the EFW rank of the origin country. In particular, we are referring to EU-2
migrants, aged 15-64. We can observe in Graph X.3 a strong evidence of positive cor-
relation, with appreciable confidence interval.
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Graph 3. Relationship between EWF and stock of EU28 migrants in 2012. Data source: EFW, Eu-
rostat.
Since European countries are quite homogeneous in terms of institutions, we start
with a preliminary analysis of their relationship with our dataset of institutional and
economic variables using a hierarchical method for clustering functional data.
The cluster analysis is useful to inspect data and get a general overview of the
characteristics of our subjects of interest. We have included variables considered by
the EFW as well as the Heritage Foundation Index of Freedom: variables in this area
covers indicators of property rights protection, ﬁscal freedom, labour freedom, in-
vestment freedom, regulation, law enforcement, taxes, government consumption,
licensing restrictions and barriers. 
A second set of variables includes socio-economic variables, such as GDP, un-
employment over total population, median income, and social expenditure as share
of GDP, as well as two output indicators for social welfare: quality of Healthcare and
quality of education; ﬁnally, we add a Social Capital indicator measuring the per-
ceived quality of social life (sub-indicators of the Legatum Index of Prosperity).
A third set of indicators accounts for political institutions, using World Bank Gov-
ernance indicators, including a rank for rule of law, voice and accountability, gov-
ernment eﬀectiveness, control of corruption, political stability and regulatory
quality. 
We apply hierarchical clustering with Ward (1963)’s minimum variance crite-
rion (Ward 1963), as the linkage method in order to minimize the total within-clus-
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ter variance (Ferreira and Hitchcock 2009). Following this method, we identify sev-
en groups, depicted in the dendrogram in Graph X.4, which are homogeneous with-
in and heterogeneous between one another.
Graph 4. Clustering of institutional and socio-economic variables in EU28. Data source: Eurostat,
OECD, EFW, Heritage Index of Economic Freedom; Legatum Index of Prosperity; World Bank Gov-
ernance indicators.
While no distance or geographical position was used, we can easily identify a geo-
graphical order in the groups, and read them against previously used data on the
stock of immigration.
On the left, the ﬁrst group is the one composed by Ireland and United Kingdom,
which are the top two countries in Europe for Economic Freedom: respectively, the
EFW score is 7.9 and 7.83. They have a very high percentage of European immigrants
over the total population: 0.569% in Ireland, 0.41% in the United Kingdom. 
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Luxembourg is a particular case, which we can consider an outlier based on
very his peculiar scale and history. In fact, it has recorded the highest percentage
of European workers when compared to the other European countries. It also has
the highest GDP pro capita in Europe and very low unemployment. It has a quite
high level of economic freedom, but also the highest national social expenditure
per capita. 
Denmark, Finland, Netherlands and Sweden are gathered in the Nordic group,
with similarly medium-high positions in the economic freedom rank (in particular
a very high protection of property rights), and a large stock of European migrants
within their borders. 
The Continental group (France, Germany, Austria, Belgium) holds a middle po-
sition in both our measures of our interest – European migration and economic free-
dom – although they have high levels of social expenditure.
Greece, Slovenia, Spain, Italy and Portugal (the Southern group) shows with mid-
dle-low levels of both measures, and the Eastern European group (Croatia, Bulgaria,
Romania, Hungary, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and the Slovak Republic) shows very
low levels in both our measures of interest.
On the right side, we can see a very interesting group. In this case, we don’t have
particularly high levels of income, nor of social expenditure, but we have two of the
top countries for what regards both European immigration and economic freedom
– namely Cyprus and Malta. In fact, in both countries the majority of non-nation-
als were citizens of member countries.
a model FoR assessiNG The imPoRTaNce oF ecoNomic FReedom iN 
FoR iNTRa-eu28 miGRaNTs
Our explanatory model of intra-EU movements is based on the assumption that the
migrant decides to migrate when the expected benefit of migration exceeds the ben-
efit of residing in his home country plus the cost of leaving. Then, the ratio between
the utility of migrating (UM) minus the cost of migrating (C) and the utility of stay-
ing in the origin country must be greater than 1. Or, expressed in a more convenient
way, we can take the logarithm at both sides of the inequality and get the expres-
sion of the return to migration (R) as the difference of the logarithm of the quanti-
ties previously mentioned. Of course, this must be positive.
Of course no migrant is explicitly thinking in these terms (unless they are
economists), but the decision of migration is inﬂuenced by what, in light of the avail-
able knowledge, the actor thinks would be an improvement in his/her quality of life
or lifestyle, comparing home and destination country, and discounting the costs of
relocation (the cost of adapting to a new geographical and cultural context, as well
as regulatory barriers to immigration). In our model, European citizens are expected
to make their decision to move based on a comparison of institutional, economic and
socio-geographical indicators between their native country and destination coun-
try in a time preceding their decision to migrate. 
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In order to measure this diﬀerence in expected utility between home and desti-
nation country, we built a diﬀerential database for economic and institutional vari-
ables. In this database we gather variances between origin and destination country
in 2012 for the following set of indicators: 1) Economic freedom, as measured by Fras-
er Economic freedom of the world indicators, 2) GDP in Purchasing Power Parity
(World Bank indicators), 3) Unemployment over total population (Eurostat); 4) So-
cial expenditure in % of GDP (Eurostat). 
We also add two dummy variables to account for the cost of relocation, name-
ly Borders and Languages. These two dummies consider geographical distance (this
corresponds the value 1 if the destination country and the origin country share a land
or maritime border) and language distance (this corresponds the value 1 if the des-
tination country has, between its oﬃcial languages, the one spoken in the origin coun-
try). 
Data availability and lack of comparability plagues research on immigration, but
in order to measure our dependent variable we built an integrated database of dyadic
ﬂows among the 28 EU member states from the OECD International Migration Database
and the United Nation International Migration Flows to and from Selected Countries
(2015 revision). Since in our behavioral model of migration information about qual-
ity of institution and socio-economic factors precedes the decision to migrate, the
dependent variable is lagged by 1 year, a reasonable timeframe to formulate and im-
plement the decision to migrate. 
We run a OLS regression on the following model:
Economic freedom is our main regressor, and we control cultural and geographic
distance as well as traditional economic indicators. For the ﬁrst, we built a vector made
of the two dummies for borders and language.
Literature on migration highlights the importance of increased economic op-
portunities and the so-called welfare magnet, assuming that migrants will migrate
either where there is more economic growth, labor market opportunities and a more
generous welfare state. We take into account these eﬀects by controlling for GDP in
Purchasing Power Parity, national social expenditure in percentage of GDP and un-
employment over the total population. 
This is the output we get when we run the OLS regression17:
17. We conducted the usual regression diagnostics for linearity and heteroskedasticity and ob-
tained positive results. 
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Linguistic and geographical distances have an impact on the decision to move, mean-
ing that in Europe there are still significant exit costs. As expected, GDP as a posi-
tive and significant coefficient, while the unemployment coefficient is negative (al-
though not very significant) and social expenditure has a positive coefficient. 
Our main variable of interest, Economic Freedom, has a positive and signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient: one point of diﬀerence between the EFW score of the destination coun-
try and the EFW score of the origin country corresponds to an increase of 0.013 in
the percentage of European immigrants in the destination country. To compare with
the popular welfare magnet theory, which seems to worry so many political com-
mentators, a percentage point of national social expenditure means adding just 0.0008
to the immigration variable. Considering that the variance range between the two
variables, EFW and Social spending in EU countries, is very diﬀerent, 1% improve-
ment in the Freedom of the world index will have the same impact of a 15.98% in-
crease in social expenditure. Economic Freedom, then, seems to be very attractive
to mobile EU citizens. 
coNclusioNs
Based on our empirical analysis, we can assess that Economic freedom act as a pow-
erful magnet for voluntary migrants inside the European Member states. Our mod-
el of migration does not require to follow strict rational-choice, nor perfect information
model assumption: the migrant might well not be perfectly informed about distances
in a set of indicators between home and destination country, but it can still can ap-
TaBle 1. ols ReGRessioN ouTPuTs
immiGRaTioN/PoPoPulaTioN
eFw 0.0131*(1.98)
BoRdeRs 0.0143(1.54)
laNGuaGe 0.0366**(2.63)
GdP-PPP 2.11e-14***(9.41)
social exPeNdiTuRe 0.000819*(2.40)
uNemPloymeNT -0.000684(-1.17)
_coNs 0.0168***(6.28)
N 677
T statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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preciate the effect of those through the price system, which Hayek (1945) described
as “a kind of machinery for registering change”. While migrants might know noth-
ing of GDP or Economic Freedom differentials between their country and the one
they’re moving to, they are well aware of the increased opportunities for coopera-
tion and thus potential welfare improvement. Thus by choosing to reside in a coun-
try with more opportunities the migrant also demonstrates, while not necessarily
expressing it politically, a preference for better institutions in term of economic free-
dom.
If this can be interpreted as a “voting with your feet” mechanism, shed an opti-
mistic light on the European landscape, which has been plagued by the rise of anti-
european, anti-immigration and anti-economic freedom populist parties. If we con-
sider the institutional preferences expressed by European citizens when moving, we
can see that EU migrants move to countries with a smaller government, ﬁscal re-
sponsibility, low regulation and more freedom to trade globally. Whether this will
be enough to make the Exit mechanism eﬀective for driving EU federal order toward
better institutions outside the scope of this paper, but Clark et al. (2015) ﬁnd small
but positive increases in institutional quality as a result of increased immigration,
so while this might be a leap of faith, migrants can be a positive force driving the Eu-
ropean union toward better institutions.
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daTa descRiPTioN
immiGRaTioN Flows
OECD International Migration database, Inﬂows of fo-
reign population 2004-2014.
UN International Migration Flows to and from Selected
Countries: The 2015 Revision.
(POP/DB/MIG/Flow/Rev.2015) for For Bulgaria, Croa-
tia, Estonia, Ireland, Lithuania, Romania.
Missing datapoints from Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Gree-
ce, Latvia, Malta, Portugal have been integrated with
emigration ﬂows to EU28 countries.
Reference year: 2013.
immiGRaTioN/PoPulaTioN
sTock
Eurostat [lfsa_pganws] Population by sex, age, citizen-
ship and labour status: 
- EU28 citizens except reporting country, age 15-64.
- Non-EU28 citizens except reporting country, age 15-64.
- Reporting country, age 15-64.
Reference year: 2012.
ecoNomic FReedom
Fraser Institute, Economic Freedom of the world.
Heritage foundation, Index of Economic Freedom.
Reference year: 2012.
GdP
World Bank, International Comparison Program databa-
se, GDP,
PPP (current international $).
Reference year: 2012.
social exPeNdiTuRe
Eurostat [spr_exp_sum], Expenditure.
Reference year: 2012.
healTh qualiTy iNdicaToR
Legatum Institute Prosperity Index, HEALTH sub-index.
Reference year: 2012.
educaTioN qualiTy iNdicaToR
Legatum Institute Prosperity Index.
Reference year: 2012.
laNGuaGe Matrix built on EU oﬃcial languages.
BoRdeRs Matrix built on public data the world.
iNTRoducTioN
In this chapter, we will review the main steps of the gradual “communitarization”
process related to the immigration and asylum policies in the EU. The purpose is to
briefly describe about 40 years of political processes and institutional goals, trying
to read them from an analytical and explanatory point of view, useful to interpret
current events as well. Bearing in mind that the current institutional architecture con-
cerning immigration and asylum comes mainly from the important changes intro-
duced by the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) and the Lisbon Treaty (2007), one should
remember that it also comes from a long and complex process of integration and ne-
gotiation between the more “Community-first” positions and the more “State
member-first” ones. This process will be analyzed in this chapter. 
FRom The siNGle euRoPeaN acT To The maasTRichT TReaTy, 
ThRouGh The scheNGeN TReaTy 
Since its establishment, the European Economic Community aimed at the progres-
sive creation of a Union: a customs union first, a free trade zone then, and a single
market in the end. This is the implementation of the “four freedoms principle” – free-
dom of movement for persons, goods, services and monetary capitals – that has al-
ways represented the point of arrival of Community integration. 
However, even in the early eighties of last century, accumulated delays concerning
the measures that would have implemented the four freedoms were signiﬁcant. On
June 28 - 29 1985, an Intergovernmental Conference was held at the EU Council in
Milan in order to give a decisive impulse to this process and to amend the Treaties
establishing the European Community. That Intergovernmental Conference issued
the Single European Act (SEA), ﬁnally approved in The Hague, on February 28, 1986. 
The SEA included the essential provision of Article 8a in the Treaty of the European
Community (TEC); this rule established that by the end of 1992 the single market
should have been born, deﬁned in the Treaty as “an area without internal borders
ensuring the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital.” 
The decisive impulse to remove the internal borders was predicted in a period
of strong concern for security – due to migration flows coming from Eastern Eu-
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rope – and this triggered a reaction by institutions, as well as in the European pub-
lic opinion.  “[...] the opinion was formed that the political objective of movement
in full freedom could be pursued only upon the adoption of adequate measures aimed
at compensating the lack of security that would have inevitably arisen” (Pastore,
1999, p. 16). And “compensatory” measures that began to circulate in the form of
proposals in international fora concerned the strengthening of external border con-
trol on the one hand, and an intensification and improvement of controls within
the single area on the other. These measures could become effective only thanks
to a coordinating action among national control bodies. With this regard, proposals
were designed to:
a) harmonize the regulations of Member States; 
b) coordinate the activities of national administrations in order to avoid dispersion
and responsibility overlapping; 
c) integrate and improve the ﬂow of information to achieve eﬀective and eﬃcient
answers to problems caused by the creation of the single area. 
However, intergovernmental cooperation – external to Community legal and polit-
ical system – has actually begun some years before SEA. Some of the most impor-
tant inter-governmental groups were established between the seventies and the eight-
ies, namely: the MAG (Mutual Assistance Group, founded in 1972), the TREVI Group
(established on December 01, 1975), the Police Working Group on Terrorism (PW-
GOT, established in 1979), the ad hoc Immigration Group (established on October
20, 1986), the Comité Européen de Lutte Anti-Drogue (CELAD, founded in December
1988), the Coordinators' Group (established by the European Council of  Rhodes on
December 1988, in an attempt to coordinate the plethora of thematic groups, which
have already become impossible to be managed).
The most important arena of intergovernmental cooperation, concerning justice
and home aﬀairs, was of course the one that arose from the Schengen institution-
al plant. The Schengen Agreement was signed in 1985 by ﬁve Member States of the
European Community (Belgium, France, West Germany, Luxembourg and The Nether-
lands). Unlike any other intergovernmental cooperation body previously mentioned,
the system created by the issuance and application of the Schengen Convention had
two disruptive characteristics granting it a special status: a wide and very detailed
regulatory base, and the establishment of a formalized and permanent body consisting
of an executive Committee and a General Secretariat.  
The key-contents of the Agreement and the Convention were as follows:
a) abolition of police checks on people and decrease of checks on goods at inter-
nal borders;
b) strengthening of external border checks, especially in relation to illegal immi-
gration and the attempts to abuse the asylum right;
c) intensiﬁcation and coordination of security checks within the area of  free move-
ment.
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For our purposes, the most important legacy of the “Schengen system” is that it has
catalyzed some very significant amendments to the development of control poli-
cies in Europe, including those concerning immigration and asylum and others as
well.
The distinguishing features of these changes are:
a) The transition from an intermittent and unstructured cooperation to a system-
atic cooperation among police forces;
b) The mitigation of operational constraints due to the State borders concerning
the control action of national police forces (not only the observation hypothe-
sis was introduced, the cross-border pursuit has been phased in as well);
c) The transition from a “jealously” national information system to an integrated
and shared information management model;
d) The check on internal area is turned from localized and static – focused on the
borders – into a widespread and dynamic process, based on the ability to con-
stantly follow and monitor certain categories of people, as per a principle sim-
ilar to the one of point b). A check on a personal basis, instead of general ap-
plication, is now applied, based on an expanded concept of “border,” as well as
on widespread checks performed within Member States;
e) The trend to outsource some checks – a real novelty in the development of mi-
gration policies, with regard to the external borders of the single area and based
on the involvement of third countries under migration pressure (through read-
mission agreements and cooperation to control illegal emigration), and of some
categories of private subjects (e.g. through the empowerment of carriers, almost
equivalent to police oﬃcers in terms of passenger checks). 
The innovations introduced by the “Schengen system” were not few, and began to
mark the pace of a more structured and continuous collaboration, which will pro-
duce a significant convergence in operational terms and in regulation contents like-
wise. These contents were obviously marked by an ideology of security and “indis-
putable” fear – we might say – of migrations coming from third countries, consid-
ered essentially as external threats and under no circumstances as economic resources,
and therefore even less as a people to be integrated into their own social fabric. 
Schengen, however, was born as a kind of experiment which had two policy ob-
jectives, instrumental to governments of countries participating the system: 
a) the eﬀective implementation of policies concerning the single area, especially
on internal security;
b) the adoption of intergovernmental decision-making structures and procedures,
in order to operate with the maximum political discretion, removing the debates
on issues dealing with the removal of borders from the internal decision-mak-
ing arenas and the Community ones, both presaging of democratic check, although
to diﬀerent and changeable extent.
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Obviously, however, it should be noted that this experiment was designed to implement
a key principle of the European Community and, in this sense, in the implementing
Convention dated 1990, it was specified that the objectives of the Schengen Agree-
ment could have been perfectly overlapped with those of the European Communi-
ty Treaty and that no decision of the Schengen institutions could have been averse
to the measures that would have been adopted to implement the Treaty provisions.
In addition, the novelty constituted by the observer office guaranteed to the EU Com-
mission in the meetings of Executive Committee must be pointed out.
With regards to its eﬀectiveness, the Schengen system had a rather slow start.
However, between 1990 and 1996, the real take-oﬀ of the system occurred, when
– in chronological order – Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Austria, Denmark, Finland
and Sweden joined the 1985 signatory States. In addition, in December 1996, the
other two Nordic countries outside the European Community, Norway and Iceland,
signed the cooperation agreements with member states of the Schengen system, which
guaranteed them the status of Associated Member of the system. 
The formal membership boom and the great eﬀort to prepare the substantial pre-
conditions to implement the system in 13 Member States of the European Community18
point out the great success obtained by an experiment – at the beginning hesitant
and even considered as “futuristic” by some people – especially in the second half
of the nineties. 
Nevertheless, the experimental and temporary nature of the system did not take
long time to manifest itself, just in the years where mechanisms ﬁnally became eﬀective
in all respects. The unanimous vote, at decision-making seat numerically growing
with the increase of memberships, turned out to be a boomerang tool, born to pro-
tect the decision power of the states but which practically ended in cancelling it, or
at least reducing it in a crucial way. In addition to this, the decision-making proce-
dures, virtually secret and without any democratic control, started to creak the in-
ternal lawfulness of the bodies. 
Finally, the crisis of the Schengen system was to a certain extent announced since
its birth, as it was conceived from the beginning – as said – as a temporary experi-
ment, with its probable “implosion” and “engulfment” in the Community legal frame-
work. And this was in fact the announced end of the system established by the Schen-
gen Agreement. However, the incorporation of Schengen into the Community frame-
work took place at the end of a long process, with two main stages, marked by the
Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam.
18. The EU had 15 Member States, excluding UK and Ireland, which were already sharing a bi-
lateral agreement regarding free movement. 
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FRom maasTRichT To amsTeRdam: 
FoRmaliziNG iNTeRGoveRNmeNTal cooPeRaTioN
The Treaty on the European Union signed in Maastricht on February 7, 1992, marked
a topical moment in several policy sectors within the European Community. One can
say, with regard to the policies under review in this document, that they formalized
the cooperation on immigration and asylum policies at the European Union level,
through the so called “pillarisation” of the Community structure. 
The newly founded “European Union” was represented and thought out as a Greek
temple, with the front supported by three columns (or pillars that is) of which only
the central one represented the community in the true sense of the word, while the
other two represented the newly introduced clauses of the Treaty. 
Therefore, the Union had a new structure with a ﬁrst pillar – traditional and con-
solidated – where the sovereignty shift from Member States to the EU took place
over time and where the new decisional policies entered into eﬀect following the
concept of the so called “codecision”19. A second pillar aimed at forming the CFSP
(Common Foreign and Security Policy), and a third – the one most relevant to this
document – dedicated to the “cooperation in the ﬁeld of justice and home aﬀairs”
(JHA sectors). 
In truth, there was not much of in terms of European integration in the substance
and consequences brought forth by these innovations. The two new pillars represented
never seen before policy ﬁelds for the European Union, for which the decision was
fundamentally to exclude EU competence. Actually, supranational institutions re-
mained excluded from having any decisional power in such matters. In this sense,
the Maastricht Treaty was the result of a diﬃcult compromise between the “maxi-
malist” positions – already favorable to a common immigration and asylum policy
across the European Community – and the “minimalist” ones – which opposed the
progress of integration and in favor of maintaining the intergovernamentalist method,
guaranteeing power to each State on the matters under review. It is necessary to high-
light the importance of the unanimity voting at the Council oh the EU as a break to
integration and to the success of the maximalist positions. This does not mean that
nothing changed in Maastricht – as later happened in Amsterdam – and that the main-
tenance of the status quo prevailed, but rather that the result of the negotiations was
strongly inﬂuenced by the preferences of the few governments opposed to the in-
tegration.  
The third pillar was designed as the means of implementation of the principle
contained in the preface of the Treaty, related to the right of free movement of peo-
ple, guaranteeing at the same time a high level of security within the European Union. 
19. The joint policy-making procedure introduced by former article 189B TCE, represents an evo-
lution of the previous cooperation procedure. Differently from the latter, the new method es-
tablishes that the Council cannot approve an act without the previous approval of the European
Parliament, which, instead, was allowed in the previous cooperation procedure.  
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The “matters of common interest” identiﬁed in the third pillar were the follow-
ing (art. K.1):
1) Asylum policy;
2) Regulations governing the crossing of borders external to the Member States by
people and the performance of related inspections and veriﬁcations;
3) The immigration policy and the policy to be followed with regard to third-coun-
try citizens:
a) The entry and movement conditions of third-country citizens within Mem-
ber States;
b) The conditions of stay for third-country citizens in Member States, includ-
ing family uniﬁcation and access to the job market;
c) The ﬁght against illegal immigration, illegal stay and work of third-country
citizens in Member States;
4) The ﬁght against drug addiction;
5) The ﬁght against fraud at the international level;
6) Judicial cooperation in civil matters;
7) Judicial cooperation in criminal matters;
8) Customs cooperation;
9) Cooperation with police for the prevention of terrorism, drug traﬃcking and oth-
er serious international crimes.
For the first time a new approach emerged – even if just in its very early stage – re-
lated to cooperation on the topic of immigration policies within the EU.Art. K.3 iden-
tified the regulatory tools and the orientation of the Council of the EU to give life
to cooperation in these matters. It represented the real negative aspect of the Treaty,
since this series of tools revealed itself to be, in terms of effectiveness, as the weak-
est point of the entire third pillar: consultations among Member States, common po-
sitions, joint actions and conventions. The serious shortcoming – calculated and in-
tentionally sought after by the representatives of some of the countries – of the pro-
visions contained in this article is tied to the non-binding magnitude of such acts to-
wards Member States. Lack of certainty on the impact caused by these national po-
litical systems essentially led to the failure of the elaborate structure for the third pil-
lar and made it such that the decision-making place for such matters would be one
emerging from the evolution of the Schengen system instead of the one less formally
tied to the judicial structure and institutional Community.
In addition to this, the decisional methods did not introduce any major changes
compared with those that had consolidated inter-governments in the previous years.
The Justice and Home Aﬀairs Council would have decided with unanimity voting both
in the cases of common positions and conventions. A majority vote was established
solely for procedural matters and for the implementation of measures for common
actions and conventions. 
Moreover, the power of initiative was shared by the Member States with the EU
Commission but not on the matters more linked to internal security, i.e. judicial co-
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operation in criminal matters, Customs cooperation and Police force cooperation,
where the power of initiative rests exclusively with the Member States. 
The entire third pillar proved itself to be very weak in terms of enforcement and
practical implementation. It was the result of a negotiation between positions rather
far away from each other that led more to “good intentions” than to “good prac-
tices.”
However, the system originated from Maastricht should not be completely un-
derestimated, namely for two reasons:
1) Even without a clear legal value, the acts, but even more so, the processes and
dynamics created in the after-Maastricht period certainly had a political-ad-
ministrative and socio-cultural impact on the key ﬁgures of the most important
sectors analyzed herein;
2) The structure that emerges from the Maastricht Treaty would, however, have act-
ed as an “ice-breaker” for the developments reached in the Amsterdam Treaty
even more so for its negative aspects than for its positive signals. 
The amsTeRdam TReaTy aNd The PosT commuNiTaRisaTioN
The Amsterdam Treaty opens the communitarisation stage of immigration and asy-
lum policies. According to Geddes (2000, p. 110), Amsterdam marked the com-
munitarisation, but not the “supranationalisation” of such policies, in the sense that
the intergovernmental decision-making method was still maintained to the detriment
of the “Community-integration” method. And this is an important specification and
a real limit that will be overcome only in the Lisbon Treaty, ten years later. 
The Intergovernmental Conference that led to the Amsterdam Treaty was an-
ticipated by the Corfu European Council in December 1994. A Reﬂection Group was
established as a consequence of the reﬂections presented in the EU Commission Com-
munication in 1994, with the aim at providing better answers to the needs related
to internal security and issues that, in general, concerned the justice and internal aﬀairs
sectors. 
Much of the IGC agenda was drawn up by the Reﬂection Group that in the meet-
ing in Corfu identiﬁed six priorities for the discussion on the JHA sector, ﬁve of which
concerned the immigration and asylum, namely:
1) ensuring that the immigration and asylum issue was considered as one of the most
important challenges that the European Union should have tackled in the future
years, thus pushing for a “structural” and not “temporary” and “emergency” vi-
sion of the migration phenomenon;
2) communitarizing the entire discipline, moving it from the third to the ﬁrst pil-
lar, that is from the intergovernmental pillar to the Community one;
3) opening the policy-making as much as possible, in order to gain both in terms
of decision eﬃciency, and in legitimacy and consensus ones;
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4) building a EU protecting civil rights, strengthening the protection of human rights,
even trying to place the European Court within the legal framework of the Treaty;
5) applying the principle of subsidiarity to the management of immigration and asy-
lum policies, transferring to the supranational level some aspects of these poli-
cies.  
Between lights and shadows, the new compromise arisen with the Treaty of Ams-
terdam marked the opening of the real communitarisation stage of immigration and
asylum policies. It also put a full stop to the experience of the Schengen system, rat-
ified by the incorporation of the so-called Schengen acquis (set of regulations) with-
in the Treaty of the European Communities. 
The justice and home aﬀairs sector was reformed in several ways, that can be sum-
marized into three main sets of provisions: 
1. the aforementioned incorporation of Schengen acquis in the EU legal framework,
which led to the dismantling even of the structures linked to the Schengen sys-
tem, then absorbed by EU institutions;
2. the communitarisation of certain issues of the third pillar constituted in Maas-
tricht, namely: policies of immigration, asylum, visas and judicial cooperation
in civil matters. Communitarisation, however, was planned as a gradual process
over time and with abnormal outcomes compared to what established for oth-
er policies present in the ﬁrst pillar, or community pillar.
3. the third pillar reform, which required a necessary reform of the institutional in-
struments that marked a real failure in the 5 years that divided Maastricht from
Amsterdam.
The communitarisation of the immigration and asylum policies is realized in their
progressive removal from the third pillar; pillar that remains alive only for judicial
cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation. 
Except for the Schengen acquis, in fact, the Amsterdam Treaty established a new
institutional architecture to be developed, starting from the “foundations” made by
Schengen and its “derivatives.”
The TEU Article 61 required that the Council of the EU could adopt within ﬁve
years – in almost all cases – certain measures “with the aim at progressively estab-
lishing an area of  freedom, security and justice.” 
Articles 62, 63, 65 and 66 aimed at providing a content to the measures men-
tioned above and their reading shows that the key issues on which to make law were
the following:
1) deﬁnitive control abolition of internal borders, through “measures suitable to en-
sure, in accordance with Article 14, the absence of any controls on persons, both
citizens of UE and citizens of third countries, when they cross internal borders”
(article 62, paragraph 1);
2) common measures on controls at external border, through:
63
a) rules and procedures which must be followed by Member States to carry out
control on persons at said borders;
b) rules on visas for intended stays of no more than three months, including:
i) a list of third countries whose citizens must be in possession of visas when
they cross the external borders and a list of third countries whose citi-
zens are exempt from that requirement;
ii) the procedures and conditions to issue visas by the Member States;
iii) a uniform visa format;
iv) rules related to a “uniform visa” (article 62, point 2);
3) common measures on the free movement of citizens of third countries, through
“measures establishing the conditions under which citizens of third countries can
freely travel within the territory of Member States for a period not exceeding three
months” (article 62, point 3);
4) provisions on asylum, through “measures [...] in accordance with the Geneva Con-
vention dated July 28, 1951 and the Protocol dated January 31, 1967 related to
the status of refugees and other relevant treaties, within the following sectors:
a) criteria and mechanisms to determine which Member State is responsible for
examining the application for asylum submitted by a citizen of a third coun-
try in one of the Member States,
b) minimum regulations concerning the reception of applicants for asylum in
Member States,
c) minimum regulations concerning qualiﬁcation and status of refugees to cit-
izens of third countries,
d) minimum regulations concerning the applicable procedures in Member States
for granting or withdrawing refugee status” (article 63, point 1);
5) provisions concerning refugees and displaced persons, through “measures ap-
plicable [...] in the following sectors: 
a) minimum regulations to temporarily protect displaced persons coming
from third countries who cannot return to their country of origin and for per-
sons who otherwise need international protection,
b) promoting a balance of eﬀorts between Member States that receive refugees
and displaced persons and bear the consequences of their reception” (Arti-
cle 63, point 2);
6) provisions concerning more generally the immigration policy, through “measures
[...] in the following sectors:
a) conditions of entry and residence, and regulations on procedures for the is-
sue by Member States of long-term visas and residence permits, including
those issued for family reuniﬁcation purpose,
b) illegal immigration and illegal residence, including repatriation of illegal res-
idents” (article 63, point 3);
7) provisions concerning the residence conditions of third country citizens,
through “measures deﬁning the rights and conditions under which third-coun-
try citizens legally residing in a Member State may reside in other Member States”
(Article 63, point 4);
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8) Provisions concerning judicial cooperation in civil matters (article 65);
9) Provisions concerning administrative cooperation, between Member States
and between them and the EU Commission (Article 66).
Looking through this list, the qualitative leap towards the past, even compared to
the unrealized good intentions of Maastricht, is absolutely clear. And it becomes even
more clear if it is considered that the extension of the sectors is added to the possi-
bility to adopt finally binding deeds (regulations, directives, decisions) for Member
States and in a period of time, namely in just five years (a term that has not been ful-
ly respected). Once this period is over, among other things, (May 01, 2004), the EU
Commission became the only institution to hold the power of initiative in the mat-
ters included in Title IV.
However, also the limitations are many that could have had a (and they did so
in certain cases) signiﬁcant eﬀect on the system so outlined:
1) First, some topics were excluded from the transitional ﬁve-year period, therefore
their discipline could have been completed even in longer terms; these speciﬁc
areas are:
a) “promoting a balance of eﬀorts between Member States that receive refugees
and displaced persons and bear the consequences of their reception” (Arti-
cle 63, point 2);
b) “conditions of entry and residence, and regulations on procedures for the is-
sue by Member States of long-term visas and residence permits, including
those issued for family reuniﬁcation purpose” (article 63, point 3, letter a);
c) “provisions deﬁning the rights and conditions of third country citizens, who
legally reside in a Member State may reside in other Member States” (Arti-
cle 63, point 4); 
3) It was practically impossible to consider as urgent – therefore as peremptory -
the term of ﬁve years, because any type of sanction was not established for any
inertial behavior of the Council;
4) Unanimity remained the main voting method within the Council, since the qual-
iﬁed majority was allowed – by article 67 TEU – right after the approval of the
Treaty, to regulate visas concerning residence permits up to three months; in par-
ticular, for the regulation related to the “list of third countries whose citizens must
be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those third coun-
tries whose citizens are exempted from that requirement” and the uniform for-
mat for visas (article 63, paragraph 3). While the qualiﬁed majority voting, was
established after the transitional ﬁve-year period for “the procedures and con-
ditions for issuing visas by Member States" and for the "regulations related to a
uniform visa” (article 67, paragraph 4).
5) The Commission would share - until May 01, 2004 - the power of legislative ini-
tiative with the Member States. 
6) The decision-making procedure, at least for the ﬁve-year term, would have been
that of the so-called “consultation”, and not that of “codecision” in which the Eu-
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ropean Parliament has the power to inﬂuence the ﬁnal outcome of the decision;
7) Any transfer to the codecision procedure, which also will require the qualiﬁed
majority voting was established by article 67, paragraph 2, but only after the tran-
sitional ﬁve-year period and after any unanimity decision of the Council of the
EU, on the whole Title IV, or on its part;
8) The opting-in and opting-out clauses, through which some States (UK, Ireland
and Denmark), by virtue of their previous particular link with the Schengen sys-
tem, may choose from time to time to ask what issues they may take part in (or
escape from) policy-making.
9) The possibility to establish some “strengthened cooperation,” e.g. to allow some
Member States (at least an absolute majority) to develop a common strategy and
to take it forward, even against the will of the minority. Even if Title VII of the
TEU, establishes many substantial limits to these possibilities. 
The overall picture that emerges from the Amsterdam Treaty is therefore characterized,
as always, by lights and shadows, if it is looked with the eye of a person who hopes
for greater integration. Of course the lights “shine” if the post-Amsterdam is com-
pared with the cooperation carried out in previous years. Even the shadows, how-
ever, have a logical and historical link with the past, as they are in a certain sense
the institutional “parachutes” that some Member States demanded to prevent con-
sequences difficult to be managed, especially in internal political systems.
The lisBoN TReaTy aNd The “Full” commuNiTaRisaTioN. 
FRom miNimal NoRms To commoN Policies.
With the Lisbon Treaty, approved in 2007 and entered into force in 2009, the three-
pillar structure established with the Maastricht Treaty and then amended with the
Amsterdam Treaty – which granted Police and Judiciary cooperation for crime cas-
es to the third pillar, while the first pillar had already incorporated matters such as
movement of persons, borders, visas, asylum, immigration and Judiciary coopera-
tion on civil cases – completely disappeared.
In the Treaty, competence with regard to Justice and Home Aﬀairs is entirely at-
tributed to the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, and it is further detailed that
the Union develops a common policy with regards to borders, visas, migration and
asylum, overcoming the previous structure which attributed the EU the competence
of adopting minimum common norms.
The European Council is granted the deﬁnition of strategic general guidance for
legal and operative planning concerning freedom, safety and justice, with ﬁve-year
plans. Finally, a standardization of procedures is achieved as well. European Insti-
tutions shall implement common policies through legislative measures (no longer
with non-binding acts then). The power of initiative is exclusive to the EU Commission
(apart from Police and Judiciary cooperation in crime cases, which is attributed to
single Member States as well). Legislative norms shall be adopted on the basis of or-
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dinary procedures, that is, the codecision method – the EU Parliament is a joint pol-
icy-maker with respect to the Council of the EU, and decision of the Council to be
taken with qualiﬁed majority, two total news for issues of migration, asylum and bor-
der controls. 
Member States retain competence over norms concerning citizenship and
maintenance of public order and internal security. Together with breaking novelties
introduced with the Lisbon Treaty, it is worth recalling several initiatives and deci-
sions taken so far since 2004 (end of the post-Amsterdam ﬁve-year period):
- Eurodac, SIS II and VIS: 24/7 information systems coordinated by the European
agency Eu-LISA, in order to manage database on ﬁngerprints of those ﬁling for
Asylum, on visas and on the exchange of information concerning internal security
of Member States;
- The Asylum and Migration Fund, created in 2014;
- The Internal Security Fund, created in 2014;
- The Standing Committee on the evaluation and implementation of Schengen,
created in 2013;
- Eurosur: European borders surveillance system, created in 2013;
- Frontex: the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation
at the External Borders, created in 2007;
- The European Refugee Fund, created in 2007.
These actions should be sided be a long series of guidance documents issued by the
European Commission: the most important one is the 2008 Communication “A Com-
mon Immigration Policy for Europe: Principles, actions and tools.”
A common migration and asylum policy has then been active de facto and de jure
since 2009; there is a binding EU set of norms for Member States; there are orga-
nization, structures, programs and funds dedicated to supporting them. Still, para-
doxically, the moment in which the European Union achieved a diﬃcult and com-
plex process of competences’ acquisition on these matters, is the very same moment
of its downward trend – a clear crisis of legitimation which has led to questioning
the entire communitarian structure. 
The following table summarises the entire period described up to this point, on
the basis of the evolution of competences of the European Community competences
and more in general of the decisional method related to the immigration and asy-
lum policies.
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coNclusioNs. FRom iNTRaGoveRNmeNTal cooPeRaTioN 
To commuNiTisaTioN: a coNsTaNT PRocess Now aT Risk.
The evolution of the competences on the matter of immigration and asylum clear-
ly shows a constant integration trend and gradual shift of sovereignty from the Mem-
bers States to the European Community institutions. Despite they are policy sectors
that are both delicate and crucial to Member States and even if in the forty-year pe-
riod examined several events took place that could have slowed down this process,
the upwards delegation of power process never experienced reflux or backpedaling
moments. Why did this happen? Why, despite the prevalent interpretation of the main
players was that of “security”, of “Fortress Europe,” those same main players end-
ed up giving up always greater portions of sovereignty to the European institutions?
The reason must be searched in the complexity of the sectors to be managed and in
the convenience of moving the decisional seats beyond the national borders. 
In other words, Member States governments – even those that historically were
the most minimalistic ones in terms of transfer of sovereignty to the EU – realized
over time that facing immigration and asylum issues only through the intragov-
ernmental method would have led to great diﬃculties and a probable ineﬀectiveness
in terms of policies because of constant decisional deadlock. Such ineﬀectiveness,
in addition, ended up entering into a growing phase of dissatisfaction and fear in the
public opinion which made it progressively more useful to move the focus somewhere
else, towards institutions far away from the citizens, useful as an “external enemy”
TaBle 1. evoluTioN oF comPeTeNces oF euRoPeaN iNsTiTuTioNs 
aNd oF The decisioN-makiNG PRoceduRe
PRe-maasTRichT maasTRichT amsTeRdam lisBoN 
euRoPeaN 
PaRliameNT No role. Limited role.
Consultation
procedure.
Shared decision
procedure.
euRoPeaN couRT
oF JusTice No jurisdiction.
No 
jurisdiction.
Limited 
jurisdiction. Full jurisdiction.
euRoPeaN 
commissioN
No initiative
power. Role of
occasional 
observer.
Initiative
power share
with other
Member
States.
Initiative 
power share
with other
Member
States.
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voting
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majority.
Source: Author’s elaboration.
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to support “internal narratives.” It is the narrative of the “Europe demands it” that
we hear so many times by the politicians of the Member States. 
The problem is that today, after years of economic crisis and in international crises
still in full swing, those fears have increased exponentially and, also due to a strong
growth of populist forces everywhere in the old continent, the convenience to move
the attention towards Europe is not enough and does not work anymore. And what
we are witnessing now is a populist contamination also in the government forces that
if they do not threaten the European institutions – in various methods – risk to lose
legitimate role and internal approval. 
If to this we add the “Brexit eﬀect” and that is the true and proven demonstra-
tion that it is possible to leave the EU, we can easily understand how fragile today
is the European Union structure (and not only that) in the matter of common poli-
cy in immigration and asylum. A fragility that is made even more evident by the fact
that the governments are no longer working to make it more eﬀective but above all
to sabotage it with the goal of acquiring internal legitimacy. 
The result is that if for years communitarisation was a way to overcome inter-
governmental deadlock, today it is itself experiencing an impasse. And the real risk
of a reﬂux, from the suspension of the Schengen agreements to the loss of sovereign-
ty quotas by the EU seems to be truly at the gates. 
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iNTRoducTioN
Transnational migration implies the creation of a number of connections between
countries of origin and countries of destination. In the last twenty years, those transna-
tional linkages have attracted increasing attention, not only under a sociological per-
spective, but also in relation to their potential economic impact, and in relation to
the ability to influence processes of strengthening of the institutions in both home
and host countries.
The increase of the studies on transnational practices determined a new trend
towards the “migration and development nexus”, characterised by growing enthu-
siasm of researchers and policy makers in terms of the positive outcomes of migra-
tion on both the contexts of origin and settlement.
In this respect, the traditional dualities “optimist/pessimist” in the approach to-
ward migration eﬀects and in the “brain drain/brain gain” debates have turned on
the positive side. 
Migrants – in particular labour migrants and diasporas - are seen as agents of de-
velopment because of their ability to contribute positively both to home and host coun-
tries through the engagement in cross border activities, managed on the individu-
al level or through political and entrepreneurial networks and NGOs. This “virtuous
circle” aﬀects not only the receiving country, but the countries of origin and the mi-
grants themselves because, as an essential part of human development, “mobility at
the individual and group level cannot be dissociated from more general processes of so-
cial and economic change which constantly alter the spatial distribution of opportuni-
ty structures and, hence, mobility patterns”. (De Haas, 2009, p.2).
Nowadays, the connection between migration and development moved far beyond
academic debates to become a central political issue, reaching the top of the glob-
al agenda and appearing in ﬁve of the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals.
At the European Union level as well, the connection between migration and de-
velopment has become one of the pillars of governance policies on migration and
of the external action, and a good number of member states have decided to pursue
programmes of development which engage migrants and diasporas, implementing
initiatives in partnership with EU and non-EU countries likewise.
Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999), the European Union
institutions and member states have strengthened reﬂections and discussions con-
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cerning the relationship between migration, employment and development, in par-
allel with the development of an international dialogue on this issue. The European
Union aims at deﬁning a comprehensive and balanced approach in migration poli-
cy also including third countries in the management of migration issues.
Furthermore, with the Global Approach to Migration (2005), the Migration and
Development nexus has become a pillar of the EU migration and mobility policy, co-
herently with the policy recommendations developed in occasion of the United Na-
tions’ High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development, held in 2006 and 2013. The
international dialogue process called Global Forum on Migration and Development,
which gives non-binding policy directions to participating institutions annually, con-
tributes as well to the shaping of the agenda related to Migration and Development. 
The present paper aims at giving account of migration management in terms of
development within the European Union political framework, while attempting to
understand the rationale behind the policies of mobility governance and their co-
herence with the global agenda.
In the ﬁrst part the “transnational turn” and the raise of migration and devel-
opment nexus in the academic and policy debate will be introduced, illustrating the
main steps which have determined the introduction of development in migration gov-
ernance at the global level.
Given those premises, the focus will be on the EU mobility policies, highlight-
ing the relevance of the migration and development connection in the migration mo-
bility agenda and its actual reception within member states.
The “TRaNsNaTioNal TuRN”, 
The miGRaTioN aNd develoPmeNT Policies iN The GloBal aGeNda
Nowadays, there is a substantial literature on the typology of connections and re-
lations between migrants and their context of origin and settlement, emphasising
the “circularity” of mobility in a transnational perspective. 
Although there are individual diﬀerences concerning the time and frequency of
mobility, circular migration is generally characterised by the spending of signiﬁcant
periods within origin and destination countries, and the maintaining of economic
ties in both contexts. 
In the ﬁeld of development studies, the analysis of the impact of circular migration
privileges migrants whose main residence is in the country of destination, and who
engage in economic and social activities in the country of origin. Several studies in
fact highlight that migrants who hold a secure legal status in the country of settle-
ment such as citizenship or long term permits of stay, are most likely to intensify their
links and exchanges with the country of origin.
As a consequence, the global exchange processes, along with the possibility of
a fast exchange of information have the strength to determine “more win-win situ-
ations for mobile persons, states and societies on the diﬀerent sides of the migratory pro-
cess” (Doyle, 2004, p.118). 
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The attention toward the economic and social changes brought by circular mi-
gration determined a new pattern in deﬁning the migration experience and its con-
sequences, labelled as the “transnational turn”. Transnationalism in migration is de-
ﬁned by Bash et al. (1994) as “the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain mul-
ti-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement”. 
Social sciences use to refer to transnationalism as one of the main aspects of glob-
alisation, which include social movements, labour market, technological development,
international political frameworks and international relations in its spectrum of anal-
ysis. With regard to migration, the transnational practices deriving from people’s mo-
bility include all those aspects and the relations between countries of residence, tran-
sit and destination. With transnationalism, borders of any kind change their nature,
become ﬂuid and porous, and personal migration histories change as well, being now
conceived as “open” and “multi directional” processes (Zanfrini, 2015). This leads
to overcoming the traditional division between country of origin and settlement, be-
cause the ﬁeld of action of transnational migrants may include two or more contexts.
On this aspect, “Transnational migrants” or “transmigrants” emerged as a new
population, composed of migrants, able to build and maintain ties, networks and ac-
tivities within a unique social tissue. 
To further explain the concept, as Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004), the space of
migrants becomes multi-layered, multi sited and ﬂuid, allowing migrants to connect
and strengthen ties with more than one society, and to “alter the economies, values
and practices of entire regions” (Levitt, Jaworksy, 2003, p.132). 
The transnational theory has highlighted the importance of self-organisation for
migrants’ actors, determining an ideal change in the development theory. The cen-
trality of migrants’ organised communities as grassroots actors, and the role of re-
mittances as provider of foreign aid, took a clear liberal character, which contrasts
with the idea of dependency, brain drain and centrality of states in the development
policies. 
The economic dimension of transnationalism is key in the shaping of migration
and development policies. This is mainly because remittances serve as a counter bal-
ance of the negative eﬀects of migration, constituting one of the principal sources
of support to the economies of the countries of origin. It has been observed that re-
mittances keep on ﬂowing from host countries to homelands in spite of the global
economic recession. This is supported by OECD and World Bank data, which reveal
how, in a timeframe of a ten years (2004-2014), this amount has resulted to be triple,
also exceeding the oﬃcial aids to development.
Although private investment of remittances represents the ground driver of de-
velopment (especially for human capital increase), a business-oriented utilisation
of remittances is highly encouraged at governmental level, both in sending and re-
ceiving ends. 
In particular, ﬁnancial inclusion, foreign direct investments and the setting of af-
fordable ﬁnancial services are seen by policy makers as fundamental for the reduc-
tion of poverty and growth, representing the principal challenges to ease the pro-
cess of remittances transmission.
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Aside from the economic dimension, remittances also include a set of ideas, val-
ues and knowledge which diasporas “send back” to home country nationals. The so-
called “social remittances” are understood as a wide and articulated concept and,
just like the economic remittances, are characterised by a high impact on social, po-
litical and cultural changes. Social remittances are recognised as a vehicle of pro-
motion of values, ideas, democratic practices and human rights. As private savings,
remittances are mainly employed at household level, as in education of the
youngest, training and livelihood goods and services.  Social remittances have a great
importance in the creation of policies as well, with a speciﬁc impact on strategic de-
velopmental sectors, such as health, business and education.  
Given this framework, the management of migration, and the “sharing” of its ben-
eﬁts, have become a common interest for sending and receiving societies likewise.
In the last ten years, a global eﬀort has been undertaken to maximise the eﬀects of
mobility for all, in the sense of sustainable development. 
Consequently, the maximization of the beneﬁts of migration for all was includ-
ed in the migration governance agenda following the key principle of “shared re-
sponsibility”.
Under the guide and inspiration of the United Nations’ High Level Dialogue on Mi-
gration and Development (2006, 2013) the global debate on migration and devel-
opment involved governments and civil society worldwide. The aim of the HLD was
understanding the “multidimensional aspects of international migration and development
in order to identify appropriate ways and means to maximize its development beneﬁts
and minimize its negative impacts”20. As a follow, the institutional dialogue initiative
named Global Forum on Migration and Development, held since 2007, has the objective
to collect the global issues related to migration and development, and is conceived
as a non-binding, voluntary and government led process which provides action-ori-
ented policy recommendations. In addition, the recent introduction of migration in
the framework of the Sustainable Development Goals, has further stressed the im-
portance of human mobility in the shaping of a development idea based on sus-
tainability, and the need of cooperation for migration policy and governance. 
miGRaTioN aNd develoPmeNT 
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The global dialogue processes concerning migration, mobility and development have
actively included both the European Union and its member states. The main outcomes
and principles adopted globally became a key element of the migration management
external action policies of the Union, with specific reference to Africa and the MENA
Region, considered as key partners in the fostering of migration and mobility poli-
20. United Nations, International High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development, Resolu-
tion of the United Nations General Assembly, 2006. 
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cies. In addition, the increase of migrants which has been registered in the last decade,
determined the need to foster a comprehensive and balanced approach toward mi-
gration, able to embrace emergency issues with long-term strategies of poverty re-
duction and growth. Statistics on migration reveal that migrants in Europe repre-
sent 3.9% of the total population, 19.5 million people – both from EU and non-EU
countries – who live in a state other than their own. Furthermore, the migration flows
to Europe have become highly diversified. Alongside the traditional flows, i.e. from
countries that are relatively close to Europe, new flows have emerged, such as the
ones from China, Pakistan, Central Asia, and East Africa.
Looking speciﬁcally at European Union Member states, the existence of diaspora
and migrants’ transnational networks and the development of entrepreneurial ac-
tivities which those groups undertake in the country of origin are particularly rel-
evant, particularly for migrants residing in Western Europe, representing the focal
point for remittances transmission and cross border activities.
As Eurostat data reveal, Germany, France, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom
represent the most important remittances sending countries, while the top ﬁve re-
ceiving countries are Nigeria, China, Morocco, India and Uzbekistan21.
Policy guidelines on migration and mobility were deﬁned in 1999, in occasion
of the Tampere Council, and shaped an approach to migration governance still valid
today. That council highlighted the need of enforcing a common approach to migration,
through internal coherence of member states’ policies and practices and through the
building of partnerships with the countries of origin likewise. That common approach
to migration included political, human rights, security, employment and develop-
ment issues in both home and host countries, to be fed by cooperation and techni-
cal assistance, as well as by speciﬁc bilateral agreements between the EU and third
countries. 
Although the recent migration governance crisis has put at the top of the agen-
da policy solutions regarding security, the ﬁght against irregular migration, human
rights and asylum, the approach deﬁned in the Tampere Council has not changed.
It is particularly clear looking at the policy recommendation deriving from the Eu-
ropean Agenda on Migration signed in 2015, and from the Khartoum Declaration,
signed in 2014 during the Italian Presidency of the EU.
Before analysing the most recent documents and policy frameworks, it is wor-
thy to give account of the progresses made concerning migration and development
policies, in the framework of the European Union Mobility Governance. 
Throughout the years, the European Union has developed several documents and
declaration on migration: Global Approach to Migration (2005); EU Pact on Immigration
and Asylum (2008); Stockholm Programme (2009); Global Approach to Migration and
Mobility (2011); European Agenda on Migration (2015). 
The “Global Approach to Migration” launched in 2005, and re-launched in 2011
as the “Global Approach to Migration and Mobility” aims to address migration through
21. Data available online at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Per-
sonal_remittances_statistics. 
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a comprehensive, balanced and coherent approach. The key objectives of this strat-
egy follows:
• improving the organisation of legal migration and facilitated mobility;
• preventing and reducing irregular migration in an eﬃcient, yet humane way;
• strengthening the synergies between migration and development;
• strengthening international protection systems and the external dimension of
asylum.22
The core aim of the Global Approach is twofold: on the one hand, it wants to set a
comprehensive strategy to address irregular migration and trafficking; on the oth-
er, it wants to manage migration and asylum through a close cooperation with third
countries, both origin and transit.
The background of the Global Approach lies in the international dialogue fora23
that the European Union has set with third countries in order to ﬁnd common syn-
ergies to manage migration issues. The activities of those dialogue processes are fo-
cused on enhancing the “triple wins” of migration in both home and receiving coun-
tries, namely the promotion of circular migration, which is seen as the core mutu-
al beneﬁcial strategy because it both serves the EU economy – through labour mi-
gration policies – and avoids brain drain in countries of origins.  In this framework,
migration and development do not represent an isolated policy, but are an integrate
part of the migration management, strictly connected with the other priorities. 
The Global Approach of 2005 marked a turning point in the European migration
management policy, given that it implemented the former intentions and policy rec-
ommendations, in order to concretely develop a comprehensive migration policy. 
The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum (2008) is coherent with the GAMM
in combining the two souls of European Migration policies: security and sustainable
development. As mentioned in the preface of the document 
In the last half century, the political and civilisational project that underlay the
establishment and deepening of the European Union has achieved considerable
progress. One of the most remarkable benefits on this enterprise is the creation
of a wide area of free movement that now covers most of Europe. This development
has provided an unprecedented increase in freedom for European citizens and
nationals of third countries, who travel freely across this common territory. […]
(Migration) can be and opportunity, because it is a factor of human and economic
22. Cf. European Commission, (2011), Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, Communi-
cation from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Brussels, September.
23. In particular the Rabat Process, launched in 2006 during the first Euro-African Ministerial
Conference. It brings together 55 countries from Western and Central Africa. For further in-
formation on bilateral dialogue processes: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/international-affairs/africa/index_en.htm.
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exchange, and also enables people to achieve what they aspire to. It can contribute
decisively to the economic growth of the European Union and of those member
states which needs migrants because of the state of their labour markets or of
their demography.24
The Pact, strongly supported by the French presidency of the European Union, aims
to give a comprehensive, harmonious and effective management of migration, through
an organization of legal migration, fighting to illegal migration and encouraging syn-
ergies between migration and development.
The Stockholm Programme (2009) is the EU ﬁve-year plan concerning security
and justice for the period 2010-2014. The programme was set with the target of cre-
ating a safer and open Europe, where people's rights are protected and the interest
of all stakeholders are pursued. In its program, the Swedish EU presidency aimed
to stress the need for strengthening the cooperation with countries of origin and tran-
sit of migratory ﬂows, as well as opening legal channels for immigrant labour, cre-
ating an equal distribution of the burden of illegal immigration among member states,
and easing the access to asylum procedures. The Programme, following the policy
direction of the Lisbon treaty, stressed also the importance of migration and devel-
opment nexus, to be implemented in a context of shared responsibility.
In particular, the Programme implied that ﬂexible immigration policies can make
a signiﬁcant contribution to economic development in the long run, and that greater
coherence between migration policies and other related policies should be given to
issues such as foreign, economic, employment, health and education policies. Co-
herently with the Stockholm Programme, the European Commission’s communication
Maximising the development impact of migration reinforces the importance of the afore-
mentioned priorities, stressing the signiﬁcance of enhancing governance through bi-
lateral agreements and involving civil society in the development related process-
es. Furthermore, it highlights the importance of migration and development link-
ages in south-south contexts.
In this context, one of the most fundamental policy instruments identiﬁed is the
creation of partnerships with third countries, seen as key actors in the management
of migration ﬂows.
The general attitude on mobility, transversal to the whole range of policy priorities,
is to foster the institutional cooperation with the strategic countries at regional lev-
el, with the aim to ensure the mutuality of migration beneﬁts. To this end, EU poli-
cies developed an external dimension composed of non-binding and voluntary agree-
ments, carried on in compliance with the principle of conditionality. The external
dimension is also evident when looking at one of the instruments of cooperation that
has been developed: “mobility partnerships” signed with strategic countries, which
represents one of the main “operating tool” of migration governance. Mobility part-
24. Cf. Council of the European Union (2008), EU Pact on Immigration and Asylum, September,
Brussels. 
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nerships, as instruments of soft law, are a combined tool for the management of mi-
gration and for the creation of a common European migration policy. Together, they
feature the characteristics of economic, social, security and foreign policies.
Signatory parties have no formalised requirement to meet in order to develop
their partnership, and their agreements are based on a voluntary adaption of existing
mechanisms of cooperation, perceived as more eﬃcient in tackling problems con-
cerning migration. The main aim for Parties involved is to create a framework of co-
operation, which may have diﬀerent degrees and ties in adaptation, according to ex-
isting agreements and activities already developed.  
As mentioned above, the policy documents elaborated in the last two years have
been strongly inﬂuenced by the increase of refugees and asylum seekers from Syr-
ia and Central Africa. In this context, the main challenge has become the overcom-
ing of the migration crisis through the cooperation of member states with strategic
third countries. Both the Declaration of the Ministerial Conference at the Khartoum
Process (2014) and the European Agenda on Migration (2015) see the nexus between
security and protection as key, together with the prevention of irregular traﬃcking
and the fostering of human rights. In this framework, sustainable development has
become instrumental for addressing the root causes of irregular migration. The Road
Map 2014-2017 signed in occasion of the EU-Africa Summit in 2014 follows this path,
adding the importance of human capital development, especially in education and
science. 
In this regard, it is important to highlight the method of reception of European
Policies within single member states.
Although there is a transversal interest in this topic in each single EU countries,
the eﬀorts toward migration and development policies appear highly diversiﬁed and
recall the single experience of states, mainly in terms of external relations. A com-
parative analysis of the “operationalisation” of the EU migration and development
principles within single member states shows that the main diﬀerences concern the
providing of funding, the actors involved and the focus of interest. The ICMPD25 re-
port “Migration and Development policies and practices” (2013), highlighted a num-
ber of major diﬀerences.
The ﬁrst diﬀerence concerns migration and development initiatives implemented
within the development agenda: countries such as France, Germany, Italy, Nether-
lands, Spain and Switzerland have dedicated resources for speciﬁc projects and pro-
grammes, while other countries have proceeded mainstreaming migration into a de-
velopmental policy, or adopting a mixed approach.
Secondly, there is a diﬀerence in the actors involved in the processes: not all coun-
tries work with a direct support to migrants’ associations or organisations. There are
diﬀerent modalities of implementation, which involve government and implementing
agencies at diﬀerent levels. This may cause a diﬀerentiated knowledge of the dias-
pora community within the country, and consequently a gap between the opportu-
nity structure and migrants’ organisation expectations. 
25. International Centre for Migration Policy Development.
79
The third diﬀerence concerns the involvement of the private sector, and of busi-
ness oriented activities. Also in this regard, involvement modalities vary, however
there is a growing attitude towards involving private subjects and chambers of com-
merce in all remittances related activities.
The last interesting diﬀerence highlighted by the ICMPD concerns the approach
toward migration and development with reference to the areas of return and rein-
tegration, focusing both on the voluntary return or encouraging the return of experts.
In the case of Italy, it is fundamental to stress that Migration and Development
have been part of the political framework of the Presidency of the EU in 2014 and,
despite the lack of a national policy, it is possible to identify some best practices of
co-development implemented at local level. The Italian government has also con-
tributed to the IOM’s MIDA strategy26, and improved the channels for remittances
ﬂows27. In this context, integration at all level – especially ﬁnancial – and capacity
building are perceived as key aspects for an eﬀective success of migration and de-
velopment initiatives.
coNclusioN
The paper illustrated the effects of the “transnational turn” at policy level within the
EU, and the modalities through which the Migration and Development policy has
been shaped. In particular, it has been highlighted that the raise of the “transna-
tionalism” and the idea of “transmigrant” at theoretical level has contributed to a
shift of perception of the migration impact on development, also on the policy side.
In this sense, the EU mobility governance developed a policy framework focused on
the enhancement of positive impacts of remittances flows, encouraging partnerships
with third countries. In spite of this fact, as for the other aspects of migration and
26. The MIDA programme is a long-term strategy of development based on the participation –
through mobility - of African diaspora in development initiatives in the countries of origin.
The MIDA approach has its roots in several programmes undertaken by IOM and since the
’70, as the RQN (Return Qualified Nationals) and includes a broad range of actions as the trans-
fer of technology, know-how and skills, or setting of entrepreneurial initiatives.  The devel-
opment of several lines of action within the strategy, and the inclusion of several African coun-
tries, have made the elaboration of a global strategy of intervention and a specific mecha-
nism of mobilisation of human and financial resources possible, for the benefit of countries
of origin, countries of destination and the migrants themselves. 
Through the MIDA Programme, a certain mechanism has been elaborated which includes a
wide range of development actors. This enables to draw up a clear picture of the development
sectors in the countries which suffer the lack of qualified resources and skills. IOM MIDA will
enable, in the long run, to promote the role of national governments and their active coop-
eration with diasporas in the definition of national policies and their strategies on imple-
mentation. The guidelines are elaborated in coherence with the national strategies, the Mil-
lennium Development Goals and the actions undertaken in bilateral cooperation.
27. As in the case of the initiative “Manda soldi a casa”, implemented by IOM and financed by the
Italian Development Cooperation office. Available online at http://www.mandasoldiacasa.it/it.  
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mobility management, there is a general lack of uniformity towards the application
of EU policies in Migration and Development, which mainly derives from different
conditions of integration of resident immigrants, external interests and bilateral agree-
ments and, lastly, from a differentiated interest towards the matter itself.  
Furthermore, the attention towards the security and protection duality has risen
to the top of the migration governance agenda, due to the well-known diﬃculties
that European Union is facing as well. 
The main question which can be raised, with regard to the ﬁnal policy objective
of Migration and Development as a strategic and core element of the mobility gov-
ernance: would a long term policy perspective be beneﬁcial for the Union to focus
on development as an instrument reducing inequalities in both sending and receiving
contexts?. It may lead, consequently, to the activation of a “better” migration, char-
acterised by the enhancement of economic and living conditions in the context of
home countries, which consequently aﬀects the personal empowerment of the mi-
grant himself. 
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The eu aNd TuRkey asylum Policy
The refugee status is defined by international law. The right of asylum is the legal
permission to stay in a country as a refugee, benefiting of a set of rights related with
this status. Not every asylum seeker will be recognised as a refugee, but all refugees
are initially asylum seekers. States are required to protect refugees and not send them
back in the country of origin where their personal security is at risk. The current in-
ternational approach to refugees dates back to the 1950s as the European answers
to the plague of the Holocaust and the victims of World War Two. The theoretical
scheme is that the international community intervenes to help citizens of third states
when the social contract and the legal protection between them and their home coun-
try breaks down. Host states welcomed the displaced people and they receive fund-
ing and symbolic commitment by the international community (O’Nions, 2014;
Lavenex - Ucarer, 2003). 
The feeling of being trapped without any escape routes is common among civ-
il population in Syria today. In the last year, the Turkish generous open-door poli-
cy of hosting millions of refugees and even complaining European Union member
states’ decision of “building walls” and “closing their doors” (Kahraman, 2016) has
been substituted by the decision of completing the construction of a permanent wall
sealing oﬀ the border between Turkey and Syria (in the ﬁrst months of 2017). This
project is part of Turkey’s “integrated security project” aimed at reducing the risk
of terrorist threats, in response to the increasing terrorist attacks in the last years.
Although the implementation of this restrictions has reduced the inﬂux of daily
refugees in Turkey, the overwhelming number of refugees has peaked to 3,1 million
in 2016, including Syrians (2,7 millions), Iraqi and other nationalities. This num-
ber needs to be updated due to the constant escalation of violence in the region (Kan-
ter, 2016). 
In order to help Turkey deal with this tremendous inﬂux of desperate people, the
European Commission and EU member states are ﬁnancing a humanitarian and de-
velopment project for 3 billion euro within the framework of the Facility for
Refugees in Turkey for the years 2016-2017.  Since 2011, the Turkish government
has organised 26 camps hosting 250000 refugees for a total expenditure of 12 bil-
lion euro. Moreover, the European Commission, in partnership with the Turkish au-
thorities and the World Food Programme, has designed the Emergency Social Safe-
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ty Net, a single card of social assistance scheme meant to transfer electronically a
monthly cash grant to the most vulnerable refugees, to cover their basic daily needs.
The measure will support up to 1 million of refugees, with an initial budget of 348
millions Euro, the biggest humanitarian project in the history of the European Com-
mission. This project comes after a string of humanitarian aid projects launched in
2016 for a total value of 164 million (Collett, 2016). 
Despite the signiﬁcant eﬀort of the European Institutions, the Turkish govern-
ment and the International Community, the numbers suggest that the situation is
almost out of control. More than 90% of Syrian refugees in Turkey - the largest com-
munity of refugees in the country- live outside the camps settings, with diﬃcult ac-
cess to basic services. Notwithstanding the eﬀorts of the European Commission to
target exactly this part of the refugees with its programmes, the refugees are pay-
ing rent and food expenses with their depleted resources. Moreover, they are ﬁght-
ing to have access to information, registration and, most importantly to public ser-
vices such as education and healthcare.
The inadequateness of the combined measures adopted is conﬁrmed by the de-
cision taken by the Turkish government of buildinga wall, or better, a reinforced fence
to close 900 km border with Syria with the aim to stop illegal crossing and smug-
gling. Over the 19 oﬃcial crossings along the Turkish-Syrian border only 2 remain
open (with some restrictions) as a legal option for refugees. In this way, only 200 peo-
ple, mainly severely wounded ones, have the permission to cross the border legal-
ly each day (Kanter, 2016). 
The EU approach to asylum entails an internal and an external dimension. Since
1999, the EU has committed to developing a Common European Asylum system. This
can be deemed the internal level. The main legislative initiatives in this ﬁeld have
been so far the 2001 Directive on Temporary Protection, the institution of a Euro-
pean Refugee Fund, the establishment of the European Asylum Support Oﬃce, FRON-
TEX, EURODAC, EUROSUR, the revision of the Dublin Agreement, and more recently,
the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), which is composed of ﬁve main doc-
uments that revise the previous system of norms and procedures. In the aftermath
of the adoption of CEAS, several NGOs and the UN High Commissioner for Refugee
have raised concerns over the weakness of the constructed legal framework – detention,
legal assistance, procedural safeguards, the impact of Dublin Regulation on the fun-
damental rights of the asylum seekers (European Commission 2012; Joint NGOs State-
ment 2013; UNCHR 2013).  
At the external level, the EU foreign and security policy comprehensively cov-
ers asylum and migration . Thus ‘Asylum’ is part of the “Global approach to migra-
tion and mobility” adopted in 2005 and renewed in 2011. Since 2005, the EU has
created a number of Regional Protection Programmes (RPPs) and in 2012 the EU
adopted a Joint Resettlement Programme to involve member states more in reset-
tlement of refugees. However, many criticisms exist on the gaps that persist between
the EU’s capability of funding projects and the realization of said projects. , especially
t those addressed at asylum seekers (Tolay, 2014; Collett, 2016; Shaheen, Wintour,
Rankin, 2016).
85
In April 2013 Turkey adopted the “Law on Foreigners and International Protection”
and in June 2013 the European Parliament endorsed the “Common European Asy-
lum System”, which was expected to be implemented in April 2014 and fall 2015.
Between June 2011 and March 2013, Turkey welcomed more than 600.000 Syrian
refugees, while the EU was criticized for the slow-paced move towards standardiz-
ing asylum policies to assist Syrian refugees. In 2013 Juliette Tolay commented the
surprising state of aﬀairs saying that “Turkey has long been seen as having a rela-
tively poor asylum policy, in comparison to the higher standards of the EU (as re-
peatedly highlighted in the yearly Progress report of the European Commission). (…)
There seems to be a deeper change in approach towards the issue of asylum and
refugees, with Turkey turning towards a more humanitarian approach, while the EU
is paralyzed by the security approach privileged by member states” (Tolay, 2014).
The syRiaN FailuRe aNd The eu’s democRacy PRomoTioN 
iN The mediTeRRaNeaN. a maRshall PlaN FoR ReFuGees 
aNd a FRee maRkeT sysTem as a viaBle soluTioN
Some 54% of world’s refugees have lived in exile for more than 5 years, with significant
restriction in their freedom of movement and the right to work. The average length
of the exile is a long period of 17 years, during which the refugees wait to see if they
can return home or if they can settle in a new country, being reintegrated in a peace-
ful society (Betts-Collier, 2015).
A diﬀerent and useful approach to solve the problem of the Syrian refugees is to
consider them not only as a humanitarian challenge, but also as an opportunity for
development for the host countries. In this way, also the social tensions and the of-
ten-diﬃcult relationship that hosting societies establish with refugees could be eas-
ily overcome. If the integration of refugees in the socioeconomic structure of the host
country becomes the solution for national economic problems, refugees will be wel-
comed with enthusiasm. In this prospect, refugees should show their promptness and
contribute to the cost of their own care. The government of the host country, in this
case Turkey, should give refugees autonomy and opportunities. The ﬁrst can be ob-
tained with the creation of Development zones, the latter with the implementation
of a market economy that is also open for the refugees (Fracchiolla, 2015; Kanter,
2016; Shaheen, Wintour, Rankin 2016). 
The international community could boast the economic integration of Syrian
refugees through ﬁnancial incentives and trade concessions, for example establishing
incentives for employing Syrians and conceiving urban areas as industrial incuba-
tor zones, where Syrian refugees can have access to education and training  (Betts
- Collier, 2015). This solution, proposed for the Syrian refugees in Jordan can eas-
ily be applied also to the Syrian refugees in Turkey. Many of the displaced Syrians
are well educated, have technical skills and share a proxy language with their host
country, whose interest in implementing this virtuous process can be fed with a new
version of a Marshall Plan for the refugees with a conditionality mechanism for the
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access. By backing similar projects,  the European Union could recover some of its
lost soft power and regain its reputational inﬂuence as a magnet of security and sta-
bility (Collett, 2016).
Beside the case of Syrian refugees in Turkey, there are several examples of the
collapse of the current system: Rohingya refugees in Myanmar and Bangladesh,
Afghani, Iraqi and Eritrea refugees in Papua New Guinea and Naru, Syrian, Iraqi and
Afghani refugee in Hungary. On the other hand, there are at least three relevant ex-
amples of success that can be mentioned whereby as refugees contribute to the eco-
nomic development of hosting societies. The ﬁrst case was the policy of Greece dur-
ing the 1920s, when the country reintegrated 1.5 million refugees ﬂeeing from Turkey
by employing them in the economic transformation of the underdeveloped areas of
the country (Betts – Collier, 2015). 
The second example is the case of sub-Saharan Africa in 1960s. In Western Ugan-
da, Oxfam helped the development of the Kyangwaly settlement, having Rwandan
refugees contributing to the growth of a previously underdeveloped region. The third
case is that of Central America after the Cold War. The Yucatan Peninsula, in Mex-
ico, beneﬁted from the work of Guatemalan refugees in modernising the economy
of the region. All these examples can be deemed to be success stories, implying an
involvement in the agricultural sector. The case of the Syrian refugees regards in-
dustrial rather than agricultural development but it can be considered even better
in terms of positive externalities for the socio-economic system of the host country
(Betts – Collier, 2015).   
The agreement between Turkey and the EU of 29 November 2015 regarding the
alleviation of refugee crisis has been harshly criticized from diﬀerent perspectives.
Human rights organizations, some European member states, the European public
opinion and Turkish intellectuals are blaming the agreement. For example, Human
Rights Watch (2016) deems that “the EU spins the deportations from Greece as break-
ing the cruel business model of smugglers, even though many refugees see smug-
glers as a lifeline to safety”. This approach has been criticized, considering that the
problem concerns the conﬂicts in the regions where people are ﬂeeing from as well
as the inadequateness of EU  policies to handle the situation. On the contrary, refugees
are more and more using alternative and more dangerous routes to Europe, for ex-
ample between Libya and Italy. All the diﬀerent points of view between Turkey and
the Eu date back to the interruption of the democratization process in Turkey.
Since the popular uprising in the Arab world the EU has stepped up its eﬀorts in
relation to democracy promotion. In relation to Turkey, it has devised a Positive Agen-
da, continuing the tradition of emphasizing the importance of democracy in its neigh-
bourhood policy, ENP (Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy, European
Commission, 2006; A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy, European Commission,
2007; A partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the Southern Mediter-
ranean and a new response to a changing neighbourhood, European Commission/High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Aﬀairs and Security Policy, 2011). 
The vision of the EU includes “closer economic integration and stronger politi-
cal cooperation” (European Commission/High Representative of the Union for For-
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eign Aﬀairs and Security Policy, 2011). In 2012, the EU declared to be satisﬁed with
the New Response, as the Council was welcoming the good progress made (Coun-
cil of the European Union, 2012). The new approach has broadened the deﬁnition
of democracy, including a deeper and more sustainable democracy. The failure of
Turkey’s Positive Agenda shows that what counts is the eventual real change on the
ground. Though Turkey ha s been ideologically oriented towards the EU, the pace
of reforms has stopped in the last years and the perception of democracy embraced
by the Turkish government is distant from the European one, considering at least the
issue related to minorities, freedom of expression and more recently even to secu-
larism.
As an EU accession candidate Turkey must accomplish the Copenhagen criteria
in relation to political conditionality and thus on democracy. Setting the priorities
for the democratization process is a prerogative of the EU, while the implementa-
tion rests in the hands of the national authorities that have deviated quite substan-
tially form the priorities set. Thus, there is a stalemate in negotiations. To what ex-
tent does the EU listen to diﬀerent social segments representing the major political
opponents to governmental and non-governmental organizations? The answer is that
the dialogue is quite poor. This also mines the credibility of the EU’s democratic pro-
motion process, that have been primary reﬂecting the EU economic and political in-
terests, not its professed democratic values. If the EU will continue to prioritize oth-
er interests over democratic values its legitimacy and credibility will be lost for a long
period and this could represent the end of the EU magnetic soft power.
The Eu use of the concept “common values” is highly contested. Even the mem-
ber states themselves diﬀer on how to conceptualize democracy. The common deﬁ-
nition of democracy adopted by the EU agrees on emphasizing human rights and fun-
damental freedoms. It is built on the importance of institutions and processes, ac-
cording with Dahl’s deﬁnition of Polyarchy (1989) with distinct liberal traits. In this
deﬁnition, elected representatives, political parties, independent institutions, in-
dependent media and a strong civil society are fundamental. The principle of non
discrimination and the rights of people belonging to minorities are preserved, as well
as the gender equality, the women’s rights, the principle of solidarity and justice (Coun-
ciul of European Union, 2009).
The essential question is whether the liberal democratic model of democracy is
suitable or compatible with Turkish settings. Some scholars argue that liberalism and
political ideology has little success in regions where values are more infused by Is-
lam (Pace and Hassan, 2012). In addition to this, liberal democracy has strong con-
nection with economic liberalism, not necessary in line with local ideals (Tocci, 2012).
Liberal outlook on civil society is often disconnected by the local context (Ketola, 2011). 
There is often an inherent contradiction between interests on common values
and common interest. When these dimensions are in tension, it is usually the com-
mon interests of energy, migration or trade preferences that trump declared values
(Dimitrova, 2010). The diﬀerence between promoting liberal democratic values and
promoting liberal democratic institutions and processes is immense. Introducing a
democratic process in which people can vote for their government based on currently
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held Islamist vision is far easier than promoting liberal values in a population cul-
turally mainly far from them. If Turkey would be allowed to formulate its own vision
of democracy the risk of compromising the liberal democratic model of democracy
is consistent for the EU. In order to address the issue of values, a possible solution
is a deeper dialogue with the Turkish society. In the EU’s late response to the Arab
Spring more emphasis was put on human rights and economic, cultural and social
rights, which indicates a step towards a broader deﬁnition of democracy (Council
of European Union, 2012). 
The eu – TuRkey deal oN ReFuGees aNd iTs imPlemeNTaTioN
The agreement between Turkey and the EU on refugees has been negotiated in March
2016 to stop the influx of refugees -  mainly from Syria - in Europe. All the asylum
seekers landing in Greece are being sent back to Turkey. In turn, the EU is giving 6
billion euro to help the 2.7 million Syrians now stuck on Turkish soil. Moreover, it
should be easier for Turks to obtain a European visa. This clause has not been ful-
filled yet. Finally, Europe has promised to accept another Syrian living in a Turkish
camp for each refugee expelled (Collett, 2016). 
However, this mechanism is not likely to see much use if the Aegean ﬂow stop.
Though this deal has reduced the number of migrants, it has opened or just reinforced
other routes to Europe and it presents a number of problems from a political, hu-
manitarian and legal point of view. Turkey has not signed the UN refugee conven-
tion, it has broken international law by sending back refugees to Syria and it does
not oﬀer working permits to Syrians, who oblige their children to work as a result. 
Turkey’s President Erdogan has been using the deal as a tool to sway the EU ne-
gotiation over the enlargement. The political relations between Ankara and Brussels
are tense due to the uptake of violent actions by the Turkish government following
the failed coup d’état in July (Collett, 2016; Shaheen - Wintour - Rankin, 2016). 
Despite all diﬃculties, the agreement is functioning at staggering numbers. 2.75
million Syrians are registered in Turkey, around the 3.5 per cent of the population.
For the refuges, challenges include vulnerability to exploitation and a complicated
bureaucracy. The implementation of progressive integration policies needs time and
a holistic and coherent strategy in order to gain the needed coordination between
public institutions. The continuing upheavals of this year have retarded the solution
of the crisis (Shaheen - Wintour – Rankin, 2016).
An example of the bureaucratic scramble created by the size of the immigrant
ﬂux is the establishment and the rapid growth of the Directorate General of Migra-
tion Management (DGMM) up to 3000 staﬀ members in one year, in charge of reg-
istering the asylum seekers as well as handling all issues concerning foreigners. There
are growing suspicions over the real AKP’s refugee agenda, regarding the possibil-
ity that Erdogan is using the refugees to transform national identity, consolidating
its power and reframing Turkey’s hegemonic ambition in the Middle East. Indeed,
the refugees are overwhelmingly Sunni Arabs and this feature raises concerns over
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the possibility of future persecutions among some minority groups in Turkey, like Ale-
vis, Kurds and some Turkish nationalists (Kanter, 2016). Opposition parties blame
Erdogan for using to his advantage the refugee crisis. He could prospect the possi-
bility to oﬀer them the citizenship and make them part of his electoral constituen-
cy (International Crisis Group, 2016). 
In the last weeks Erdogan has threatened to tear up the deal a day after the Eu-
ropean Parliament urged governments to freeze EU accession talks with Ankara. In-
deed, the European Parliament has made a symbolic, non-binding vote demanding
an end to the decade-long accession negotiations with Turkey. Turkish oﬃcials blame
the EU for not showing suﬃcient support in the aftermath of the putsch and even
NATO partners for not understanding the scale of the threat posed to stability by the
Gulenists and Kurds in Turkey (Shaheen, Wintour, Rankin 2016). Brussels’ oﬃcials
are questioning over the Turkish commitment to EU values, repeatedly criticising Er-
dogan for the purge of thousands of civil servants accused of links to Fethullah Gulen,
and for the crackdown on media outlets and Kurdish politicians. The European par-
liament’s vote does not bind EU foreign ministers, who will meet in December to dis-
cuss EU relations with Turkey (Shaheen, Wintour, Rankin 2016). Notwithstanding
the expressed willingness of Germany, France, Italy and all the main EU member states
to continue institutional relations with Turkey - with regards to the negotiation talks
on accession, the EU will be obliged to interrupt said dialogue if Erdogan succeeds
in reintroducing the death penalty. 
On the other hand, Erdogan is playing the card of putting pressure on the EU by
approaching the Energy Club of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, established by
Russia and China in 2001 as an alternative to the EU. Turkey has a negotiating sta-
tus and it has become the Chairman of the organization just a few weeks ago. The
deputy prime minister Kutulmus, speaking at Chatham House, underlined that Turkey
was an island of stability in a region of chaos, highlighting the Turkish commitment
to Syrian refugees’ cause (Chatham House, 2016).
The break down of the traditional relationship between states and refugees calls
for a policy that reconciles the interests of host states with the needs of the displaced.
As considered in the previous paragraph, the economic integration of refugees in the
economic system of the host country would be the only real solution to the economic,
social and political problems faced by the host country. In order to achieve this goal,
Turkey should revive the promise of exerting its soft power for overcoming rather
than feeding the conﬂicting dichotomies of the Middle East. This approach recalls
the fundamental role of diplomacy and politics, implying the direct beneﬁt for the
stalemate of the relationship between Turkey and the EU (Fracchiolla, 2015b; Frac-
chiolla, 2012).
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iNTRoducTioN
The dramatic expansion of the number of third-country nationals (TCNs) in the EU
over the past twenty years has presented society with fresh dilemmas regarding the
balance of non-absolute fundamental rights, specifically the conflict between the rights
to non-discrimination and family life for non-EU residents on the one hand, and the
right of States to decide who enters their national territory on the other. In this con-
text, this article analyses the recent case of an ECJ ruling concerning Member States’
possibility to require TCNs to pass a civic integration examination prior to family re-
unification.
Following a description of the content of the rights to non-discrimination and
to family life for non-EU citizens residing in the EU, the article discusses the case,
the implications, as well as the controversies surrounding the ECJ’s ruling, especially
in light of the general EU objective to enhance TCNs chances of integration in the
host countries. We argue that, while the Court’s decision is in line with the European
Directive on Family Reuniﬁcation, the ruling does not consider the positive role that
family life and unity can play in enabling integration. 
The PRoTecTioN oF Family liFe iN euRoPeaN law
The right to family life has long been at the core of European legislation. The issue
is dealt with by both the fundamental treaties of the European Union and Council
of Europe, as well as in more specific EU regulations. However, the rapid social trans-
formations produced by immigration and the progressive stabilisation of immigrants
in EU countries requires European law to constantly readapt its legal framework to
grant the right to family life and unity to all the individuals residing within EU bor-
ders, whilst at the same time still granting Member States the possibility to au-
tonomously manage their national borders in accordance with their national priorities.
Within this framework, the right to family life was originally enshrined within
the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), under Article 8, which estab-
lishes the right to respect for private and family life. Under EU primary law, family
life acquired the status of a fundamental right under Article 7 of the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01). The two treaties also equal-
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ly introduce a fundamental right to non-discrimination (Article 14 of the ECHR and
Article 21 of the Charter), which is importantly related to, although distinct from,
the right to family life. The link between the two rights represents a primary legal
source for the assertion of a right to family life for non-EU legal residents. Howev-
er, the social transformation produced by immigration especially since the 1990s has
produced speciﬁc challenges with respect to the material conditions for granting the
right to family life to non-EU legal residents, therefore generating a need for more
speciﬁc conventions. 
The ﬁrst EU Council meeting that speciﬁcally dealt with this issue took place on
the 15-16 October 1999 in Tampere. In the presidency conclusions of that meeting,
the importance of ensuring that TCNs legally residing within EU border are grant-
ed fair treatment is clearly stressed. In particular, the document underlines that TCNs
should be granted “rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens” (EC
1999, par.18), and that discrimination in all aspects of their lives should be fought
against. The Council calls for the fair treatment and non-discrimination objectives
to be achieved through a “vigorous integration policy” to be implemented at the na-
tional level. The same objectives were then reasserted at the 2001 Laeken meeting,
where the Council called for the establishment of anti-discrimination programs, to-
gether with a set of “common standard procedures”(EC 2001, par. 40) for family re-
uniﬁcation. These two meetings set the guidelines for the translation of a right to fam-
ily life for non-EU legal residents into more speciﬁc directives. 
The main EU instrument of secondary law concerning the protection of the right
to family life for TCNs, and the one that lies at the core of this case, is the Family Re-
uniﬁcation Directive (2003/86/EC). Introduced in 2003, the Directive establishes
a set of common criteria to grant the right to family reuniﬁcation across Europe, which
Member States are then responsible for implementing at the national level. The 2003
Family Reuniﬁcation Directive provides TCNs with a strong right over the possibil-
ity to have their spouses and children join them in their country of residence, pro-
vided that the sponsor holds a residence permit of validity of at least one year (Art.
3).  In the Directive, making family life possible is not only good per se, but also in
as far as “it helps to create socio-cultural stability facilitating the integration of third
country nationals in the Member State, which also serves to promote economic and
social cohesion, a fundamental Community objective stated in the Treaty” (point 4).
The Family Reuniﬁcation Directive does however foresee the possibility for Member
States to require TCNs to comply with “integration measures," in case national law
requires it (Art. 7, 2). 
The right to family life and unity is also to be found in Directives 2003/109/EC
concerning the status of TCNs who are long-term residents and Directive 2009/50/EC
concerning the conditions of entry and residence of TCNs for highly qualiﬁed em-
ployment. Directive 2003/109/EC provides for the preservation of the family unit
in case the TCN who is a long-term residence moves to a second Member State (Art.
16). Directive 2009/50/EC grants EU Blue Card holders the possibility to be reunited
with their family members independently of a minimum period of residence (Art.
15, 2) — which is instead required for all other TCNs.  
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case descRiPTioN aNd RuliNG
Notwithstanding the existence of a legal framework that safeguards the right to fam-
ily life of all individuals residing in the EU, there exist cases in which Member States
have imposed specific conditions for family reunification applications to be accept-
ed. In the case under analysis, the Kingdom of the Netherlands rejected a family re-
unification application by the spouse of a TCN legally residing in the territory of that
State. The rejection of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs was based on the fact that
the applicants had not fulfilled the requirement of passing an “integration test” in the
country of origin. The applicants, Ms. K and Ms. A. respectively, had requested ex-
emption from the test based on health problems for which they provided a medical
certificate. However, based on Dutch law, exemption from taking the integration test
can only be granted in case of “very special individual circumstances” in which a TCNs
is “permanently unable” to pass the examination (ECJ Judgment, Case C-153/14, point
23) – a condition was deemed not applicable to the case under analysis.
Although the applicants lodged an objection against the rejection of their ap-
plication, the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs declared the challenges unfounded on the
basis that their health problems did not justify exemption. The question was then
referred to the national district court (Rechtbank’s-Gravenhage), which declared the
appeals lodged by respective Ms. K and Ms. A. to be instead both well founded. But
as the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs appealed against the judgment of the national dis-
trict court, the Council of State (Raad van State) referred to the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) for a preliminary ruling. 
The ECJ was consulted regarding the interpretation of the Family Reuniﬁcation di-
rective, and in particular of Article 7, section 2 of the text, which foresees the possibility
for Member States to require TCNs to fulﬁl “integration measures” for the purpose of
their residence permit. The ECJ was asked to rule on whether: (1) The Dutch integration
test is consistent with the “integration measures” mentioned by Article 7, section 2 of
the Family Reuniﬁcation Directive; (2) The “very special individual circumstances” men-
tioned by Dutch law as the only possible circumstances for granting exemption to the
test should be interpreted as being excessively narrow in a way that infringes with the
general purpose of the Family Reuniﬁcation Directive; (3) The costs of the Dutch ex-
amination (350 Euros per attempt for the examination, plus 110 for the preparation
pack) are consistent with the purpose of the Family Reuniﬁcation Directive. 
In its judgment, the ECJ upheld the right of Member States to “require third coun-
try nationals to pass a civic integration examination prior to family reuniﬁcation (au-
thorising…) before authorising that national’s entry into and residence in the ter-
ritory of the Member State for the purposes of family reuniﬁcation”. Integration mea-
sures like the Dutch test are considered to be acceptable in as far as they are meant
to facilitate the integration of the sponsor’s family members.
For this conclusion to be reached, the ruling recognised that the Dutch regula-
tion that subjects the granting of the authorisation of entry into its territory of in-
dividuals applying for a residence permit based on the family reuniﬁcation could be
interpreted as being consistent with the terminology of “integration measures” fore-
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seen by Article 7, section 2 of the Family Reuniﬁcation Directive, in as far as hold-
ing a basic knowledge of Dutch language and society does encourage integration by
facilitating interactions, social exchanges and, ultimately, access to the labour mar-
ket and vocational training. The Court ruled that if the conditions of application of
the test do not exceed what is necessary to achieve the aim of integration, the test
might well be considered a useful measure of integration. Similarly, regarding the
fees, the Court ruled that Member States are free to require TCNs to pay fees relat-
ed to integration measures in as far as the level of those fees does not make it im-
possible or excessively diﬃcult to exercise the right to family reuniﬁcation.  
Moreover, the Court did not raise any issue regarding non-discrimination. Part-
ly the reason seems to be that the Dutch policy was discussed with regards to the Eu-
ropean Directive on family reuniﬁcation, which does not refer to the articles on non-
discrimination. We will discuss in next section whether a link should have indeed
been established. 
After the closing of the case, in 2014, a Communication from the Commission
to the European Parliament and the Council on guidance for application of Direc-
tive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reuniﬁcation was published (COM 2014, 2010
ﬁnal). The purpose of the Communication was to provide Member States with guid-
ance on how to apply the directive, clarifying some of the “grey zones” – including
that of the possible inclusion of “integration measures” as a requirement for TCNs
– also based on precedent rulings of the ECJ on the matter. 
Policy aNalysis aNd coNsideRaTioNs
The case under analysis features a conflict between two sets of fundamental social
values, namely, the right to family life and family reunification on the one hand, and
the objective of promoting integration of immigrants into society on the other. Such
conflict of values poses serious challenges to the possibility of TCNs to exercise their
right to family reunification in some Member States countries. In each country, the
reasons accounting for the prioritisation of family life over immigrant integration
stretches far beyond the legal sphere to comprise the country’s historical, cultural
and social roots.
All EU initiatives on the matter of the right to family reuniﬁcation pertain to a pol-
icy area that the Treaty of Lisbon refers to as one of “shared competence” (Treaty on
Functioning of the EU 2010, 51-2). National policymaking should be restricted to ar-
eas in which the Union has not previously exercised its competence, meaning that,
at least in theory, the EU has a large room for manoeuvre in this ﬁeld. However, due
to the interpretability of some of the wording of the 2003/86 Directive on the right
to family reuniﬁcation, States are left in practice with ample autonomy in deciding
how to balance the objective of protecting family life with that of promoting integration.
A 2008 Commission report on the implementation of the Directive (COM
2008/610) had already rightly highlighted the problems generated by some of the
uncertain boundaries created by the “optional clauses” in the Directive, and in par-
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ticular, that of Article 7 (2) regarding States’ possibility to require TCNs to comply
with “integration measures”. In a 2011 document aimed at providing some guide-
lines on this issue, the admissibility of integration measures was made to depend on
an evaluation of whether the measures “serve the purpose of facilitating integration”
(COM 2011/735, sect. 2.1). The ECJ ruling of the Minister van Buitenlandse Zak-
en vs. K and A case does indeed make repeated references to such document. 
The Court’s ﬁnal ruling declared the pre-arrival integration test as admissible on
the grounds that it facilitates integration while at the same time not undermining
the broader purpose of the family reuniﬁcation Directive. However, the ruling still
does not solve the issue of the overall lack of clarity surrounding the “right to fam-
ily life” and the conditions at which the latter can be rightfully claimed by TCNs wish-
ing to reunite with their family members in the host country. Not specifying what
does (not) constitute an acceptable “integration measure” that a state can introduce
to restrict family reuniﬁcation, the Court’s ruling seems to prioritise – rather than
balance – integration over family life. More stringent guidelines concerning the in-
terpretation of the concept of acceptable “integration measures” would be necessary
if the objective is that of reducing Member States’ ability to use integration tests as
instruments for immigrant selection or border management. 
Furthermore, the ECJ’s ruling about the usefulness of integration measures can
be contested on the grounds that those measures might actually be counter-productive
with regard to the purpose they are meant to serve. In recent years, several researches
have challenged governments’ assumptions that mandatory language and civic test
signiﬁcantly ameliorates immigrants’ chances for integration (Bocker and Stik, 2011;
Groenendijk, 2011; Goodman, 2011; Goodman and Wright, 2015; HRW, 2008; Per-
moser, 2012; Scholten et al., 2012). In a report on the impact of family reuniﬁca-
tion tests in several EU countries (MPG, 2011), the Migration Policy Group argues
that pre-entry language tests do not carry long term positive eﬀects on linguistic and
cultural integration. The report indicates that language-learning beneﬁts are only
transitory, as applicants tend to forget what they learned as soon as the test is passed.
Similarly, in other researches, interviewed teachers and oﬃcials deny the existence
of noticeable language skills diﬀerences between applicants having being required
to pass a test and the others (Groenendijk, 2011, 25). 
More in general, the question of the impact of these tests on ameliorating chances
for economic and socio-cultural integration is diﬃcult to be addressed satisfactori-
ly, according to an evidence-based approach (Schweitzer, 2014, 18). To be sure, pi-
oneer studies on the topic have been far from optimistic (Scholten et al., 2012; Good-
man and Wright, 2015). At the same time, while the relation between the passing
of the test appears and individuals’ potential (or willingness) to integrate is far from
straightforward, considerable risks exist that not passing the test – and being refused
a family reuniﬁcation visa on those grounds – might reduce the psychological and
material resources necessary for the applicants’ and their family to seek integration
in the future (Groenendijk, 2011, 26-7; HRW, 2008; Permoser 2012). 
The ECJ ruling on the case rightly underlines that integration and family re-
uniﬁcation are both top priorities at the level of the EU. What it does not seem to suﬃ-
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ciently consider, however, is the diﬀerence in status that characterizes the two ob-
jectives. Indeed, while family life represents a fundamental right of individuals and
therefore carries an intrinsic value, the same cannot be said of integration, whose
desirability relies instead on the fact of it being an instrument to achieve some oth-
er goods (for example social cohesion, as spelled out clearly in EU documents28).
Adding to this, the ruling of the Court also does not seem to take in suﬃcient account
the signiﬁcant positive role that family life and reuniﬁcation can play in enabling in-
dividuals’ integration into society, through the creation of the conditions for indi-
viduals to enjoy a more stable and fulﬁlling life. 
Integration and family unity are indeed strictly related. However, since their re-
lationship is mainly unidirectional – as family life can foster integration, but integration
does not foster family life – it seems reasonable to expect that policies aimed at achiev-
ing integration be dependent on the encouragement and facilitation of family life
and reuniﬁcation. Based on this, the decision of the Court to declare the admissibility
of an “integration measure” which denies family reuniﬁcation on the grounds of pro-
moting integration can appear short-sighted and paradoxical. For this reason, pol-
icy-makers in the EU might be interested in considering alternative “integration mea-
sures” that, instead of making family reuniﬁcation more diﬃcult on the grounds by
imposing ex ante integration measures, facilitate family reuniﬁcation on the
grounds that it represents a key to immigrant integration. What this implies, in prac-
tice, is for member states to consider requiring TCNs to attend language and culture
courses only after reaching the country of destination, in order to motivate and fa-
cilitate the integration of the reuniﬁed spouses. To be eﬀective, such courses
should be accessible, well-organised and designed around the real needs of those
who attend them. 
iNTeGRaTioN aNd Family liFe: should we sTRike a BalaNce?   
Is the ECJ ruling in the Dutch case consistent with the right to family life as stated
in both the Charter and the European Convention? 
Before digging into the details of the Court’s ruling, we should ﬁrst address a gen-
eral issue concerning immigration policies. Speciﬁcally, it should be noticed that Mem-
ber States still retain within the legal framework of the European Union their tra-
ditional legal power to grant access to foreigners. The recent limitation of the “Schen-
gen area” free movement by Denmark and Sweden are an example of this ultimate
power. In the context of the current refugee crisis, States are indeed called upon by
their own citizens to prevent an uncontrolled ﬂow of immigration that is thought to
be destabilising the peace and security, the alternative being social and political chaos.
Containment policies of immigration ﬂows seem to have then a presumptive legit-
imacy in citizens’ constitutional rights to a peaceful and secure existence. Thus, while
28. See European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Tampere, 15-16 October 1999. http://-
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00200-r1.en9.htm. 
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the European Convention on Human Rights provides a ground for asylum rights29,
it also seems to justify some containment claims. For instance, Article 2 of the Con-
vention, after stating that everyone (EU nationals and aliens alike) have a right to
liberty and security, speciﬁes that that exceptions to unconditional rights are yet ad-
mitted in several cases, including “noncompliance with the lawful order of a court
or in order to secure the fulﬁlment of any obligation prescribed by law” (section b),
“reasonable suspicion of having committed an oﬀence” (section c),  and especially
“the lawful arrest or detention... to prevent his eﬀecting an unauthorised entry into
the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to de-
portation or extradition”(section f). The term law refers here to national legislations.
Since many of the EU Member States have recently adopted restrictive measures on
this matter, containment seems to fall within the scope of Article 2, especially un-
der section f.30 Moreover, Article 8 of the Convention restricts the right to family life
in cases of “interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of
the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” (section 2). Fi-
nally, Article 15 admits derogations from the obligations under the Convention to
the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.  
The European Charter of Fundamental Rights, while granting to right to asylum
(Article 18), and prohibits collective explosions (Article 19, sub 1), also allows States
to deport aliens seeking asylum in those cases where no serious risk of death penal-
ty, torture or inhuman treatment is envisaged (Art. 19, sub 2). 
Since fundamental rights are subject to limitation and balance against interests
of public safety or security, it follows that also more speciﬁc rights, such as that to
family reuniﬁcation, should be balanced against those interests. In the Dutch case,
the legitimacy of containment policies seems to be even more urgent, given the de-
mographic pressure caused by the number of reuniﬁcation requests in a Country which
29. See also Art. 3 of the Protocol No. 4 to the Convention.
30. Notice that many have criticised the introduction of such measures as punishing the mere
condition of being an irregular alien subject. See, for instance the statement issued by Ital-
ian Democratic Party Senator Luigi Manconi in a recent press release from January 8, 2016
(available at: http://www.senatoripd.it/giustizia/manconi-cancellare-reato-di-clandes-
tinit/).  In Italy the crime of illegal immigration is regulated by the Law 94/2009, “Disposizioni
in materia di sicurezza pubblica”. In Germany ( “Siebtes Gesetz zur Änderung des Bun-
desvertriebenengesetzes”, May 16, 2007), United Kingdom (Immigration, Asylum and Na-
tionality Act  2006) and France (Loi n. 2007-1631, relative à la maîtrise de l'immigration, à
l'intégration et à l’asile, November 20, 2007)  illegal entrance can also be punished by im-
prisonment. For an overview on other EU Country Members, see Laws for Legal Immigration
in the 27 EU Member States For an overview on the European Law - Edition 2009 edited by the
International Organization for Migration (IOM), available at: http://publications.iom.int/sys-
tem/files/pdf/iml_16.pdf. For a survey on the European Law on immigration, see The Hand-
book on European Law relating to Asylum, Borders, and Immigration - Edition 2014, edited by
the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, and the Council of Europe, available
at: http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/handbook-law-asylum-migration-borders-
2nded_en.pdf.
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already host large communities of foreigners. If containment policies – we may add
– are de facto enacted in the case of asylum requests as the recent crisis shows, even
more they are in the case of family reuniﬁcation.31
The legitimacy argument has important consequences for our understanding of
the legal status of the European citizenship, especially with regards to the non-dis-
crimination principle that we mentioned in the ﬁrst section. There are at least two
issues that need a brief discussion. First, does the legitimate prerogative of the Mem-
ber States to control their borders imply the power to unilaterally contain immigration
ﬂows? Despite the general argument that unrestricted ﬂow would destabilise
peaceful living, other considerations run against it unrestricted power of States. One
consideration concerns the rights of those aﬀected by containment policies. It must
be noticed in fact those who apply for reuniﬁcation are already legal residents of the
country where they submit their request. Therefore, a justiﬁcation of the contain-
ment policy should explain why only foreign residents should suﬀer from a poten-
tial curbing of rights, whereas the same containment does not apply to nationals. To
give an example: why is it the case that a Dutch national can marry a foreigner and
ask for family reuniﬁcation without passing any civic integration test, whereas le-
gal residents are required to take it? 
Of course legal residents and nationals are not equal in many regards. Residents
do not usually have voting rights, which is certainly true for Parliamentary or Eu-
ropean elections. However, in many other respects, they do enjoy a right to equal treat-
ment before the law. Why is it then that in the case of family reuniﬁcation equal treat-
ment does not apply? The arbitrariness of the test does not consist in discriminat-
ing between nationals and TCNs, but in the lack of a justiﬁcation for this discrimi-
nation. 
The argument again, cannot not be inferred from the status of the joining spouse
or relative, for again in the case of the Dutch resident the joining party does not have
to pass any test. Absent a justiﬁcation for such diﬀerential treatment, we are left with
two options: either the right to family reuniﬁcation holds equally both for nation-
als and TCNs when they submit a request of reuniﬁcation with a non-EU citizen; or
it does not. On one hand, if we argue that all aliens – regardless of the nationality
of their spouses or relatives – should pass the test, a further question arise: would-
n’t the national law after all discriminate against aliens qua aliens, regardless of their
family or marital status? On the other hand, if we argue that there should be a dif-
ferential treatment, the ground for a justiﬁed discrimination should be made clear-
er. To this purpose, we propose to analyse more in detail the arguments provided by
the Court. 
Within the framework of this general argument, the Court’s ruling seems to fall
within the presumptive legitimacy of States to retain control of their borders. As we
31. Notice however that, strictly speaking, containment policies are not allowed in the case of
asylum, since when an asylum seeker has accessed one of the countries of Refugee Conven-
tion, authorities are legally obliged to provide temporary shelter until the request is assessed.
We owe this point to Jackson Oldfield. 
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just saw, the Court judged the term “measure” was suﬃciently broad to be consid-
ered both as a measure of “integration” as speciﬁed by Article 7, section 2 of the Fam-
ily Reuniﬁcation Directive. The Court also ruled that the test did not exceed what
is necessary to achieve the aim of integration – for example by systematically pre-
venting family reuniﬁcation in the case of an applicant showing willingness to pass
the examination despite repeated failed attempts to do so due to speciﬁc individu-
al circumstances. Since failed attempts (unless due to speciﬁc circumstances,
which the Court didn’t envisage in the Buitenlandse Zaken vs. K and A case) would
prove the insuﬃcient motivation of the applicant, they were not prejudicial to her.
Therefore, the integration test might well be considered a reasonable require-
ment that falls within the scope of integration and it is proportionate to the right of
family reuniﬁcation. Similarly, with regard to the fees, the Court ruled that Mem-
ber States are free to require TCNs to pay fees related to integration measures in as
far as the level of those fees does not make it impossible or excessively diﬃcult to
exercise that same right. The Court concluded that the measure could be legitimately
demanded for before the applicant can enter the Country.  
some NoRmaTive aRGumeNTs aGaiNsT The couRT’s RuliNG
Given the above premises, we may now raise some normative arguments against the
Court’s ruling. First, the test puts an undue burden on the migrant for a condition
he/she is not responsible for. Such burden consists — inter alia — in the costs car-
ried by the prospective migrant to take the test. Although the Court judged this bur-
den not to be excessive in this particular case, Article 7(2) of Directive 2003/86 ex-
plicitly states that the integration measures must be aimed not at filtering those per-
sons who will be able to exercise their right to family reunification, but at facilitat-
ing the integration of such persons within the Member States. Yet, as the test is pro-
vided ex ante, failing to pass the test acts as a de facto filter. This is even more so if
we consider that the Advocate General, in his opinion on this case, stated that fail-
ing to pass the test did not imply automatic refusal of the family reunification request.
The Court did not find the applicant to be “permanently unable to pass that exam-
ination” (point 19, c), which is the main condition when the hardship clause applies.
Since hardship applies only to permanent inability, the Court reasoned that the right
to family reunification was just conditional on the requirement to pass the civic in-
tegration examination even in all those possible cases where maintaining that re-
quirement would make family reunification impossible or excessively difficult
(point 63). 
The same general reasoning that excludes non-permanent hardship applied in
the further question posed to the Court, that is whether the costs relating to the civic
integration examination should be considered as a suﬃcient ground for exemption
from the test. The Court stated that “the fact remains that, in accordance with the
principle of proportionality, the level at which those costs are determined must not
aim, nor have the eﬀect of, making family reuniﬁcation impossible or excessively diﬃ-
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cult”, yet leaving competence to the national authorities to determine the fee costs
without considering the particular circumstances of TCNs from countries where 350
euros can often correspond to several months’ salary. 
Second, it is dubious whether the test is a suitable proxy for evaluating willing-
ness to integrate, as it contradicts straightforwardly the aim of facilitating the inte-
gration of the applicant. One may argue that integration should be taken as a gen-
eral policy towards the community as a whole. Admittedly, both the Directive and
the Court’s decisions do utilise the term integration as a general term, but the right
to family life on which the Directive is based is an individual, not a communal or col-
lective right. In other words, if integration is value that should pursued, it seems quite
unreasonable to deny access to applicants whose integration we seek on the basis
that they would not further this aim. We should keep in mind that failing the test
has more far reaching negative consequences for migrants than any upholding of an
abstract value of integration.
Third, valuing integration in general seems to underline a view of the societies
we live in as culturally defined by a set of values prospective immigrants should be
assimilated into. This point is shown by the phrasing of the Court’s decision referring
to the integration test as a civic measure meant to evaluate the knowledge of the
hosting country. But European societies are now far from being closed communi-
ties defined by one unique set of values. The very criteria for granting citizenship
(whether based on birth or parent’s nationality) does not imply the citizen should
share any particular value of the community she is part of. Of course being a law-
ful citizen of a country comes with the possession of rights and the duty to respect
the laws and abide by the fundamental principles entrenched in the constitutions.
Yet, rights and duties are not values in the sense we are discussing here. Rights and
duties empower people with the capacity to make choices according to their moral
and personal aims, and their limit comes – as it is usually recalled – with the equal
rights and duties of other members of that community. The language of rights does
not overlap, and sometimes clearly diverges, from the language of values. Values
have rather strong moral connotations, in that they constitute beliefs that provide
a foundation for our personal lives, not public life. Thus, if we want to say that in-
tegration is a value, it cannot be that sort of moral value that we associate with our
strongest moral convictions, whether religious, ethnic or cultural. We must think
of integration along different lines, more closely to which rights integration fur-
thers. 
We argued above that we may think of integration not as a value per se, but as
an instrumental value aimed at enhancing autonomy, recognition and respect for new-
comers. We can certainly express autonomy, recognition and respect as values, but
what they consist in are claims of rights individuals have. They are part of what be-
ing a citizen means, quite apart from what moral convictions she or he may have.  
An important consequence of the previous argument is that balancing between
integration and the right to family life is an ill-posed issue, because we can hardly
weigh-up abstract values or general policies with speciﬁc right claims or requests.
The Court’s very decision is indecisive in this sense, referring to the authority of the
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Member States to set measures that would not contradict the general aim of the Long
Term Residents Directive. The consequence is that, when the right to family life is
made conditional on the general value of integration or the manifest willingness to
integrate, authorities can more easily ﬁnd a way around to couch otherwise politi-
cal measures in moral language.  
To sum up: abiding by the moral values of a given community cannot be the aim
of integration because current European societies are all more or less multicultur-
al, so no set of deﬁned values would be a good criterion of inclusion.  
In conclusion, all things considered, the entry test per se is either insuﬃcient to
establish a proper capacity for integration (for whatever reason integration is upheld)
or it can represent in some cases an undue burden against migrants for a condition
they are not responsible for. A culture of integration should not be selective in the sense
required by the test as set out by the Dutch legislation. 
However, we do not want to claim that integration measures should be abol-
ished, neither that language abilities are unnecessary to the aim of integration.  Lan-
guage abilities do have positive consequences overall in favouring subjects’ autonomy
and a richer social life, and a politics of inclusion should adopt measures that would
facilitate the legitimate aims of integration such as autonomy, respect and recog-
nition. However, strengthening these abilities should not (a) require the imposi-
tion of entry tests before arrival; (b) be evaluated in the form of selective exami-
nations.
coNclusioN
In this paper, we have argued that the Court’s Decision in the van Buitenlandse Za-
ken vs. K and A case addresses focal issues in the present European legislation on im-
migration policies, rights to family life, and non-discrimination. We have argued that
the practice of employing civic tests as selective measures of integration does not fur-
ther the proper aims of integration, conflicts with fundamental rights to family life
and non-discrimination, and does not take into due consideration the proportion-
ality principle required for the adoption of these selective measures. 
We have also defended the idea that the right to family life is a fundamental right
which should trump considerations of balancing it with unspeciﬁed values of inte-
gration. Yet, as we have said, integration has the instrumental value of facilitating
the promotion of other values, such as autonomy, recognition and respect, which can
be translated in actionable rights. This is indeed not a new idea. Jean Jacques Rousseau
(1755) thought of recognition as the sentiment of being an equal among equals.
A society of equals is one in which the standards of acceptance depend on par-
ticipation in public life, and participation is an expression of freedom, for it grants
collective self-government. In this sense, integration has an important function, as
it favours the recognition and respect of migrants as political subjects, and indeed
as citizens in the sense of potential participants in the public life of the community
they live in. We did not argue however that immigration policies should be unre-
104 shall iNTeGRaTioN TesTs TRumP The RiGhT To Family ReuNiFicaTioN?
strained. Conﬂicts of rights may arise at such a level when unrestrained access com-
promises the welfare entitlements of nationals. But such considerations cannot be
taken as presumptive arguments in favour of selective measures based on civic in-
tegration.  
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whaT aRe we TalkiNG aBouT? 
deFiNiTioN, size aNd deTeRmiNaNTs oF iRReGulaR immiGRaNTs iN iTaly. 
A quota of the foreign population In recent years  migration ﬂows in Europe  seem
to be charaterised in Europe has an irregular legal status. Over the years, this pop-
ulation has become a priority issue for At the same time, irregular migration has be-
come a priority issue for European Union migration policy (Triandafyllidou
2010).migration policy (Triandafyllidou 2010).In Italy the undocumented immigration
has also become one of the main electoral issue in recent election campaigns.The de-
bate over undocumented immigration has ended up taking an ideological value that
transcends largely its numerical and economic impact. It is therefore important to
deﬁne the actual scope of irregular immigration, starting with a clear deﬁnition.  The
immigrant population may be broken down roughly on the basis of their legal sta-
tus. There are regular immigrants who hold residence permits; regular immigrants
who are registered in the municipal population registers; and irregular immigrants
who do not hold residence permits. 
Irregular immigrants may in turn be broken down into those who enter Italy with-
out authorisation, that is, without visas, and those who enter Italy with visas, but
stay after visa expiration without converting their visas into residence permits The
illegal part is in turn formed by immigrants entered Italy without authorization, name-
ly without visas, or staying without permit.(overstayers).Here we deﬁne as undoc-
umented immigrants, both the unauthorized component and Overstayers one. In this
paper, irregular immigrants refer to both undocumented immigrants and over-
stayers.They represent the part of the immigrant population that will be analyzed.
Both groups account for the portion of the immigrant population that will be in-
vestigated in this paper.  Immigrants can obviously change their status. Regular im-
migrants may, in fact, lose their residence permits, and thus become irregular, which
Obviously the immigrants during their stay may change their legal status. In particular,
they can move from legal to illegal component of immigration if they loss the per-
mit to staywould entail worse living conditions. Conversely, irregular immigrants who
become regular immigrants will see their living conditions improved. Our analysis
will focus on the latter case.  This last path is the process that will be analyzed.  
When it comes to .irregular immigration, the size of the phenomenon is a cru-
cial issue. Eiven the nature of this population, stimates obviously have error margins;
The imPoRTaNce oF BeiNG RecoGNised as woRkeRs.
iRReGulaR immiGRaNTs 
aNd access To The iTaliaN welFaRe sTaTe
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in Italy, however,As shown Strozza (2004 p. 325), the estimates produced in Italy
while following diﬀerent methodologies have always given more or less similar val-
ues and they have never reached exorbitant amount. estimates made with diﬀerent
methodologies have produced broadly similar results, which are not disproportionate
to the total foreign population (Strozza 2004; ISMU 2016).Moreover, in the last decade
the incidence of undocumented component on the total of immigrant population has
experienced a signiﬁcant decrease. In addition, the incidence of irregular immigration
has signiﬁcantly decreased over the past decade. Certainly, the most signiﬁcant con-
tribution to this decrease is given by the considerable increase in foreign population
legally present.This is, for the most part, due to the considerable increase in the for-
eign population that is in Italy legally, mainly following regularisation programmes.
Alongside this trend, it acted, especially in the last two years, also a decline of un-
documented immigrant population.Alongside this trend, the population of irregu-
lar immigrants has fallen, especially over the past few years (Bonifazi 2007; Boni-
fazi, Heins, Strozza, Vitiello 2009). In general, the current trend of the irregular im-
migrant stock may be explained by the eﬀects of regularisation programmes, with
only a small portion of immigrants remaining in an irregular situation. In the years
following the regularisation, the initial quota is restored by new entries.If we cConsid-
ering the estimates of the illegal component of immigrant population presents in Italy
produced from 1980 forwards, and the eﬀects of regularization programs have oc-
curred in recent years, one can suppose that illegal component of immigration has
a close relationship with the legal component.onsider the estimated number of the
immigrant population that has been in Italy legally from 1980 onwards and the eﬀects
of the regularisation programmes implemented over the years, we may argue that
the regular component of the immigrant population may only partly be accounted
for by regular entries. In other words, regularisations have brought about a popu-
lation increase, either directly or indirectly (because of family reunions)According
to Bonifazi, if we consider the total number of immigrants regularized, we get that
they represent more than half of immigrants legally present (2007, p. 116)..
Therefore, we may assume that being irregular is a transient and not a structural con-
dition. Hence, it is virtually impossible to make a distinction between the regular and
irregular components of the immigrant population as if there were no interplay be-
tween two separate sets of population.  The spread of undocumented immigration
among immigrant population is not uniform but it varies according to nationalities. 
The distribution of the irregular immigrant population is not even: it varies de-
pending on nationalities. On this, it should be noted that enlargement of the Euro-
pean Union has aﬀected the composition of illegal immigrant population. Interest-
ingly, the enlargement of the European Union aﬀected the composition of the irregular
immigrant population ﬁrst, and of the regular one later. After 2008, for immigrants
from Romania and Poland, the distinction between documented and undocument-
ed has lost meaning.After 2008, the distinction between legal and illegal lost its mean-
ing for immigrants coming from Romania and Poland. Beyond those changes, the
immigrant population with a more ancient presence in Italy, such as Albania, Mo-
rocco, China, Philippines, Senegal, have relatively small shares of illegal presence,
109
as opposed to those coming from Eastern Europe, as Ukraine, Moldova and coun-
tries of former Yugoslavia, which have the highest incidence of illegal presence, as
shown by (Blangiardo 2009, p. 62). Certainly, one of the main reasons accounting
for this variety is that the nationalities that have been present the longest have reached
a more advanced stage of the integration process. Now, they have a greater and more
stable presence among regular immigrants, which makes illegal entries unnecessary
and the proportion of the irregular immigrant stock increasingly less signiﬁcant. They
now have a larger legal and stable presence, which makes very small proportion of
illegal one.
Geographical factors should be taken into account when considering the possi-
ble determinants of undocumented migration ﬂows towards Italy. The proximity of
The proximity of Italy with less developed areas has fostered the beginning of im-
portant migration ﬂows. Italy to less developed countries has encouraged major mi-
gration ﬂows. Moreover, the length and the accessibility of the borders with the The
length and accessibility of the borders with the Mediterranean Sea and its position
with respect to other destination countries, has played a crucial role especially at the
beginning of Italian immigrant experience.Mediterranean Sea and Italy’s position
with respect to other destination countries played a key role, especially at the beginning
of the Italian immigration experience.Furthermore, when Italy started to witness im-
migration in the early 1970s, the country was open to immigration ﬂows because
of the absence of any particular rules controlling the entry and the stay of foreign
workers. When Italy began experiencing immigration during the 1970s, the coun-
try was more open to migration ﬂows, due to a relative lack of rules for checking for-
eign workers’ entries and stays.Nevertheless, in the subsequent years the immigrants
population is increased while Italy has begun to develop increasingly restrictive im-
migration policies. However, the immigrant population grew in the following years,
during which Italy started developing increasingly restrictive immigration legisla-
tion. This paradox is explained by the labour demand dynamics in Italy, with a sig-
niﬁcant and structural demand for immigrant workers in the economic sectors that
have been abandoned by Italian workers.So, the presence of an informal econom-
ic sector contributes to explain the social reproduction of illegal immigrants area,
Reyneri (2003). Italian labour market segmentation and a signiﬁcant labour demand
in the industrial sector (Pugliese 1991) help explain the existence and persistence
of irregular employment.Last, we have to stress the role of immigration policies adopt-
ed by Italy in the last years. Finally, the role should be highlighted of the immigra-
tion policies adopted by Italy in recent years. In The issues regarding immigration
in Italy are regulated by the Consolidation act on immigration and status of foreigners
amended by Law 189/2002, 125/2008 and law 94/2009.Italy, immigration matters
are regulated by the Consolidated Act on Immigration.Regarding the ways of entering,
the Consolidation act rules that it is possible enter in Italy only through two chan-
nels: visa system and for payroll employment, which can also be seasonal. Under this
legislation, it is possible to enter Italy only though two channels: either an entry visa
or a quota system for paid employment (including seasonal work). A foreign national
who enters the country with an entry visa and wants to extend their stay beyond nine-
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ty days must apply for a The persons that want to extend their stay to more than 90
days must apply for a permit to stay. Residence permit.In the case of permit for work-
ing reasons, it states that the permit shall be issued only after the work contract has
been stipulated. A residence permit for work reasons may be granted only after an
employment contract has been entered into. This rule has considerably worsened the
living conditions of immigrants, as we will see below.In this way, the permit to stay
is tied to having a work contract and to the length of the period of employment.The
second legal channel of entering is for payroll employment. The second channel of
regular entry is based on a quota system, based on the estimated need for foreign
labour. Setting quotas usually aims at severely limiting the (legal) entry channels for
new immigration ﬂows. Therefore, available options for entering the country
legally are characterised by increasingly restrictive measures. Finally, the adoption
of a quota system for regulating the entry of immigrant workers has never been suﬃ-
cient to make up for the lack of other legal entry channels.
The Basic mechaNisms FoR iNTeGRaTiNG iRReGulaR immiGRaNTs 
iNTo The laBouR maRkeT
Work gives irregular immigrants (just like anyone else, for that matter) not only in-
come opportunities, but also the possibility to build relationships and socialise in host
societies. Interactions and relationships in the work place make it easier to learn val-
ues, rules, habits and behaviour.The interactions and relationships within the work-
ing environment favour the learning and the incorporation of values, norms,
habits and behaviours. This socialisation process at work helps immigrants devel-
op a This process of socialization on the work place helps to develop a new social iden-
tity for undocumented immigrants in terms of desire to camouflage in the new so-
cial environment. new social identity that makes them blend into the new social en-
vironment. Additionally, being employed and carrying out a working activity leads
the undocumented immigrants to a recognition of a precise position and role with-
in the economic system by the host society. Having a job gives irregular immigrants
the recognition of having a place within the economic system of the host society.This
identification removes the stigma of clandestinity and move undocumented immi-
grants to a level of normality. The identification with their role and this admission
of usefulness remove the stigma of being irregular and bring immigrants to a level
of normalcy: they can thus be considered just like other workers.The working di-
mension as a fundamental and favourable element of immigration on behalf of the
Italian legislation is particularly evident in the law n. The emphasis on the work di-
mension as a fundamental and positive element of immigration is common to all im-
migration countries and all migration history. This is a good starting point of the pro-
cess of recognising the immigrant as a person. 
In Italian legislation, however, immigration is reduced to the work dimension
alone. First, it aims to link the admission of immigrants to the actual demand for for-
eign labour through a quota system. In Italy, entry for economic reasons is allowed
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only if the person has an employment contract. Furthermore, the stay is linked to
employment status. In particular, we refer to Law No. 189/2002 that introduces the
legal ﬁgure of the “contract to stay for employment”.189/2002, introducing the le-
gal instrument of the “residence contract for paid employment”.This kind of permit
consists of a employment contract between an employer and an immigrant employee.
Basically, this kind of permit consists in a work contract between an Italian employer
or a foreign employer who stays in Italy legally, and a non-EU employee. In partic-
ular, Article5 comma 3, states that the permit to stay for working reasons is issued
following the signing of the “contract to stay for employment” and the length is the
one stated in the contract itself. 5(3) establishes that a residence permit for work rea-
sons is issued following the signature of a “residence contract for paid employment”,
and its duration is the same as that indicated in the contract. Consequently, the the
permit to stay and employment contract are closely linked. residence permit and the
work contract are closely tied. One cannot have one without the other. Within this
regulatory framework, irregular immigrants may only have irregular work.The table
1 shows the volume of irregular jobs, particularly for undocumented immigrants.
For “irregular” we mean the work not complying with existing legislation about tax
and social security contributions, thus they are unobservable directly from compa-
nies, institutions and administrative sources.”Irregular” work refers to work in which
existing tax and social security legislation is not complied with. We cannot therefore
gather information on these workers from companies, institutions, or administra-
tive sources. There are three diﬀerent kinds of iThe irregular work includes three dif-
ferent types of job performance: of irregular residents (that is persons employed both
Italians and foreigners enrolled in the Municipal Population Registers); of multiple
positions (that is working activities as secondary activities carried out by both res-
idents and non-residents); of non resident and undocumented foreigners who, as
such, are not visible to the tax authorities.rregular work. Irregular work may be car-
ried out by regular residents (that is, Italian and foreign employees who are regis-
tered in the population registry). Moreover, there may be “multiple positions” (that
is, secondary working activities) held by residents and non-residents. Finally, irregular
work may be carried out by irregular non-resident foreign nationals who, as such,
are not visible to the revenue authorities. Within the volume of irregular work record-
ed in Italy over the past decade, immigrants account for the smallest share (ISTAT
2010; 2016). Their weight over non regular work units moves therefore from 22%
in 2001 to almost 13% in 200Their weight on irregular work units went down from
22 per cent in 2001 to almost 13 per cent in 2014.This indicates that there was a re-
duction in the incidence of undocumented immigrants in the informal sector of the
Italian labour market. In the last decade, a marked increase has been recorded in reg-
ular immigrants’ employment, partly due to the 2002 In sum, during recent years,
we have registered a strong growth in immigrant regular occupation, part of which
coming from the latter regularisation in favour of irregular immigrant workers.reg-
ularisation, which was meant exclusively for immigrants with irregular employment
relationships. Once again, data conﬁrms that most immigrant workers in Once more
again, the data conﬁrm that most of immigrant workers present in Italy have known
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irregular situations with respect to presence and employment status before passing
to the legality in all respects.Italy experienced illegal situations, in terms of their im-
migration and employment status, before acquiring a legal status in all respects. 
Available data from Through the available data of regularization programs and
those provided by some speciﬁc surveys, it is to possible to detect that undocumented
immigrants workers are mainly concentrated in the agriculture, domestic, and con-
struction sector, as showed by Anastasia, Bragato, Rasera (2004); Zucchetti (2004);
Conti, Strozza (2006); Ambrosini (2013).regularisation programmes and some spe-
ciﬁc surveys suggests that irregular immigrants are mainly employed in the agri-
cultural, domestic and building sectors, as indicated by Anastasia, Bragato, Rasera
(2004); Zucchetti (2004), Conti, Strozza (2006), Chiuri, Coniglio, Ferri (2007), Am-
brosini (2013).The agricultural, building and sole traders are the traditional work-
ing activities of entering into Italian labour market for immigrants. Agriculture and
construction are the traditional sectors in which immigrants enter the Italian labour
market, as pointed out in the ﬁrst surveys on this phenomenon (Calvanese, Pugliese
1990).This relative facility is due to the characteristics of labour demand in these
sectors. This is essentially due to the features of labour demand in these production
sectors. First, there are only a few requirements to enter these sectors, which do not
usually include being in the country legally. Second, working activities in these eco-
nomic sectors require limited skills. Therefore, Additionally, the typical working ac-
tivities of these economic sectors need limited skills. an immigrant who has just ar-
rived and does not speak Italian can work at a construction site or in a farm as a labour-
er. When immigrants learn the language and basic skills at work, they are more like-
ly to move to better jobs. This work mobility takes place both within the same sec-
tor or between diﬀerent sectors, and is often related to geographical mobilitySo, even
a newly arrived immigrant who does not speak Italian can make the labourer on a
construction site or he can work in a farm.This labour mobility that can be both in-
tra-sectoral and intersectoral and it has often matched with geographical mobility,
that is the working improvement also involves a shift from south to north Italy, as
shown by Ambrosini (2001).. Irregular immigrant workers generally ﬁnd themselves
in working situations that range from something almost similar to regular employ-
ment (in terms of wages, working hours, and tasks), toUndocumented immigrants
generally have an intermediate working situation between that of irregular work in
which the wage conditions, working time and pace of work are not very dissimilar
from those of legal work, and that of severely exploited labour. seriously exploita-
tive employment (characterised by job insecurity, lack of a job description, and hav-
ing to live in the working place). This entails no distinction between life and work,
and an employment relationship in which the employer has greater decision-mak-
ing power on working conditions. Irregular immigrants who experience a great deal
of social isolation run a signiﬁcant risk of slipping into seriously exploitative work
conditions. The rebalancing of market forces for undocumented immigrants requires
a process of de-reiﬁcation of their labour. This implies giving them access to the wel-
fare system.
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The PossiBiliTies, limiTaTioNs aNd BaRRieRs. 
availaBle RiGhTs aNd leGal sTaTus
We mentioned above that the change in legal status brings about an improvement
in the living conditions of immigrants.The most important change concerns the pos-
sibility to access to a wider area of entitlements. In particular, it gives them the pos-
sibility to access a wider area of rights and social services. Acquiring a regular legal
status is the gateway to becoming eligible for the welfare benefits that are provid-
ed for immigrants, even though eligibility is mediated by integration policies. The
part of the Consolidated Act on Immigration that regulates immigrants’ rights and
that identifies integration policies is contained in Articles 34 to 46. All regular im-
migrants in Italy with permits to stay will benefit from social policies. Moreover, un-
der Article 2(1), a foreign national at the border or on Italian soil is afforded the fun-
damental human rights provided for in domestic law, international conventions in
force, and the generally recognised principles of international law. Consequently, ur-
gent hospital or other medical treatment is also available for foreigners without per-
mits to stay, as is the right to compulsory schooling for foreign minors who are, in
any case, living in Italy. As a consequence, foreign nationals who live in Italy illegally
are entitled to emergency care (treatments that cannot be delayed without risks to
life or health).They also have the right to essential treatment (treatment for condi-
tions that are not immediately dangerous but which could, over time, cause greater
damage to health or death), and to continued treatment (complete treatment and
rehabilitation programmes).Health facilities are forbidden to report the presence of
illegal immigrants requesting treatment to the police authorities in order not to dis-
courage access to care. In addition, hospitals are not allowed to report the presence
of irregular immigrants requesting treatment to police authorities in order not to dis-
courage access to health care. The same applies to the school education of foreign
minors, and the additional benefits that are intrinsically part of the right to educa-
tion. Foreign minors and their parents, in fact, should not be asked for a residence
permit, and they should not be reported, not even indirectly, to the police and/or
to law enforcement authorities. Hence, Italian legislation on immigration guaran-
tees a set of fundamental rights to foreigners present in Italy who do not comply with
entry and stay rules. Access to social inclusion programmes is instead provided only
for third country nationals who prove that they comply with regulations governing
their stay in Italy. 
In the last decade, the number of immigrants receiving welfare services in Italy
has been gradually increasing. However, this seems to be due to the increase in the
resident foreign population and its stabilization, rather than to the implementation
of more social services for immigrant citizens. Between 2003 and 2012, according
to the ISTAT survey on Interventions and Social Services of Individual and Groups of
Municipalities, the average per capita spending for foreigners dropped from 67 eu-
ros a year in 2003 to about 46 euros in 2012 (ISTAT 2015: 10). From both a legislative
and implementation viewpoint, this does not mean that no eﬀort was made to gen-
erate an adequate supply of services for immigrants. However, such eﬀort proved to
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be insuﬃcient because of its inherent limitations and the numerous obstacles en-
countered during its implementation, in particular a substantial funding reduction.
In an essentially unchanged legislative and institutional framework, the imple-
mentation deﬁcit was therefore remarkable (Morris 2002; Pugliese 2006).
As to the intrinsic limitations, in Italy, the statements of principle established by
the Consolidated Act on Immigration reﬂect a “situation where services are subject
to an often complex classiﬁcation of one’s legal status, in which rights diﬀer according
to the legal status of a person: regular with a residence permit, regular with a resi-
dence document, stable regular, asylum seeker, refugee, irregular, illegal immigrant”
(Spinelli 2005; 87). Based on this ranking in the exercise of citizenship rights in Italy,
an analytical scheme can be proposed for identifying the mechanisms of inclusion
of the immigrant population in Italy’s welfare state. Here, we refer to the concept
of civic stratiﬁcation as proposed by Lydia Morris (1997) for immigration analysis
and subsequently applied to Italy (2002). Morris applied the term to the construc-
tion of varied immigration statuses with diﬀerential access to civil, economic, and
social rights, depending on the mode of entry, residence, and employment. 
mechaNisms FoR iNcludiNG iRReGulaR immiGRaNTs iN iTaly’s welFaRe sysTem
Analysis of the relationship between immigrants and the social services provided by
welfare systems has traditionally focused on the economic consequences of the use
of the latter by immigrants (Simon 1989). However, the findings of such a large num-
ber of studies do not establish unequivocally if immigrants are net contributors or
if they consume more than natives (Borjas 1999; Isbister 1996; Nannestad 2007;
Palivos 2009). Too many factors influence the relationship between immigrants and
the use of services in order to identify a single pattern; among these, mention should
be made of the length of their stay in the host country (Borjas 2001 p. 106).
In recent years, social research has paid more attention to the processes of in-
clusion of immigrants in welfare systems (Baldwin-Edwards 2004; Bommes, Ged-
des 2000, Koopmans 2010; Sciortino 2004; Sainsbury 2006; Zincone 2009). With-
in the framework of such research, analytical eﬀorts focused on irregular immigrants
are far less common (Bommes, Sciortino 2011; Liu, 2010; Van der Leun 2003). How-
ever, the literature seems to move within a merely economic perspective, as explained
above, or within a political analysis of the issue; in other words, access to the wel-
fare system by immigrants seems to be regarded as an “immigration policy regime”
(Faist, 1995) deﬁned as the set of rules governing immigrants’ inclusion in or exclusion
from the host society. This approach appears to be insuﬃcient for the purposes of
this paper. While it is undoubtedly true that the rules governing immigration have
a signiﬁcant impact on immigrants’ access to social rights, it is necessary to include
the various forms of migration that are associated with speciﬁc rights, having an im-
pact on immigrants' access to citizenship rights (Morris 2002: 19). Finally, other than
considering integration policies for immigrants as such, we should also take into ac-
count the social policies that aﬀect immigrants, just as any other citizen, as Hammar
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(1985) put it. In other words, we should consider both direct and indirect policies. 
Generally speaking, access to the welfare state for immigrants with an irregu-
lar legal status is very limited. Even when their access to basic health care, for ex-
ample, is provided as a fundamental human right, the national implementing reg-
ulations are often in conﬂict with the humanitarian rules established by international
treaties (Biswas, Toebes, Hjern, Ascher, Norredam 2012). By any measure, irregu-
lar immigrants make a very modest use of basic social services in Italy (Devillano-
va 2008), even when they are aware that such services are available (Amaturo, de
Filippo, Strozza, 2010). Some have observed that the Consolidated Act on Immigration
grants all foreigners on national territory, even those without a residence permit,
a core of fundamental rights provided for the human person under international con-
ventions in force and the generally acknowledged principles of international law, such
as the right to health and the right to free compulsory education for all foreign mi-
nors (Biondi Dal Monte, 2013). Similarly, based on the ratiﬁcation of internation-
al treaties, Article 18 of the Consolidated Act on Immigration provides for a residence
permit for the social protection of victims of human traﬃcking. This rule identiﬁes
a number of mechanisms for inclusion in the Italian welfare state of irregular im-
migrants who are victims of human traﬃcking, allowing them to access social ser-
vices and work. Thanks to Decree-Law No. 300 of 2006, Article 18 extends its va-
lidity and becomes a positive expression of the State’s duty to provide care, protec-
tion, and social inclusion for irregular immigrants who could be exposed to a seri-
ous and imminent danger due to their statements to judicial authorities. In addition,
this rule contains a reference to situations of “severe exploitation” that would allow
its application to cases of severe labour exploitation even when they are not
speciﬁcally related to traﬃcking. The combination of these two legislative provisions
opens the possibility of enforcing Article 18 upon irregular immigrant workers, too.
In particular, it might cover undocumented immigrant workers, who are extreme-
ly vulnerable and are exposed to severe forms of labour exploitation undermining
human dignity and physical survival.
These ﬁrst two mechanisms of social inclusion, however, stem from recognition
of the fundamental rights of immigrants. These can be identiﬁed under one gener-
al umbrella, namely a humanitarian one, in which the recognition of rights is based
on the simple condition of human being. At any rate, we can identify other social in-
clusion mechanisms that arise from the status of worker of irregular immigrants.
The Consolidated Act on Immigration, Article 2, establishes the principle of equal
treatment between foreign and Italian workers. This principle implies that the same
labour law and social protection mechanisms guaranteed to Italian workers are ap-
plicable to foreign workers. Nevertheless, this does not prevent labour law entitle-
ments from being applicable to immigrants without a residence permit or in possession
of an expired residence permit. Any employee is entitled to be paid for and protected
as established by an important provision contained in Article 2126 of the Civil Code,
which applies also to the employment of immigrants without permission. This pro-
vision recognizes the employee’s right to receive a salary and any other beneﬁts un-
der the employment contract, thereby protecting the rights arising from the work
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done. This ruling, issued after illegal immigration was sanctioned as a crime, is ex-
tremely important. According to the Supreme Court, the payment of contributions
is a consequence of the obligation to pay a salary, and such an obligation is valid even
if a foreign employee is unlawfully present in the country.
The above reasoning results from a joint reading of Article 2126 of the Civil Code
and Article 22 of the Consolidated Act on Immigration. In addition, this obligation
extends to accident, disability, and occupational disease insurance. Therefore, the
status of worker gives irregular immigrants an entitlement to the rights associated
with such status, giving them a special place in the Italian welfare system.
The rights arising from this inclusion are associated with the immigrant’s eco-
nomic function in the host society. In other words, integration into the labour mar-
ket attributes an economic position to irregular immigrants; it gives them a status
and a role, albeit purely economic, legitimizing their presence. However, this posi-
tion is particularly vulnerable for immigrants because it does not amount to legal recog-
nition.  Until a few years ago, there was no warranty with respect to deportation, even
when an irregular immigrant was awarded a case in a labour court. This helps ex-
plain the low number of court appeals by immigrant workers. The inclusion of irregular
immigrants in the Italian welfare system, achieved through their integration into the
labour market, mainly results from a signiﬁcant economic beneﬁt to the host coun-
try. At the same time, it gives immigrants the dignity attached to being a worker or
an employee: in a nutshell, the social legitimacy of their presence. The launch and
implementation of regularisation programmes for irregular immigrants were explicitly
based on these considerations. The widespread perception of a growing number of
illegally employed foreigners led to enactment of the ﬁrst signiﬁcant regularisation
measure, implemented in accordance with the provisions contained in the ﬁrst leg-
islative text on the entry, stay and employment of immigrants (Law 943 of 1986 and
subsequent amendments). Later, more regularisation measures were promoted and
introduced (Bonifazi, Heins, Strozza, Vitiello 2009 p. 24). The main objective of such
programmes was to regularise illegally employed foreigners. Even when the regu-
larisation measure was aimed at disclosing the actual number of foreigners present
in Italy without a residence permit, as in 1990, workers accounted for the majority
of regularised immigrants. The regularisation associated with Law No. 189 of 2002
was the largest measure ever adopted in a European country to correct the status of
irregular foreign workers.  The number of regularised persons is even more remarkable,
considering that the eligibility requirements were more restrictive than in any pre-
vious measure. Regularisation programmes can be considered as the main mecha-
nism for including irregular immigrants in the Italian welfare system, through the
granting of a residence permit. Likewise, the quota system for selecting entries, as
a substitute for regularisation, can be considered as a mechanism for the inclusion
of irregular immigrants in the Italian welfare system.
The quota system as a mechanism to let new foreign workers enter Italy was es-
tablished by Law No. 943 of 1986. This mechanism soon turned out to be too restrictive
to manage migration ﬂows eﬀectively. No type of quotas for new entries was established
until 1995. This system had its peak with two decrees on migration ﬂows, both is-
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sued in 2006; they allowed regular immigration for work reasons to 600,000 ap-
plicants. Right from the outset, employers, trade unions, associations, and foreign
workers considered the quota mechanism as an opportunity for regularising irreg-
ular immigrants. Indeed, the majority of workers included in such quotas did not come
from abroad, but were already living in Italy, and employers were the ones who used
such a  system the most in order to regularise their foreign employees. Hence, even
if the annual programming of migration ﬂows through quotas established by spe-
cial decrees was intended for the entry of new arrivals, these provisions have actu-
ally operated as regularisations. As a consequence, a proportion of irregular immi-
grants have settled their legal status through the quota system. In this respect, so far
Italy seems to have experienced a situation similar to that of northern European coun-
tries in the Fordist era of migration, when the labour market demand was so high
that quite a considerable proportion of foreign workers who had entered outside the
regular channels was subsequently regularised (Lemaitre 2003). Actually, Italian im-
migration policies create a system in which the possibility of having a legal residence
is closely linked to the availability of a job rather than to the existence of channels
for legal entry. In this system of entry characterised by insuﬃcient and uncertain con-
ditions to acquire a “regular” status, the transient state of “irregularity” and/or “il-
legality” is likely to continue indeﬁnitely, generating a progressive existential inse-
curity for those immigrants who have entered the country illegally.
FRom “camouFlaGe” To emaNciPaTioN ThRouGh woRk. 
The RecoGNiTioN oF iRReGulaR immiGRaNTs
If we agree that emancipation is the act of allowing a person to take on responsibilities
and freedoms originally precluded, then by emancipation we mean the act of set-
ting free an immigrant from the control mechanisms of immigration policies and the
taking on of the responsibilities and freedoms of a citizen. Thus, emancipation is the
integration process of irregular immigrants into the citizenship rights system.
As regards the processes of inclusion in the Italian welfare state, it is possible
to identify three mechanisms for the inclusion of irregular immigrants. First, they
are granted access to basic social services such as health care and compulsory school-
ing. In this case, access to Italian welfare is based on a recognition of their funda-
mental rights. This mechanism of inclusion can be deﬁned as a humanitarian one.
Granting a residence permit on the grounds of social protection, through the pro-
cedures laid down in Article 18, can be compared to this mechanism. Second, irregular
immigrants have access to social security beneﬁts, provided that they have a job. In
addition to their salary, they are entitled to social security contributions, unemployment
beneﬁts, and accident insurance. This second mechanism is related to integration
into the labour market, to workers’ rights, and to the immigrants’ ability to demon-
strate their worker status.
The irregular status of an undocumented immigrant does not allow any further
progress in integration into the Italian welfare system. This is due to the complex in-
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terplay between Italy’s immigration policy and social policies. In actuality, access to
social services is ﬁltered out through a strict ranking of the legal status of immigrants,
with irregular immigrants ranking at the lowest level. Therefore, the combined ac-
tion of these two mechanisms of inclusion in the Italian welfare state limits irregu-
lar immigrants’ access to basic social beneﬁts. Moreover, the second mechanism prac-
tically operates ex post only; in other words, social security rights and wages are guar-
anteed only when irregular immigrants are able to get rid of the condition of sub-
ordination linked to the particular nature of their legal status. Their emancipation
is allowed only by the possibility of regularising their legal status.
Regularisation is the third mechanism of inclusion in the Italian welfare system
for irregular immigrants. Having a residence permit allows an immigrant, who is no
longer irregular, to move up the civic stratiﬁcation ladder built by immigration poli-
cies. From this point of view, the quota entry system may be considered as a surro-
gate of the regularisation programme and, ultimately, as a mechanism to include ir-
regular immigrants in the Italian welfare state. These latter mechanisms are eﬀec-
tive only if the irregular immigrant is a worker.
All the above mechanisms start with the recognition and evaluation of immigrants’
integration into the labour market. If an irregular immigrant retains the status of work-
er on an on-going basis and such status can be veriﬁed for a period of time, they have
the opportunity to extend their rights through a residence permit that is granted to
them. In short, irregular immigrants who have worked for a certain period and have
been socially classiﬁed as workers are allowed to apply for a residence permit and
move forward along the path of integration into Italian society. At this point, it is pos-
sible to theorise a hypothetical path for irregular immigrants, towards their full in-
clusion in the system of citizenship rights, in which the recognition of their integration
into the labour market represents a real turning point, that is, a diﬀerent direction
in the life of irregular immigrants. The shift to the status of recognized worker gen-
erates a change in their role and expectations, and in the deﬁnition of their situa-
tion, contributing to the recognition of irregular immigrants. During this stage, recog-
nition is seen as a social esteem, namely “recognition of individual performance, the
value of which is measured by the extent to which it is perceived as signiﬁcant by a
society” (Honneth, 2002, p. 136). This gives rise to self-esteem (that is, a mutual es-
teem), or acknowledging other people’s skills since they are deemed to be valuable
for collective life. The institutional framework within which the process of social recog-
nition of irregular immigrants is shaped characterizes the immigrant as a person
“whose sole reason for existence is work and whose presence is not regular, autho-
rised, and legitimate unless they work” (Sayad, 1999: 82).
Italian institutions grant legal recognition to irregular immigrants after assess-
ing existing shortages and the demand (economic, demographic, and social) they
can meet. In this respect, regularised former irregular immigrants have represent-
ed a most eﬀective, eﬃcient, and practical response to the shortages caused by the
demographic, social, and economic changes that have occurred in Italy. The social
dimension of recognition is added, therefore, to the legal one. Speciﬁcally, legal recog-
nition is “a relationship in which the parties respect each other as legal subjects, be-
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cause they both have a common understanding of the social norms governing the
legitimate allocation of their rights and duties within the community” (Honneth, 2002:
133). In addition, when someone feels legally recognised, “the subject tends to act
freely because he or she knows that their actions are legally recognised and respected
by the other members: in such an environment, the subject gains self-respect” (Hon-
neth, 2002, p. 144).
Legal recognition confers equal dignity; it therefore precedes the process of eman-
cipation of irregular immigrants. On the part of immigrants, recognition encourages
them to learn and adopt the “normal” behaviours of Italians, and to gain their ac-
ceptance. Therefore, during this stage, the recognition strategy can be deﬁned as a
camouﬂage, and it is pursued in order to experience the phase of being irregular with-
out being perceived as such. By means of camouﬂage, immigrants blend in with Ital-
ians, adopting their behaviours, lifestyle, and social practices. As in Edgar Allan Poe’s
story The Purloined Letter, the best way to hide an object is to put it in plain sight;
similarly, camouﬂage is the best way to go unnoticed. Camouﬂage works like train-
ing; in other words, at this stage irregular immigrants are recognised by Italian so-
ciety, while they get accustomed to it.
Now, it may happen that the juridical recognition of irregular immigrants is used
by the State as a control mechanism for better managing those who enter and those
who are inside its territory, rather than as a means of social inclusion. In this case,
it is more about the legalisation of the relationship between the Italian State and the
irregular immigrant than legal recognition. Such legalisation is meant as a legal frame-
work aimed at irregular immigrants, through a proliferation of repressive and con-
trol measures - think of the so-called ‘security package’. Hence, it is rather a denial
of the legal recognition of irregular immigrants. The lack of legal recognition, or le-
gal mis-recognition, ends up having a negative impact on the self-esteem of irreg-
ular immigrants, which they had previously gained in the positive process of social
recognition. As unrecognised members of the community under the law, irregular
immigrants realise they have a high chance of losing their social esteem and they in-
troject a feeling of inferiority.
The segregation of immigrants into a legal status with no certainty of rights en-
tails a loss of dignity as workers; even worse, the working segregation into degrad-
ed and degrading tasks contributes to the loss of self-esteem and to social isolation.
In extreme cases of severely exploitative labour, this process of marginalization as
a result of mis-recognition can lead irregular migrants to their reiﬁcation, intend-
ed as a forgetfulness of recognition (Honneth, 2007: 55). According to Honneth, reiﬁ-
cation is the process by which in our knowledge of other people and the knowledge
of ourselves we lose awareness of how both of them are in debt to a previous disposition
at participation and recognition (Honneth, 2007: 55). The core of each instance of
reiﬁcation thus consists in a forgetfulness of recognition, and its social causes are to
be sought in practices or mechanisms that systematically enable or strengthen such
forgetfulness. One can take a reifying attitude toward other individuals for two ba-
sic reasons: either because one is tied by a social practice where the observation of
others takes place just for the sake of it, leading to the denial of any awareness of a
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previous social relationship, or when people’s actions are driven by a belief system
that causes them to deny the original recognition. It is evident, therefore, that the
legal recognition of irregular immigrants through regularisation of their legal sta-
tus is the main tool both to let them access citizenship rights and to reverse the in-
feriority process they may be victims of.
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PoPulaTioN movemeNTs aNd demoGRaPhic TReNds iN xxi ceNTuRy
Decades between XX and XXI has been characterized by deep transformations at glob-
al level, that produced several repercussions on international migration processes.
From the political point of view, for example, the end of decolonization and real so-
cialism – which gave rise to new States and, in some cases, to the outbreak of con-
flicts, especially on ethnic grounds - as well as the increased free movement of per-
sons in regional contexts such as Europe, played a propulsive function on migration
flows. On the economic side, instead, the globalization process, whose most evident
effects are the progressive markets integration and the growing international divi-
sion of labor, is affecting the demand and supply of labor, including foreigners. As
a matter of fact, in the international labor market can be observed a strong labor mo-
bility, both qualified and unskilled, aiming at filling employment gaps in destination
countries.
In this regard, international demographic trends are fundamental, particularly
when diﬀerences in population growth rates between advanced and developing ar-
eas are taken into account. A large number of industrialized countries is experiencing
a “demographic deﬁcit”, meaning an increasing share of older persons (65 years old
and over) interacting with a fertility rates reduction33 (Giordano, 2015). By contrast,
emerging and developing countries are facing positive demographic trends, as ob-
served in the working age population, which between 1995-2015 grew by 45%, while
more developed countries achieved a 5.6% increase (United Nations, 2016).
aFRicaN aNd asiaN miGRaTioN iN iTaly: 
FeaTuRes, Flows aNd RouTes
aNToNieTTa PaGaNo aNd GiusePPe TeRRaNova32
32. Although this article is the result of the authors’ shared ideas, the following paragraph is at-
tributable to Antonietta Pagano: ‘‘Population movements and demographic trends in XXI cen-
tury’’ and “The migration of Asian origin in Italy: features and flows”, while the paragraph
‘‘The migration of African origin in Italy: features, flows and routes’’ is attributable to Giuseppe
Terranova. Conclusions can be considered the work of both authors.
33. The replacement fertility rate is 2.1 children per family, however many societies are experi-
encing far lower levels, such as the European Union (where the fertility rate is equal to 1.5)
and in Japan (1.4) (World Bank, 2016b).
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International migration is, therefore, a useful tool for rebalancing international la-
bor markets, especially in reality such as the Italian one, where without foreigners
there would be a contraction in local population (ISTAT, 2011), with severe conse-
quent at economic and welfare level. For example, during the Nineties, despite the
745,000 foreigners, Italian workforce decreased, on the contrary between 2001-2011
with 2.1 million migrants it grew by 0.12% (Bonifazi, 2013).
Beside to unbalance into the labor market, many advanced economies are suﬀering
from high old-age dependency ratio, which rose from 16.6% in 1975 to 26% in 2015
(World Bank, 2016a), although some countries stood around 32%, as Finland Ger-
many, or even beyond 34% as in Italy (ISTAT, 2016a), in other words three work-
ing age people for every person aged 65 or over.
The Italian migration scenario is quite complex, however for the purpose of this
paper, it can be divided in two groups: the ﬁrst arrived during the Eighties and Nineties
with the ﬁrst immigration waves and currently are well established and have a bal-
anced gender composition; the second one correspond to the recent migration ﬂow
and, therefore, has a strong gender polarization.
The miGRaTioN oF asiaN oRiGiN iN iTaly: FeaTuRes aNd Flows
The Italian geography of non-European migration has some well-defined charac-
teristics, with a minimal prevalence of Africans (31%), followed by Europeans (29.3%)
and, finally, Asians (29%) (ISTAT, 2016a).
In last ten years, Asian migratory trend has been particularly active considering
the average annual growth rate of 10%, in the same period Bangladeshi group dis-
tinguished with a 16% average annual growth, compared with the 13% of China,
Philippines and India (ISTAT, 2016a).
The majority (almost 96%) of the Asian community in Italy comes from Central,
Southern and Eastern Asia, among which emerge migrants from China (29.27%),
India (14.85%), Philippines (14.65%), Bangladesh (12.48%) and Pakistan (10.77%)
(ISTAT, 2016b). 
TaB. 1 - woRkiNG aGe PoPulaTioN (ThousaNds)34
yeaR woRld PoPulaTioN
sum oF woRkiNG 
aGe PoPulaTioN
wold moRe develoPed
less 
develoPed
1975 4,061,399 2,336,316 681,181 1,655,135
1995 5,735,123 3,537,108 782,038 2,755,069
2015 7,349,472 4,825,484 825,886 3,999,599
Source: United Nations, 2016
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Currently is not possible to identify a sort of homogeneity within this group, as
it results quite diverse, especially on gender composition. China, the Philippines, Sri
Lanka and Iran have a balanced structure in terms of female and male community;
while Bangladesh, Pakistan and Afghanistan present a strong male polarization, as
well Georgians that, instead, gave a wide share of female migrants. Such a diﬀerence
is due to segmentation in the labor market, as well as, the distinctive migration pat-
terns of each community. As a matter of fact, Philippines – one of the ﬁrst non-EU
groups to settle, as a result of migratory networks and religious factors as well – and
Chinese currently have a family based migration system; while the remaining groups
are characterized by a strong labor specialization, which is one of the explanation
for the diﬀerences in their internal composition.
Graph. 1 – Breakdown of main Asian communities by gender (2016). Source: ISTAT, 2016
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According to 2014 data concerning the employees of the nine considered national-
ities, the majority works in the tertiary and industrial sectors (65%), followed by the
house and family care sector (27%) and, finally, just 7% in the agricultural sector.
More than two-thirds of domestic workers are Filipino and Sri Lankan (respective-
ly 55% and 21%), however, the Georgians, who in this area represent a small per-
centage, are concentrated for 90% in the household service. A similar specialization
characterizes the Indian community but in the agricultural sector, where they rep-
resent 76% of employed workforce from the nine analyzed nationalities. This two
information can help in understanding the gender polarization characterizing the
Georgian and Indian migration scheme in Italy (INPS, 2016).
The industrial sector is the least representative35, unlike the service sector where
the majority of Asian workforce is employed. Except for house service, in the tertiary
works 91% of Sri Lankan, more than two-thirds of Chinese and Bangladeshi, more
than half of Pakistanis and 35.5% of Indians, with a strong specialization in the re-
ceptive, hotel and restaurant areas, as well as, in trade. In this latter sector, more-
over, ethnic entrepreneurship is particularly dynamic, especially in Chinese,
Bangladeshi and Pakistani communities (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche So-
ciali, 2015b). In relation to 2014 non-European enterprises is interesting to note that
most of Asian ones ranked among the top ten countries. Indeed, Chinese companies
were second, followed by Bangladesh (fourth), Pakistani (none) and ﬁnally, the In-
dian (twelfth) (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali, 2015a).
Migrant contribution to Italian economy is, therefore, signiﬁcant, although Asian
community represents only 1.9% of resident population. However, inﬂow is increasing
over the years, despite the negative economic trends. Not only the numbers are grow-
ing, but most importantly, former communities are becoming permanent, as proven
by the increasing visas released for long permanence (at the expense of short-term
ones). In this regard, family reuniﬁcation and study visas are rising as well (ISTAT,
2016b).
35. In 2014 Pakistani, Indian and Chinese employed workforce represented respectively 43.2%,
32.5% and 28% of each ethnic group (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali, 2015). 
TaB. 2a – shoRT-TeRm visa vaRiaTioN (2012-2016)
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
BaNGladesh -4% 5% 16% 12% -3%
chiNa -10% 10% 3% 0% -6%
PhiliPPiNes 2% 0% 1% -1% -8%
iNdia -10% 1% 8% 3% -5%
PakisTaN -16% 10% 14% 19% 7%
sRi laNka -5% 1% 4% 0% -3%
Source: ISTAT, 2016
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Family and study visas have been the main tools to access regularly in Italy, but re-
cently have increased the number of requests for political asylum, especially from
Pakistani and Bangladeshi migrants36 (in 2015 this latter has more than doubled). 
In addition, several are the Asian migrants trying to enter irregularly in Italy. Un-
fortunately, the system lacks of reliable and detailed information. According to Fron-
tex (2016), three are the main Asian migratory routes. Some of them arrives through
the Eastern borders of the Schengen area - trying to cross the Baltic or Scandinavia
countries, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The second route is the Eastern Mediter-
ranean, once arrived in Turkey, migrants attempt to arrive in Greece, Balkan coun-
tries or Apulia. The third one is the Western Balkan routes, particularly used by Afghan
and Pakistani which, rather than staying in Greece, prefer to achieve the Balkans,
cross non-Schengen countries, such as Macedonia and Serbia, and get as fast as pos-
sible in Hungary and Croatia. However, these countries represent just a transit route
fundamental to access to Western Europe.
The miGRaTioN oF aFRicaN oRiGiN iN iTaly: FeaTuRes, Flows aNd RouTes
Among the top ten countries hosting the largest number of refugees in the world,
five are African: Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Chad and the Democratic Republic of Con-
go. The last mentioned is on the top of the world ranking of the countries that in ac-
cordance with the size of the national economy shelter more refugees: 471 for each
dollar of the GDP per capita measured at purchasing power parity (UNHCR,
2016). If we pass from forced migration to voluntary migration we notice that in 2015,
36. Besides from political and religious issues, is increasing the number of migrants escaping from
Southern Asia, especially Bangladesh, due to environmental crisis and hazards. Although the
environmental refugee status has not been receipted under the International Law, this type
of emergency might help understanding the growing exodus from Asia. (Giordano, Pagano,
2013). 
TaB. 2B – loNG-TeRm visa vaRiaTioN (2012-2016)
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
BaNGladesh 11% 8% 10% 6% 8%
chiNa 27% 9% 10% 9% 10%
PhiliPPiNes 25% 8% 8% 5% 5%
iNdia 17% 6% 5% 5% 8%
PakisTaN 14% 8% 5% 2% 5%
sRi laNka 21% 7% 7% 5% 7%
Source: ISTAT, 2016
128 aFRicaN aNd asiaN miGRaTioN iN iTaly: FeaTuRes, Flows aNd RouTes
244 million global migrants came mostly from 10 countries, none of which are African.
The preferred destination of 75% of the original immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa
is still Sub-Saharan Africa. Only 25% actually decide to leave their homeland to move
out of boundaries of Africa (OECD-AFD, 2015).
Perhaps, these numbers are useful to analyze with greater scientiﬁc clarity the
migration routes, the data and the composition of African immigration to Europe,
and Italy in particular.
According to Frontex (which since October 6, 2016 has been replaced with a man-
date and wider powers of the European Border and Coast Guard), there are eight
“highways” trodden by illegal immigrants and asylum seekers to reach the Old World
(Frontex, 2016). Three following ways are connecting Africa to Europe across the
Mediterranean.
The ﬁrst, Western Mediterranean Route: a route between Morocco and Spain,
separated by 14km of sea in the Strait of Gibraltar. This route, together with the Span-
ish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on Moroccan territory, has been for a long time,
the subject of a strong migratory pressure. This route has been utilized much less
by migrants in recent years for at least two reasons: eﬃciency of Madrid-Rabat bi-
lateral agreements against illegal immigration and geopolitical revolution of the
Maghreb as a result of the Arab Spring that from the point of view of human traﬃckers
has left Libya without the most desirable Government of Morocco (where, on the con-
trary to the Gaddaﬁ regime, the monarchy of Mohammed VI has withstood the shocks
to the popular movements) as the point of departure of their “clients”. For these rea-
sons, only 6,090 migrants have taken this path in the ﬁrst nine months of 2016 – most-
ly coming from Guinea (1,403), Ivory Coast (1,137) and Algeria (909).
The second, Central Mediterranean Route: the most direct route from Libya and
Tunisia to Malta and Italy, an area of 400 km that has never been trodden so much
in the history of modern international migration. In 2014, 170,760 migrants have
arrived by this route – 153,946 throughout 2015 and 127,599 in the ﬁrst nine months
of 2016.
The third, Eastern Mediterranean Route. The Turkey-Greece route, a maritime
border of about ten kilometers, which after recording the transit of 50,830 migrants
in 2014, 2015 marked a record of 885,386 people and in the ﬁrst 9 months of 2016
has stopped at 172,982 migrants. This drastic fall compared with the previous year
is justiﬁed by the achievement of an agreement between the EU and Turkey. In March
2016, Brussels agreed to pay Ankara with a guarantee of more strict controls of the
border with Syria and an additional responsibility of the reception of Syrian asylum
seekers from Athens (Terranova, 2016).
If it is true that the western route, thanks to the political stability of Morocco and
the partnership with Spain, has little traﬃc; the eastern route is even less likely to
be a successful journey because of the euro-Turkish agreement; for the potential African
migrants – and especially for the crime that manages the traﬃc – the Central Mediter-
ranean Route is not only the last option, but the preferable one. Because it is quite
evident, the fact that Libya is the “plaque tournante de l'émigration dans le Nord de
l’Afrique” (Melki, 2016). It is now a transit land, which until a few years ago was, in
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fact, a welcoming destination for signiﬁcant migration ﬂows. In the second half of
the ’90s, Muammar Gaddaﬁ, in the name of his Pan-Africanism (Terranova, 2010),
had promoted an open-door policy towards economic migrants from Sub-Saharan
Africa, primarily Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, to be used in the rich and proliﬁc oil sec-
tor. A scenario that had changed radically and permanently in October 2011 with
the fall of the Colonel, his regime and 42 years of absolute power. Since that time,
Libya has progressively transformed into a free zone for international human traﬃckers
and a springboard for African population movements towards the European
fortress, through the Italian door.
We must ask what are the main migratory routes from southern-central Africa
that lead in the former kingdom of Gaddaﬁ? We will try to answer this question be-
fore to dwell on the composition and the main nationalities of the newcomers to Italy.
Comparing information that is already known (Reitano, 2014) with those that
have emerged from a recent study presented in Rome on September 13, 2016 by the
organization “Medici per i Diritti Umani” (MEDU), it is possible to trace ﬁve migratory
routes from the African continent that lead to our country. Of all that are crossing
the Sahara, many of them pass by the “Carrefour d'Agadez” (Denninger, 2015), a
town in the heart of Niger, before arriving in Libyan territory.
The ﬁrst migration route is Western-West route that is used only by a minor amount
of the candidates for immigration from Western and Central Africa. After reaching
important transit cities in Mali (Gao) and Nigeria (Agadez), they move to Algeria
passing through Tamanrasset. The next step in Libya is going through the towns of
Deb Deb and Ghadames near the border that unites Algeria, Tunisia and Libya.
The second is Western-East route that is among the most trodden by candidates
from Senegal, Gambia, Guinea, Ivory Coast. The people begin the ﬁrst part of their
journey from the motherland in Bamako, Mali, and travel directly east, crossing
through Ouagadougou to reach Niger. An alternative route goes from Bamako to Gao
in Mali, and then to Niamey in Niger. It must be said, that many Nigerians prefer to
reach the Niger through Kano, while Cameroonians cross Chad to reach Madama
in Niger. In the end all come together in Niger, mostly in Agadez, from where a part
of the journey in the desert called “the road to hell” begins, leading to Sabah in the
heart of Libya. Here migrants are waiting to be transferred in the major ports of de-
parture, ﬁrst Zuwara, not far from Tripoli.
The third is Eastern-Center route: in order to follow it, a part of future migrants
from the Horn of Africa chooses to reach Libya through Sudan and Chad.
The fourth is Eastern-Center route: The most widely travelled route by immigrants
and asylum seekers from the Horn of Africa. Migrants along this route arrive in the
Libyan oasis in Kufra via Khartoum, Sudan from Kassal, Sudan or the refugee camp
of Shagrab, Sudan or Mai Aini, Ethiopia. There is also a shorter path from the Sudanese
city of Dongola instead of Khartoum that allows migrants to reach Kufra or the Libyan
city of Al Uweinat. In any case, once they arrive on Libyan territory, the majority of
migrants wait to be transferred to the North, to Ajdabiya. From there, a minority try
to sail towards Italy through the port of Benghazi in the North-East but the majority
continue their journey through the ports of Zuwara and Sabratha (west of Tripoli).
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The ﬁfth is East-East route and is the least use route for EU immigration candi-
dates. To follow it, a small residual minority of migrants from the Horn of Africa that
arrive in Kharthoum instead of taking the more common routes through Libya, opt
going to Egypt through Aswan, and Cairo is the chosen location to embark from the
port of Alexandria to Italy. This is the longest and the most dangerous route across
water that lasts for an average of 8-10 days of sailing.
Regardless of the route, the country of origin, and the destination country, mi-
grants from sub-Saharan Africa, with rare exceptions, have to deal with the racket
of traﬃckers. It is they, who dictate the time, the route, and of course the costs of a
journey. A journey paved with unforeseen, abuses of power and countless violations
of basic human rights.
To prove that this network of international criminals is successful in their en-
terprises, it is appropriate to recall that in 2015 over one million men, women and
children crossed the Mediterranean (mainly using routes deﬁned in this paper as Cen-
tral and Eastern Mediterranean Route) into southern Europe. Staggering ﬁgures such
as these have never been recorded. In 2014, there were around 216 thousand peo-
ple, 2013 brought around 60 thousand, and in 2012 there were only around 22 thou-
sand who decided to make the dangerous journey from Africa to Europe across the
Mediterranean.
Looking closely at the number of newcomers in 2015 we see that 885,386 of them
have come through Turkey to Greece. Among these, 90% of people came from three
countries: Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq. The geographic provenance of migrants is
completely diﬀerent in Italy, in fact, approximately 153,946 migrants landed in the
same year in Italy: Eritrea (26%), Nigeria (14%), Somalia (8%), Sudan, Gambia, Syr-
ia (just 7,500 people), Mali and Senegal (F. Colombo, 2015). Summing up, Greece
received a major proportion of potential asylum seekers from three major interna-
tional wars of recent years. Italy has more complex and diverse African audience,
which is composed of candidates with refugee status or humanitarian protection sta-
tus, but also includes illegal immigrants. A panorama of newcomers, almost exclu-
sively Africans, is also conﬁrmed by data analysis of the ﬁrst nine months of 2016.
Out of more than 127,000 arrivals in 2016, 15% are from Nigeria, 10% from Gam-
bia, 9% from Somalia, 8% from Guinea, Eritrea and Ivory Coast, the remaining 58%
originate from Senegal and Mali. Numbers like these only certify an extraordinary
humanitarian commitment of Italy in the reception of African migrants. Moreover,
in 2015 the number of permits for asylum and humanitarian protection submitted
in Italy has come to represent 28.2% of new entries (compared to 19.3% in 2014 and
7.5% in 2013), 43.8% of which are given to citizens of Nigeria, Pakistan and Gam-
bia (ISTAT, 2016). Providing analysis of the types of residence permits given by Italy,
there is a decisive and progressive increase in forced migration and, at the same time,
decrease in the voluntary migration caused by economic reasons. According to the
latest ISTAT ﬁgures we ﬁnd that in 2015, in comparison with the previous year, the
number of residence permits for work decreased by 35,312 (-62%). Among the to-
tal number of residence permits granted for diﬀerent reasons, those for reasons of
work have gone down to 9% compared with 23% in 2014. 
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At this point, a clariﬁcation is obligatory. The decline of economic immigration
to Italy in favor of humanitarian immigration has prompted some observers to a dif-
ferent interpretation of the facts. In their view, many economic migrants, therefore
illegal, have used, with the decisive role of international human traﬃckers, the gen-
eral atmosphere of emergency and welcoming of Syrian refugees as a “Trojan horse”
to get into Europe, but especially in Italy, asking for asylum or humanitarian protection.
This idea is conﬁrmed further by the fact that even after signing the agreement be-
tween Turkey and Greece last spring, a majority of Syrians still not prefer the Cen-
tral Mediterranean Route. As we have seen, especially in the last three years, citi-
zens of African states with diﬀerent levels of political and social stability keep com-
ing to Italy and not always aim to justify the recognition of refugee status (or hu-
manitarian protection status) in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 1951.
In any case, if we stick to the oﬃcial data of the Ministry of Interior in Italy, it is
possible to argue that there is a revolution in the composition of migration ﬂows to
Italy (the more sub-Saharan Africans, the more asylum and humanitarian protec-
tion seekers). As a consequence, it intends to alter the composition of the stock of
immigrants in Italy in the medium to longer term. Until a short time ago was noticed
a predominance of economic immigrants from African community, consisted of a dis-
tinct presence of individuals from Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia, not sub-Saharan Africa.
Out of 3,931,133 non-EU citizens resident in Italy on January 1, 2016 (ISTAT, 2016),
the largest community37 with over half a million admissions is, in fact, Moroccan. Ar-
rived since the second half of the ‘70s of the last century in the South Italy, today they
are geographically concentrated (approximately 70%) in the North, concentrated
mostly in Lombardia. Most are employed in retail trade sectors (many are hawkers),
industry, construction and agriculture. The unemployment rate is close to 30%
(www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it, 2016), also due to the fact that the participation
of Moroccan women in the Italian labor market is very low. Their incidence among
employed is just 22%, almost twenty percentage points less than ﬁgures recorded
on average between foreigners employed in Italy (40%).
The second largest African community in Italy with more than 140 thousand vis-
itors is Egyptian. Even more than the Moroccan community, it is geographically con-
centrated in the regions of Northern Italy (80%), mostly located in Lombardy. Three
out of four Egyptian workers are employed in the tertiary sector. A feature of this com-
munity is the high employment in the hotel and restaurant industry, where 33.4%
of the Egyptian labor is occupied, against an average of 10% among the non-EU for-
eigners residing in Italy. Among Egyptian workers, contrary to the Moroccans, the
unemployment rate, according to the latest available data, went down from 22% in
2013 to 19.4% in 2014, the lowest value among all other African migrants . Note that
from 2008 to 2015, the number of Egyptian citizens that are legally residing in Italy
has doubled from 70,000 to more than 140,000 that are today in Italy. A boom that
37 To this number should be added 1.5 million of EU citizens (more than a million are Roma-
nians). 
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may be at least partly explained by the fact that, contrary to Morocco, Egypt, as re-
sult of the fall of Mubarak's regime due to the Arab Spring, is in a complex phase of
political instability that prompted a part (also residual) of the population to leave
their homeland.
In third place, ﬁnally we ﬁnd the Tunisian community with about 120 thousand
members. Compared to other foreign communities, Tunisian Maghreb in particular,
recorded one of the most homogeneous geographical distribution on the peninsu-
la. That proof the fact, if it’s true that about 61% of this community is living in the
North and is equitably distributed between Emilia-Romagna and Lombardy here is
a signiﬁcant presence in the South, peaking at 13% in Sicily, where the ﬁrst gener-
ations settled since 1972. Many have found employment in the ﬁshery sector, especially
in Mazara del Vallo. Today, on the national level, the primary sector for job place-
ment of Tunisian Workers is industry, with an incidence of 42% against 28% of the
same sector of the whole non-EU labor’s market. In particular, 23% of Tunisian work-
ers are employed in the construction sector, while 19% are employed in industry in
particular. The unemployment rate is actually around 24%.
coNclusioN
Italy within few decades has turned into an important immigration country, due to
the synergy produced by several national and international factors – i.e. aging so-
ciety, mismatch in the labor market, refugee crisis – but currently appears unprepared
to wisely manage recent immigration phenomena. Considering the Italian structural
difficulties, immigration can represent an opportunity to rebalance both the de-
mographical and economic system, particularly in a long run perspective. To this end,
Italy should implement policies aiming at valorizing and promoting the integration
of migrant communities, not only with regard to economic migrants but asylum seek-
ers too, as in most cases these are skilled foreigners that can actively contribute to
the economic development of the receiving country (Pagano, 2016). Therefore, au-
thorities should focus on how to benefit from migration flow rather than prevent-
ing it, especially when comparing the Italian scenario with other European countries.
For example, while foreigners in Italy represent 9.7% of total population, Germany,
Austria and Belgium has larger migrant communities (respectively 14.9%, 17.5%
and 12.3%) (World Bank, 2016c). A discrepancy confirmed by the refugee issue as
well, since Italy is far from having the numbers characterizing the other UE mem-
ber States (Giordano, 2015), for example, Italy registers an average of 1.9 refugees
per thousand inhabitants, against 3.9 in Germany, 4.1 in France, 5.2 in Holland, 8.4
in Austria and 17.4 in Sweden.
Asylum seekers represent one of the biggest challenge for Italian authorities, as
is the only country in EU that lacks a ordinary law on asylum. A political and legal
anomaly that among its few contraindications it has also spoiled terms, manner and
quality of the refugee reception system in our country and even the geography and
the distribution of centers for refugees on national territory.
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A vacatio legis that is more diﬃcult to understand and justify because it repre-
sents a failure to implement the art. 10, paragraph 3, of the Italian Constitution, which
since 1948 declaim: “A foreigner who is denied the eﬀective exercise of the demo-
cratic liberties guaranteed by the Italian Constitution in his or her own country has
the right of asylum in the territory of the Italian Republic, in accordance with the
conditions established by law” (Senato della Repubblica, 2016) . That statute has
never been approved and is the original sin of Italy's asylum policies –  perhaps not
the only one. However, one sins leads to another; in 1954, because of ratiﬁcation
of the Geneva Convention on refugee status, Italy invokes so-called geographical reser-
vation. It should guarantee refugee status in accordance with the guidelines of the
Convention, but only for women, children and men of European origin, excluding
those of the other continents. It gives the right of reception to a limited range of sub-
jects, like those who many years ago were escaping the communist regimes of the
Soviet Union. This narrow ﬁlter has been in force for almost forty years until 1990
when it was abolished by law n. 39/1990, better known as Martelli, named after the
Vice-President of the Council. He was the one who signed and promoted the ﬁrst
regulation about the migratory phenomenon in Italy. It had the merit of overcom-
ing the principle of “geographical limitation”, but the failure of this law comes from
not implementing article 10 paragraph 3 of the Constitution on the right of asylum.
So today, operating conditions depend on myriad of legal provisions and decisions
of courts.
Legislative chaos has begun, with the suddenness and violence of an earthquake.
In 2011, following years of international emergencies, beginning with Albanian and
then Yugoslavian refugees, then with the explosion of the Arab Spring, Italy becomes
a permanent land of asylum and immigration. For example, it is enough to remember
that only in that year the number of asylum requests in Italy had reached 38 thou-
sand. That is a threefold increase of the annual average of 13,000 that was record-
ed in the previous twenty years. Italy turned out to be unprepared to this revolution
of geography and migration of asylum seekers on a global level. That is happening
for a reason of a regulatory and domestic policy deﬁcit in Italy that is enlarged with
similar deﬁcits of other EU’s countries. The EU in this particular and delicate inter-
national situation had stimulated movements of population but was not been able
to regulate them (Giordano, 2015) because of nationalistic impulses that some EU’s
states have (Bolaﬃ, Terranova, 2014).
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